Problems of Communism

MARCH-APRIL 1987

Socialist Internationalism

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CEMA/WTO Military Economics

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Cover: At the June 1986 meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee, from left to right: Todor Zhivkov, Nicolae Ceauşescu, Gustáv Husák, Mikhail Gorbachev, János Kádár, Wojciech Jaruzelski, and Erich Honecker. Photo by Interfoto MTI via Eastfoto.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Socialist Internationalism in Eastern Europe

Karen Dawisha and Jonathan Valdez

A major principle cementing the Soviet–East European alliance is socialist internationalism. In the past this principle meant in essence that the East Europeans followed Soviet policy initiatives and emulated the Soviet model of socialism. While this interpretation is presumably no longer applicable today, the fact that the Soviet leadership itself has not yet agreed what the doctrine means leaves the East Europeans wondering whether the "limited sovereignty" aspect of socialist internationalism applies as much today as it did under Leonid Brezhnev.

Warsaw Pact/CEMA Military-Economic Trends

Michael Checinski

A number of objective factors seem to be affording the East European states modestly increased influence in the making of defense-industrial decisions within the bloc. The revolution in arms technology, shifts in Warsaw Pact doctrine, and the growing economic importance of arms transfers—gratis and for hard currency—has increased the stakes of Eastern Europe in military-economic issues and also afforded them greater room for maneuver. Arms control agreements and a further shift toward technological competition with the West could lend impetus to this trend.

Electoral "Choice" in the Soviet Bloc

Werner Hahn

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has recently announced a landmark program for the "democratization" of the Soviet electoral system. The most striking of his proposals is the call for a choice of candidates and secret balloting in party elections, for nominations of more than one candidate in elections to the soviets, and for elections rather than appointments of factory directors and other economic officials. Gorbachev's proposals—though radical for the Soviet Union—are not unprecedented for communist states and, in fact, appear patterned on practices in other communist countries, most notably, Poland and Hungary.

Notes

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1986

Richard F. Staar

During 1986, a number of communist parties experienced changes in leadership through retirement, death, coup, or factional maneuver. In party-ruled states, membership continued to increase; elsewhere both membership in and electoral support for nonruling communist parties generally seemed on the decline. This account of developments in the "world communist movement" as defined by Moscow is published in conjunction with the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Stanford, CA)

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Communist Fronts in 1986

Wallace Spaulding

Analysis of the leadership, organization, attendance at coordinating meetings, and public activities of a variety of international organizations justifies their designation as fronts for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—existing to unite communists with persons of other political persuasions in order to support, and thereby lend strength and respectability to, Soviet foreign policy objectives. During 1986, the fronts continued to stress nuclear disarmament, but seemed to place somewhat reduced attention on the US Strategic Defense Initiative in favor of opposition to nuclear testing.

Essay Reviews

Western Images of the Warsaw Pact

Robin Alison Remington

The last decade has witnessed growing interest in the Warsaw Treaty Organization on the part of Western governments, which has led to the publication of a spate of books on this previously neglected subject. The US government, in particular, became interested in the question of the reliability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union of the East European forces in a war with NATO. Much of the literature published so far has attempted to address this question. An equally important but still somewhat neglected topic is how the Warsaw Pact functions as an alliance. In considering this question, it is important to keep in mind that all members of the Warsaw Pact are political actors in several arenas—the national, intra-bloc, intra-communist, and international. In recent years, national politics have increasingly impinged on the East Europeans' behavior in the alliance. By now there is sufficient evidence on this development to allow for serious cross-system comparisons of coalition politics in the Warsaw Pact.

Pathologies of Central Planning

Bartłomiej Kamiński

Despite the fact that the rates of economic growth of the Soviet and East European members of the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) are respectable by international standards, there is strong evidence that these economies are losing their momentum. Although several recent studies on the CEMA economies tend to view the situation more optimistically, extrapolation of past economic trends and their impact on these economies indicates that a crisis situation is in the making. At its root lies the incompatibility of the domestic structures of these countries, which are based on administrative centralized state control, with the imperatives of the contemporary world economy.

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Socialist Internationalism in Eastern Europe

Karen Dawisha and Jonathan Valdez

The vitriolic polemics that the principle of proletarian or socialist internationalism can generate between the Soviet Union and its East European allies are symptomatic of the many unresolved questions in this often troubled relationship.[1] These range from disagreement on the practical meaning of socialist internationalism to uncertainty over how much loyalty the Soviet Union under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev is going to demand to the principle. According to the traditional definition, socialist internationalism has in essence meant loyalty to Soviet policy initiatives and the Soviet model of socialism. The most succinct—and all-encompassing—Soviet definition of socialist internationalism came after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, when the concept was said to embody the "doctrine of limited sovereignty" or the "Brezhnev doctrine," as it became known in the West. The official Soviet statement pointed out that "every communist party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all socialist countries" and that "the sovereignty of individual socialist countries cannot be counterposed to the interests of world socialism and the world revolutionary movement."[2]

Socialist internationalism is not the only theoretical issue in dispute between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that is relevant to the formulation of actual policy. Other and related issues are the role of small states in bridging the gap between the superpowers; defense burden-sharing within the Warsaw Pact; and the delicate balance between economic performance and political reform. But the focus of this article will be on the extent to which the Brezhnev doctrine continues to influence relations among East European states in the first era of thoroughgoing Soviet reform attempts since the doctrine's imposition.

Karen Dawisha is a Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland (College Park) and author of the forthcoming book, Between East and West: The Challenge of Eastern Europe, *from which portions of this article are drawn. Jonathan Valdez, a doctoral candidate at the University of Maryland (College Park), is conducting research on Soviet–East European ideological debates.*

The Soviet Debate

After coming to power in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev called several times for building intra-bloc relations on a new basis.[3] On the whole, he has shied away from using the term socialist internationalism. One notable exception came on the occasion of the renewal of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in April 1985,[4] when he reaffirmed the validity of socialist internationalism as the basis for Warsaw Pact cooperation. Using this reference by Gorbachev as a cue for airing his own more traditional views, the first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee Department for Liaison with Ruling Workers and Communist Parties (DLRWCP), Oleg Rakhmanin, published an article under the pseudonym of O. Vladimirov. In the the strongest and most coherent attack on

[1] "Socialist" and "proletarian" internationalism are often used interchangeably in the Soviet vocabulary. The former is a more recent version, usually used to describe relations between socialist states. "Proletarian" internationalism on the other hand, is used more frequently when referring to non-ruling communist parties. However, it is also used, typically by those of more hard-line opinion, to describe relations between ruling communist parties. The hybrid term "proletarian socialist internationalism" has, if infrequently, also been used in recent articles. This article will assume the terms to be basically similar in meaning and will use the term socialist internationalism throughout, except in quotations.

[2] *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 26, 1968.

[3] See, e.g., Gorbachev's promise to make the improvement of intra-bloc relations his "first commandment." *Pravda*, Mar. 12, 1985.

[4] Ibid., Apr. 27, 1985.

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Mikhail Gorbachev, center, head of the Soviet delegation, signs the "Protocol on Extension of the Term of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, signed in Warsaw on May 14, 1955," at ceremonies in Warsaw on April 26, 1985.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

the Soviet reformist position to date, he stated:

Anticommunist theoreticians and opportunists, slandering proletarian internationalism, declare it to be "outdated," try to pose as trailblazers of some new kind of "unity".[5]

In upholding a "hard-line" interpretation of socialist internationalism, Rakhmanin set himself against a growing number of high-ranking Soviet and East European theoreticians who were indeed posing as "trailblazers of some new kind of 'unity'."[6] At the other end from Rakhmanin on the Soviet spectrum of opinion was Yuriy S. Novopashin, a section head at the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System. Novopashin warned that there was "no magic wand" that could dispose of "national egoism" on the one hand or of "great-power ambitions" on the other.[7] He noted that, far from dying out, "national and state interests" of individual socialist states were increasingly being expressed and were often "contradictory." As a result, even though socialist states were by no means equal, each deserved to be treated as equal. This would involve renouncing "domineering" methods, "great-power ambitions," and "hegemonistic pretentions." Finally, Novopashin adamantly rejected unspecified "attempts" by theorists and practitioners alike—including, obviously, Rakhmanin—"to define the essence of socialist internationalism in terms of subordination or to suggest, for example, that,

[5]O. Vladimirov in ibid., June 21, 1985. Vladimirov is generally considered to be the pseudonym of Oleg Rakhmanin.

[6]The "trailblazers" include such personages as Georgiy Shakhnazarov, another deputy head of the DLRWCP; Ivan Frolov, the new editor of *Kommunist*; Oleg Bogomolov, head of the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System; and Anatoliy Butenko and Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, who, along with Novopashin, have headed sections of that institute. Soviet political commentators Aleksandr Bovin and Nikolay Shishlin, both of whom have served as consultants to Gorbachev, also should be included in this group. For a detailed discussion of this and earlier debates, see Ernst Kux, "Contradictions in Soviet Socialism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1984; and Karen Dawisha, "Gorbachev and Eastern Europe: A New Challenge for the West," *World Policy Journal* (New York), Spring 1986.

[7]Yu. S. Novopashin, "Political Relations of Socialist Countries," *Rabochiy Klass i Sovremennyy Mir* (Moscow), September-October 1985, pp. 55–65.

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where the socialist countries are concerned, the principle of respect for national sovereignty could be subordinated to some higher principle governing their relations—namely that of unity."

This Soviet debate not only left its mark on the proceedings and documents of the 27th CPSU Congress but also reverberated throughout Eastern Europe. Thus, when General Secretary Gorbachev told Congress delegates that "radical reform is necessary,"[8] it did not matter that he was talking about reforming the Soviet Union and not relations with Eastern Europe. The East European leaders present at the Congress understood that this simple sentence also had enormous implications for the future development of their own countries. Similarly, when the first secretary of the Moscow city party committee, Boris Yeltsin, asked rhetorically: "Why have we not managed to uproot bureaucratism, social injustice, and abuse from our lives over so many years,"[9] the East Europeans knew they were witnessing a truly historic Congress.

In effect, by opening a debate in the Soviet Union about radical reform, the Soviets—whether they meant to or not—gave a green light to similar debates and experiments throughout Eastern Europe. For the East Europeans, Gorbachev's statement meant that he was admitting what some of them had been saying for years, namely, that parts of the classic model of Soviet economic development introduced under Stalin were inappropriate for sustaining growth and shifting to an intensive high-technology stage of development.

The impression of a historic shift in Soviet thinking was supported also by what Gorbachev said—and did not say—directly about Eastern Europe and the socialist commonwealth in the course of his Congress speech. First of all, absent was any mention of the principle of socialist (or proletarian) internationalism, or any euphemism for the same doctrine. Instead, Gorbachev specifically emphasized "unconditional respect in international practice for the right of every people to choose the paths and forms of its development." In what appeared as almost a mea culpa for past Soviet practices, Gorbachev stated that "unity has nothing in common with uniformity, with a hierarchy." Instead, he emphasized the need to "solve problems . . . avert crisis situations . . . and find mutually acceptable solutions to even the most difficult problems."

However, there are several indications that Gorbachev's own prescription was resisted by powerful quarters inside the CPSU Central Committee. The new version of the CPSU Program approved at the Congress, which replaced the more utopian Khrushchevite 1961 version, contained an extremely circumspect assessment of the parameters of reform in Eastern Europe.[10] The differences between the Program and Gorbachev's speech were marked in some instances, raising the prospect that Gorbachev was conceptually out in front of the more conservative Central Committee bureaucracy—with potentially disastrous effects for his plans for both domestic and foreign policy. The Party Program made reference to the principles underlying international relations between socialist countries. But instead of repeating Gorbachev's formula about "unconditional respect," it stated that the "foundation" of intra-bloc relations is "mutual assistance in resolving the tasks of the building and defense of the new society"—an unmistakable euphemism for the Brezhnev doctrine.

Resistance to Gorbachev's ideas was also suggested by the fact that the section on Eastern Europe in the final version of the Program was more hard-line than the published draft of the Program.[11] The final version described "the building of relations with the other fraternal countries on the basis of the principles of socialist internationalism" as being among the "most important factors" underlying the "successful onward movement" of socialism, language not found in the draft. Nevertheless, the term socialist internationalism was left totally without definition, appearing to confirm publicly what had been told privately to Western scholars visiting Moscow—that the whole issue of intra-bloc relations and reform in Eastern Europe had proven "too controversial" for detailed enunciation during the Congress.

Thus, the major pronouncements made at the Congress left the parameters of permissible political reform and national autonomy in Eastern Europe undefined. Also unanswered was the question whether the Brezhnev doctrine had survived Brezhnev. It was therefore incumbent on the East Europeans to interpret the results of the Congress and subsequent policy moves by Moscow correctly, for failure to do so could have nothing but negative—or even catastrophic—results.

The East European Response

In Eastern Europe, there appeared to be as many opponents of Gorbachev's "radical reform" as there were supporters. Many in the Czechoslovak leadership, for example, obviously indicated in their evaluations of the CPSU Congress that while "their camp" had not entirely

[8] *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1986.
[9] Moscow Television in Russian, Feb. 26, 1986, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Mar. 3, 1986, p. O/1.
[10] *Pravda*, Mar. 7, 1986.
[11] Ibid., Oct. 26, 1985.

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won the day in the debates at the Congress, neither had the Gorbachev line been so unequivocal and so unchallengeable as to foreclose the possibility of continuing along a conservative road in Prague. Moreover, judging by the speeches at the 17th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCz), held in late March, it would appear that the Czechoslovak leadership had decided that the real watchword was not "radical reform" but "economic performance": provided the economy was fulfilling the tasks assigned to it, reform, and particularly political reform, could be avoided entirely.

Thus, while the speech of Secretary General Gustáv Husák to the CPCz Congress did echo Gorbachev in calling for a "drive for acceleration, for scientific and technological progress, for structural changes, and for a substantial improvement of planning," and admitted that "subjectivism" and "stagnation" had crept into the system, Husák was on balance very upbeat about Czechoslovakia's prospects. He maintained, for example, that "Czechoslovakia is entering upon the latter half of the 1980's as a consolidated, politically strong, and economically and socially developed state whose people have high living and cultural standards." No such praise was forthcoming from Husák about the Soviet Union.[12]

The acknowledgment by at least some in the Soviet leadership of the essential correctness of the Czechoslovak position was shown by the publication in prominent Soviet theoretical journals of precisely those in the Czechoslovak leadership who expressed the least desire for reform. In an article published in the CPSU journal *Kommunist* in July 1986, for example, CPCz Presidium member and First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party Jozef Lenárt made no mention at all of the decision, taken at the 17th Congress and subsequently reaffirmed by Secretary General Husák, to phase in economic reforms throughout Czechoslovakia on a trial basis prior to their full-scale introduction after 1990.[13] Similarly, Miloš Jakeš, another Presidium member and Central Committee secretary, was published in the Russian-language edition of *World Marxist Review* in the summer of 1986. Jakeš quoted the Czechoslovak Congress documents as calling only for a continuation of the policy, adopted in 1971, of "constructing developed socialism." He entirely neglected to mention reform, and made but the vaguest obeisance to Gorbachev's concept of economic "acceleration."[14]

Although Lenárt did not propose a different definition of socialist internationalism, the thrust of his argument was obvious. Even as he professed Czechoslovakia's loyalty to the principle, he clearly implied that political support for economic reform would not be without costs to Moscow: "We in Czechoslovakia, a relatively small country, are particularly interested in deepening economic cooperation, primarily with the USSR, because we consider it as the only possible and workable way to hasten intensive economic development. I am confident that, as always, we will in this respect meet with full understanding on the part of Soviet comrades."[15] The audaciousness of the Czechs appeared to be exceeded only by the openness of the Soviets in letting the bargaining strategies that operate in intra-bloc relations come to light.

Romania continued to maintain its distance from Moscow. Scathingly anti-Soviet commentaries continued to appear in the Romanian press following the 27th CPSU Congress. One such article explicitly condemned socialist internationalism and blamed it for a series of "distortions and mystifications" in intra-bloc relations, such as the illusory "monolithic unity" which in fact included only those parties recognizing Moscow as the ruling center, and "the imposition of a certain model . . . as obligatory for all countries." The article made it clear that the origins of these practices lay not in the Brezhnev era but in the 1920's and 1930's when the Moscow-centered Communist International also demanded "monolithic international unity." And it asserted that hegemonic manifestations remain evident to this day.[16]

This blistering condemnation of past and present Soviet practices indicated how unaffected the Romanian position was by the Gorbachev succession. The Soviets, too, seemed not to have altered their own previously negative assessment of Romania. Indeed, they contin-

[12]See "Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to the Seventeenth Congress of the CPCz presented by Gustav Husák, Secretary General of the CPCz," *Information Bulletin* (Prague), Vol. 24, No. 9, pp. 12–20.

[13]Jozef Lenárt, "A Comprehensive Program for Our Development," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 11, July 1986, pp. 76–84, in Joint Publications Research Service, *East Europe Report* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS-EER*), Oct. 7, 1986, pp. 65–75; "Prague Publishes Plan for Reform of Economic System Along Soviet Lines," *Soviet/East European Report* (Washington, DC), Vol. 4, No. 12, Feb. 1, 1987, p. 1.

[14]Miloš Jakeš, "On the Course of Acceleration of Socio-economic Development," *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma* (Moscow), No. 6, June 1986, pp. 3–7, trans. in *JPRS-EER*, Oct. 7, 1986, pp. 56–64. Another Czechoslovak hard-liner published in the same journal was Bohuslav Chňoupek, Central Committee member and Czechoslovakia's foreign minister, who wrote on "The Concept of Peace in the Nuclear Age," *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma*, No. 9, September 1986, pp. 3–8, in *JPRS-EER*, Oct. 23, 1986, pp. 53–63. Chňoupek discusses the necessity of "favorable external conditions for building a developed socialist society" (p. 59), but makes no mention of the role of the experimental Czechoslovak economic reforms in this process. Nor does he support any of the more independent East European stands on arms control.

[15]Lenárt, loc. cit., p. 71.

[16]Ion Chisu, "The RCP Activity for a New Unity in the International Communist and Working-Class Movement," *Steaua* (Bucharest), No. 5, 1986, pp. 4–6, trans. in *JPRS-EER*, Nov. 10, 1986, pp. 107–13.

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ued to provoke the regime of Nicolae Ceauşescu. For example, following the Ceauşescu-Gorbachev meeting during the Congress in Moscow, the official TASS statement on the meeting included the following highly charged and surely inaccurate sentence: "The Soviet and Romanian leaders reaffirmed the unvarying nature of both parties' policy of deepening Soviet-Romanian relations . . . on the principled basis of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism."[17] In fact, the Romanians had long ago ceased to profess their loyalty to socialist internationalism, always using the much more circumspect term "international solidarity," or simply characterizing the bilateral relationship as "traditional relations of friendship, cooperation, and good-neighborliness."[18]

If the Romanians felt impelled to defy adherence to socialist internationalism, the Hungarians showed they were not so easily drawn into this frequently vitriolic and politically costly debate. Instead, Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) Central Committee Secretary Mátyás Szürös, a person of considerable stature within the bloc, wrote an article in which he expressed the Hungarian party's adherence to socialist internationalism. At the same time, he stated that the important thing was not the term itself but rather "what meaning is read into the concept."[19] Citing HSWP General Secretary János Kádár, Szürös emphasized that "there is no universally applicable or binding model of socialism or way to socialism," although "general laws of its building" do exist. These derive from the "considerable body of historical experience [which] has been accumulated in this field," that is, not exclusively from the Soviet experience.

The Hungarian view was consonant with the Polish position. The Poles typically equated socialist internationalism with "the sum total of the experience gained in the struggle for socialism and during the building of socialism." Clearly the Poles felt that the experiences of all the "fraternal countries" had equal validity and served as "sources of experience and useful solutions."[20]

The Bulgarian response to the debate was marked by ambivalence. On the one hand, the party daily continued to print ritualistic praise for all things Soviet, including the 27th Congress: "The Congress confirmed that the CPSU, with its boundless loyalty to the ideals of communism and the interests of the working people, has achieved the right to be the guiding and leading force of society."[21] On the other hand, the Bulgarians also displayed a pronounced uneasiness about the implications of developments in the Soviet Union both for Soviet-Bulgarian relations and for domestic politics in Bulgaria. Reports and editorials gave a more subdued treatment to Gorbachev's personal role than was the case in the rest of the East European press. Bulgarian coverage contained almost no references to Gorbachev himself, and his February 26 speech was simply referred to as the "Report of the Central Committee to the Congress."[22] This would be of little consequence were it not for persistent reports of a rift between the Soviets and the Bulgarians, starting in the mid-1980's and continuing under Gorbachev, over the expressions of a rather virulent official Bulgarian nationalism.

A similar ambivalence could be seen in Bulgarian statements on Bulgaria's economy. On the one hand, they avoided systematic discussion of the need for reform, stressing instead the "scientific and technological revolution." As in some other East European countries, the application of science and technology was presented almost as a panacea that would obviate the need for reform. On the other hand, the Bulgarians gradually did show increased willingness to admit "shortcomings" in their economy, and to call for action. While still falling far short of "real deeds," the party did instigate a debate on changes in the pricing mechanism, although prices for the most part were still to be determined by the central plan. Yet, the "Draft Regulations on Economic Activity" were suddenly withdrawn from public debate in November 1986.[23]

However, by December, those pressing for reform were once again on the offensive. An editorial in *Rabotnichesko delo* called for "drastic change" and warned that "working people will evaluate their leaders not according to their instructions and directives . . . but according to their visible, real deeds."[24] The reformist view appears to have prevailed since Todor Zhivkov himself announced a major set of reforms in May 1987, including a new Labor Code, a Code on Economic Activity, and the establishment of a commercial bank. The implications of the changes appeared to be far-reaching, with Zhivkov stating that "direct self-management must

[17]Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, Feb. 28, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 3, 1986, pp. O/26–27.

[18]"Documents Adopted by the April 1–2, 1986, RCP Central Committee Plenum," *Scînteia* (Bucharest), Apr. 11, 1986, p. 5, *JPRS-EER*, June 9, 1986, pp. 33–39.

[19]Mátyás Szürös, "Promoting Unity," *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), No. 4, April 1986, pp. 31–39.

[20]Anna Pawlowska, "Thought and Deed," *Trybuna Ludu*, (Warsaw), Apr. 22, 1986, in *JPRS-EER*, June 26, 1986, pp. 81–82.

[21]*Rabotnichesko delo* (Sofia), Mar. 8, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-EEU*), Mar. 12, 1986, p. C/1.

[22]See "Revolutionary Strategy of Construction and Peace," *Rabotnichesko delo*, Mar. 8, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 12, 1986, pp. C/1–3.

[23]Radio Free Europe Research (hereafter RFE Research), *Bulgarian Situation Report* (Munich), No. 12, Dec. 30, 1986, pp. 3–6.

[24]"Full Mobilization, Drastic Change in Economy, and in All Spheres of Our Development," *Rabotnichesko delo*, Dec. 15, 1986, p. 1, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 22, 1986, pp. C/4–10.

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be introduced in all fields," and warning that "an enterprise that works badly must go bankrupt."[25]

When it came to evaluating words and deeds, the East Germans appeared initially to share Bulgarian skepticism about the new Soviet leadership. Their reservations about whether Gorbachev could deliver the reforms he promised started immediately after the 27th CPSU Congress when Kurt Hager, secretary for ideology of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), wrote that his party had derived some "important ideas" from the Soviet Congress.[26] Not exactly glowing praise. What was more, the 11th SED Congress unabashedly lauded East Germany's accomplishments under Erich Honecker, without mentioning any similar progress in the Soviet Union. Nor were the East Germans quick to endorse fully the results of the CPSU Congress: in his report to the SED Congress Honecker did not quote Gorbachev even once—a notable omission given not only Gorbachev's presence on the podium, but also Gorbachev's own praise for East Germany's accomplishments.[27] By October, however, Honecker's reservations about the direction of Soviet policy appeared to have lessened: during a visit to Moscow, he said that the Soviet Congress had indeed "initiated a stage of great, revolutionary, creative work."[28]

Implications of Theoretical Debates

The real question, of course, was whether these often esoteric debates had any real meaning when it came to the actual mechanics of bloc management and alliance

[25]*Rabotnichesko delo*, May 1, 1987, *FBIS-EEU*, May 19, 1987, pp. C/5, C/8.

[26]Kurt Hager, "A Turning Point of Historic Significance," *Einheit* (East Berlin), April-May 1986, pp. 304–13, in *JPRS-EER*, June 23, 1986, pp. 33–43.

[27]E. Kautsky, "Gorbachev and the GDR," RFE Research, *Background Report* (Munich), No. 183, Dec. 15, 1986. Also see Walter Süss, "Not a Model for the GDR?—Soviet Reform Efforts as Viewed by the SED," *Deutschland Archiv* (Cologne), September 1986, in *JPRS-EER*, Nov. 7, 1986, p. 78.

[28]East Berlin Television Service, Oct. 3, 1986, *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 7, 1986, pp. F/1–3.

Mikhail Gorbachev listens as Erich Honecker addresses the opening session of the 11th Congress of East Germany's Socialist Unity Party in East Berlin on April 17, 1986.

—ADN-Zentralbild from Eastfoto.

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

Chiefs of the ruling communist parties of the states of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance at the opening of a Moscow working meeting on November 10, 1986. At the table, clockwise from one o'clock are: Wojciech Jaruzelski (Polish United Workers' Party), Nicolae Ceauşescu (Communist Party of Romania), Mikhail Gorbachev (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Gustáv Husák (Czechoslovak Communist Party), Todor Zhivkov (Bulgarian Communist Party), János Kádár (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party), Truong Chinh (Vietnam Communist Party), Erich Honecker (Socialist Unity Party [of the GDR]), Fidel Castro (Cuban Communist Party), and Jambyn Batmonh (Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party).

—TASS from Sovfoto.

relations. They evidently did, since the appearance of two official bloc documents in 1986 and the absence of a third indicated that the Soviets and East Europeans remained far apart on many aspects of their relationship. While Gorbachev's Report to the 27th CPSU Congress and the Party Program represent significant statements of policy, the political communiqués issued by the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) provide more important indicators of Soviet influence in the bloc as a whole after the Soviet Congress.

The Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee meeting in June 1986 was attended by all the top leaders. Held in Budapest, it was an important litmus test of how Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe had developed since the Congress. If anywhere, this was the time and place for a definitive statement on socialist internationalism. After all, the Warsaw Pact is the ultimate guarantor of East European adherence to that doctrine.

Yet, much as in Gorbachev's speech to the CPSU Congress, the communiqué did not mention proletarian or socialist internationalism.[29] On the other hand, neither the Romanian slogan nor "new internationalism" (another term sometimes used) was invoked. The most that could be agreed upon, apparently, was "strengthening the unity and cohesion" of the Pact. Indeed, in what seemed to be a reflection of the Polish and Romanian concept of the "socialist treasury of thought," the Warsaw Pact member-countries "declared for a further expansion of exchanges of experience in socialist construction."

Nor was reference made to any form of internationalism in the communiqué issued by the regular 42nd CEMA session in Bucharest in November 1986.[30] The

[29]"Communiqué of the Conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee," *Pravda*, June 12, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, June 13, 1986, pp. BB/1–12.

[30]"Communiqué of the 42nd Sitting of the CEMA Session," *Pravda*, Nov. 6, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 7, 1986, pp. BB/4–8.

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meeting of CEMA party chiefs several days later also indicated that unanimity on this issue was still a distant prospect. In contrast to the earlier Warsaw Pact and CEMA meetings, this gathering produced no communiqué or general statement of policy at all. Although this may have been simply a manifestation of Gorbachev's "new style," it is more probable that the Soviets and their partners in the bloc simply could not agree on what to say and, therefore, decided that it was best to say nothing. In light of this, the *Pravda* editorial that appeared after the meeting had ended,[31] characterizing relations between the socialist states as developing "on the basis of the principles of proletarian socialist internationalism," could be taken either as wishful thinking or as a veiled warning by remaining Soviet hardliners that ultimately the Soviet Union could still require loyalty to the doctrine.

There is no doubt, however, that as long as the Soviets themselves were divided over the validity of socialist internationalism, the East Europeans felt free to enunciate their own views on this and many other issues. Above all, with the debate on reform in full swing in the Soviet Union, and with Gorbachev issuing blistering attacks on "conservative sentiments, inertia . . . and an unwillingness to come to grips with outstanding socio-economic questions,"[32] the East Europeans felt pressure to do something in their own countries or at least to justify why they were not introducing reforms in the Gorbachev manner.

In the GDR, Erich Honecker felt he could resist pressure to introduce new reforms, partly due to his country's undisputed economic success, and partly because the East Germans believed they had already instituted sufficiently sweeping economic reforms in the 1970's. These reforms saw the creation of "combines" in which factories in related branches of the economy were grouped together and made subordinate to one of the industrial ministries. Each combine is responsible for everything from research and design to foreign trade. Agriculture has been similarly decentralized with the creation of "regional agricultural cooperatives," in which a grain farm and two to three animal farms coordinate production and feed supply among themselves.[33]

Thus, Honecker was able to maintain with considerable justification at the SED Congress that the GDR has evolved into a "politically stable and economically efficient socialist state."[34] The East German leaders, then, took quite literally the assertion—made with increasing frequency by Soviet officials—that a "Soviet model" of socialism no longer existed. They obviously felt that if the GDR were to follow the Soviet model, this would mean the undoing or at least the redirection of reforms that have been on the whole quite successful. As Hans-Dieter Schütt, editor-in-chief of the SED youth organization newspaper *Junge Welt,* so succinctly said in a June 27, 1986, interview with the West German *Die Zeit:* "For me the Soviet Union has claim to historic merit because it defeated Hitler and won the war, but in technology and progress it is no model to us."[35] A less categorical but more authoritative note was sounded when Kurt Hager, the SED secretary for ideology, gave an interview to the West German weekly *Stern*. The East German press reprinted the text, and in addition quoted Hager as saying that "the SED and CPSU have always exchanged their experiences, learning from one another; this, however does not mean copying everything."[36]

This idea of models can work in more ways than one. An article published in a Warsaw daily in mid-July contained a straightforward discussion of the East European countries' reform records.[37] Noting that the GDR had shown the best performance and Hungary the poorest in terms of indicators of economic growth, the author asked whether this meant that the "improved administrative and economic tools employed by the GDR should serve as models for other countries to follow?" He answered his own question by saying that such suggestions were "arrogant nonsense." The GDR's solutions may have been effective in the "disciplined German community [but] they may not necessarily prove to be suitable for, say, Poland." Thus, the debate on models extends beyond the Soviet one and influences relations among the East European states.

Czechoslovakia was in the center of this debate. Here was a country whose leaders in 1968 had believed that the 1965 Kosygin reforms in the Soviet Union had given them a green light to reform, and whose current leaders believed that they had to act as personal guarantors against reform. Even in Prague, however, the winds of change were being felt from the East, and were for the

[31]"Unity, Cohesion," *Pravda,* Nov. 15, 1986, *FBIS-SOV,* Nov. 20, 1986, pp. BB/1–2.

[32]Quoted from Gorbachev's speech to the January 1987 Central Committee Plenum, in *The New York Times,* Jan. 28, 1987.

[33]A. Martynov, "Important Stage in the Life of GDR Communists," *Kommunist,* No. 12, August 1986, p. 100.

[34]"SED Central Committee report to the 11th SED Congress," East Berlin Domestic Service in German, April 17, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV,* Apr. 21, 1986, p. E/17.

[35]On the interview, see RFE Research, *Background Report,* No. 183, Dec. 16, 1986, p. 3.

[36]East Berlin Domestic Service in German, Apr. 9, 1987, *FBIS-EEU,* Apr. 10, 1987, p. E/1.

[37]Piotr Olejnik, "Toward Intensive Economic Development," *Rzeczywistość* (Warsaw), July 20, 1986, p. 9, *JPRS-EER,* Sept. 25, 1986, pp. 34–36.

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

Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion forces in Prague's Wenceslaus Square in August 1968.

—Black Star.

most part being resisted. The Lenárt and Jakeš articles already cited were examples of this resistance. Another such example was an article published in the Czechoslovak Central Committee's weekly by Vasil Bejda, head of the CPCz Central Committee's Agitation and Propaganda Department. The article specifically addressed the topic of reform but in a classic case of doublespeak succeeded in equating it with the discredited Khrushchevite notion of "catching up" with the West.[38] Bejda artfully used the concept of "different paths," originally proclaimed by Nikita Khrushchev as a signal to Eastern Europe that there could be more than one model of socialism, to urge instead that the socialist bloc should not emulate the capitalist countries, because following such a path could only turn out to be retrogressive and "disruptive." This was the lesson learned by Czechoslovakia the hard way in 1968, according to Bejda, when the market mechanisms and other economic reforms that mimic the West were put forward by the Czech economist Ota Šik and served as a catalyst for the Prague Spring.

This is not to say that the current Czechoslovak leadership has no interest whatsoever in reform. Well before the Soviet Party Congress, Secretary General Husák had protested that "we are not afraid of reform."[39] Later, at the Czechoslovak Congress in March 1986, a program of "gradual restructuring of the economic mechanism" was evidently approved.[40] A "comprehen-

[38]Vasil Bejda, "The Line of Accelerating National Development and the Ideological Work of the Party," *Tribuna* (Prague), July 2, 1986, in *JPRS-EER*, Aug. 5, 1986, pp. 55–65.

[39]Husák speech to the Prague municipal party conference, as reported by Radio Prague on Feb. 15, 1986. See RFE Research, *Czechoslovak Situation Report* (Munich), No. 4, Mar. 10, 1986, p. 3.

[40]See Zdeněk Hoffmann, "Significant Experiment," *Rudé právo* (Prague), Dec. 31, 1986, *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 13, 1987, pp. D/2–3.

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sive experiment" would be carried out between 1987 and 1990, and if successful the reforms would be introduced across the board in 1991. These reforms were to include economic accountability for enterprises, reduction of the number of obligatory plan indexes, and the entitlement of each enterprise to use "resources" (profits) as it sees fit. These proposals engendered debate in the leadership between ultra-conservatives like ideology secretary Vasil Bil'ák and more moderate leaders like Prime Minister Lubomír Štrougal. As a result, most Czechoslovak sources described these measures in very circumspect terms, shying away from the word reform, preferring instead to talk about the "perfection" of the economic mechanism—a term popular in the Brezhnev era.[41]

Clearly, the fact that more articles were published in top Soviet theoretical journals by Czechoslovak leaders than by any other East Europeans indicated that many in Moscow approved of their caution. Moreover, in a country as potentially volatile as Czechoslovakia, a cautious approach to reform might serve to prevent another crisis that, once again, could kill the chances for reform in the Soviet Union. This seemed to be the message Gorbachev conveyed during his visit to Czechoslovakia, from April 9 to 11, 1987. While evidently undercutting the political influence of hardliners such as Bil'ák, he nevertheless expressed firm support for the Husák leadership. He made it clear that current Soviet reform efforts had nothing in common with the Prague Spring, declaring at one point that the Czechoslovak leadership had "courageously thought over what happened. You went through a stern school. You drew good conclusions."[42]

An East European nation that showed no intention of following the Soviet Union's lead on reform was Romania. The Ceauşescu regime, notwithstanding its rambunctious foreign policy, continued its very conservative domestic course. In the past, the latter had made the former more palatable in Moscow but, given the almost total mismanagement of the economy by Ceauşescu and Gorbachev's push for reform, it was by no means clear that this situation would continue. The Ceauşescu clan's attempts to perpetuate their personal rule and the fostering of a Ceauşescu cult of personality have disquieted the Soviets as well. In particular, the Soviets are known to be uneasy about the prospect of "Comrade Academician Doctor Engineer" Elena Ceauşescu taking power after her husband.[43]

Statements made by Ceauşescu have demonstrated that there was no impetus whatsoever for Gorbachev-style reforms. For example, speaking at the "harvest day" rally in October 1986, he stated unequivocally that "we have all we need in order to appropriately fulfill the development programs and plans."[44] Ceauşescu's proposed solution to Romania's economic woes was to raise the people's "revolutionary awareness."

At the same time, Ceauşescu announced a unilateral five percent reduction in military expenditures for 1987, and even held a nationwide referendum in November to "consult the people" on this decision. (Not surprisingly, the voter turnout was 99.9 percent, with 100 percent voting in favor.)[45] Ceauşescu asserted that "nearly 50 percent" of the Romanian armed forces had been diverted to economic activity, and even proposed the use of tanks to transport water on cooperative farms, a proposal that, as Ceauşescu later asserted, was being carried out with "very good results"![46] This reduction in defense spending and diversion of resources from the military to the civilian sector appeared to be Ceauşescu's way to economic reform.

The Reykjavik "mini-summit" in October 1986 provided an opportunity for Ceauşescu both to assert his foreign policy independence and to call yet again for a reduction in arms budgets. At Reykjavik, President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev came close to agreement on a comprehensive package that included elimination of all medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe, only to see the negotiations collapse when the Soviets insisted that the US Strategic Defense Initiative be dropped. In a speech to a meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Bucharest on October 16, 1986 (four days after Reykjavik), Ceauşescu displayed continued intransigence by calling for negotiation of an agreement on the removal of nuclear weapons from Europe that, he felt, should not be tied to SDI. When the Soviets failed to respond, Ceauşescu made the same call again at the 42nd CEMA session, and two

[41]In fact, this is exactly how Jakeš described his country's plans in the June 1986 issue of *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma*, the same journal in which Szürös had written on socialist internationalism and models of socialism *one month earlier*. While this may be an example of the Gorbachev drive for *glasnost'*, such juxtapositions undoubtedly also reflect the tensions between those in the bloc who desire reform and those who do not. It is worth remembering that in 1968, prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the East Germans were among the most vocal proponents of military action for fear that the infection of Czechoslovak reforms could spread to East Germany. A similar dialectic may be at work today.

[42]See *Pravda*, Apr. 12, 1987, *FBIS-EEU*, Apr. 15, 1987, p. F/7.

[43]As described in "Documents Adopted by the April 1–2, 1986, RCP Central Committee Plenum—On the Party-State International Activity in 1985 and the Main Foreign Policy Targets in 1986—Abstract," *Scînteia*, Apr. 11, 1986, in *JPRS-EER*, June 9, 1986, p. 36.

[44]Nicolae Ceauşescu, text of speech in *Romania Liberia* (Bucharest), Oct. 20, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 22, 1986, pp. H/1–7.

[45]RFE Research, *Romanian Situation Report* (Munich), No. 13, Nov. 26, 1986, p. 27.

[46]See Ceauşescu speech to May 13, 1987, meeting of bloc Central Committee secretaries in charge of organizational matters, in *Scînteia*, May 14, 1987, *FBIS-EEU*, May 18, 1987, p. AA/6.

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days later at the meeting of the Military Council of the Warsaw Pact.[47]

While the other East European countries have hewed closer to the Soviet arms control position, the East Germans and Hungarians continue to have their own problems with Moscow on other foreign policy issues. The GDR, for example, differed in minor but significant ways with the USSR over its policy toward Bonn. For more than a decade the USSR had seen the advantages of inter-German relations primarily, although not exclusively, in economic terms. The same was not true of the East Germans, who viewed the relationship in a much wider political context. Although Erich Honecker undoubtedly had stressed the economic benefits of the inter-German relationship to justify those links to Moscow, the Soviets had serious reservations about the end purposes of these evolving contacts. Of particular concern was East German insistence that its foreign policy conduct rested on two pillars, namely, that East Germany is both a socialist state allied to the USSR and a Central European state, even a German state, with rights and responsibilities in the heartland of Europe. From the East German perspective, these rights and responsibilities include the maintenance of an inter-European détente independent of the US-Soviet relationship.

After the 27th CPSU Congress, the debate about this specific aspect of the Soviet-East European relationship abated in intensity. Beyond a renewed awareness of "European" interests and consciousness, the most notable contribution on the role of small states in maintaining détente was another article by Hungary's Szürös, who had played a major part in this debate prior to the Soviet Congress. Adapted from a speech given in Finland in May 1986, this article stressed the interdependence of the European states, and the special importance of the process inaugurated in Helsinki in 1975, when the agreement establishing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed.[48]

Szürös also maintained that détente could only be reestablished in Europe with the participation of the United States. This was the exact opposite view from that found in an article published in a Slovak party daily almost simultaneously.[49] This article, which ran under the byline of Spartak Beglov, a political commentator of the Soviet press agency Novosti, asserted instead that the United States was, unlike the USSR, alien to the European continent. Its presence in Europe was by invitation only, and its involvement in the Helsinki process came about only because "the USSR and other countries agreed to US participation in the European process." The US "pursuit of the illusion of nuclear supremacy and intimidation," however, had "betrayed" the European process, according to Beglov.

The two articles also differed about the role of small states. Beglov made no mention whatsoever of their contribution to détente in Europe. Szürös, on the other hand, restated his by now well-known position that small states could and should bridge the gap between the superpowers. At the same time, he sought to remind one skeptical superpower of some unfortunate historical facts: "The responsibility of small and medium sized countries is demonstrated by the historical experience that while a small country in itself cannot really influence international relations in a favorable fashion, yet it can easily become the source of significant conflicts and tensions."[50] Given the experience of his own country in 1956, Szürös was writing with authority.

Yet this debate, too, appeared unresolved. Neither side was able to sway the other significantly. As in the pre-Congress debates on the role of small states, Czechoslovakia's leaders identified firmly with the "hard-line" Soviet position, while the Hungarian leaders took the lead in innovative thought, which also found some support in Moscow.

Balance Sheet

Since the 27th CPSU Congress, Soviet authors and theoreticians have been remarkably silent about Eastern Europe. Most of the specialists usually writing on Soviet-East European relations were publishing instead on arms control or on Soviet domestic reforms. Moreover, while personnel shifts in key editorial positions led to the publication of frank articles on other topics, Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe was not a topic benefiting from more open treatment in the era of *glasnost'*. For example, even though Richard Kosolapov was removed from the *Kommunist* editorship, the few articles published in that journal on Eastern Europe showed no great change in treatment. Kosolapov had been well-known for his strongly conservative views and had personally participated in the debate on contradictions in socialism from a hard-line perspective. The publication of Lenárt's article in *Kommunist*, some months after Kosolapov's departure, suggested the continued strong influence of conservative opinion. Indeed, the appear-

[47]Nicolae Ceauşescu, text of speech in *Scînteia*, Oct. 16, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 21, 1986, pp. AA/1–6; Nicolae Ceauşescu, Agerpres, Nov. 5, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 6, 1986, pp. AA/4–9; Agerpres, Nov. 14, 1986, *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 17, 1986, pp. AA/2–4.

[48]Mátyás Szürös, text of speech in *Valóság* (Budapest), No. 7, 1986, pp. 1–7, in *JPRS-EER*, Oct. 28, 1986, pp. 68–76.

[49]Spartak Beglov, *Pravda* (Bratislava), July 8, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, July 16, 1986, pp. CC/7–8.

[50]Szürös in *Valóság*, loc. cit., p. 73.

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ance of articles expressing views similar to Lenárt's in other key theoretical journals controlled directly by the CPSU Central Committee supported the view that the traditional hard-line interpretation of intra-bloc relations remained extremely influential in the highest reaches of the party bureaucracy.

Moreover, many Brezhnev stalwarts who had previously dealt with Eastern Europe have either hung on to their posts or remain on the Central Committee. For example, Oleg Rakhmanin, although no longer visible, supposedly has retained the post of first deputy head of the DLRWCP. Similarly, Boris Ponomarev, the "eternal candidate member" of the Politburo, indeed lost that position in addition to being removed as head of the International Department after the CPSU Congress, but he remains a Central Committee member and is apparently still taking an active interest in Eastern Europe.[51] Konstantin Katushev, the former Brezhnev-appointed head of the DLRWCP, was able to return to Moscow from his exile as Soviet ambassador to Havana and has assumed control over the key State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. Konstantin Chervonenko, who as ambassador to Czechoslovakia played a major role in the Soviet decision to invade that country in 1968, has maintained his post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as director of personnel stationed abroad.

This is not to say that those who had supported changes in intra-bloc relations have been defeated or stood no chance of success. In personal terms, they fared better than the conservatives and were able to maintain and advance their positions. Nikolay Shishlin, Georgiy Shakhnazarov, Oleg Bogomolov, Ivan Frolov, Aleksandr Bovin, Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, Anatoliy Butenko, Yuriy Novopashin, and others who had previously expressed the new line on Eastern Europe were all more visible and active than their conservative counterparts. However, most of these specialists were focusing less on Eastern Europe and more on either superpower relations or purely domestic issues. For example, Shishlin, a prominent participant in the pre-Congress debate on Eastern Europe, has been dealing primarily with arms control. Shakhnazarov, the newly appointed deputy head of the DLRWCP who had taken issue with Rakhmanin in the debate prior to the Congress, has been involved in the development of the electoral reforms proposed by Gorbachev at the January 1987 Central Committee plenum.[52]

The same was true of Oleg Bogomolov, head of the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System, who has remained an outspoken proponent of reform in the USSR. Although he did make several trips to Eastern Europe in the year after the 27th Congress, his many interviews there focused on the "inertia" and other "objective," and "subjective" factors hindering reform in the Soviet Union rather than on East European developments. In one rather pessimistic appraisal, he appeared to doubt the ability of the Soviet system to overcome systemic and cultural deformations: "there is a kind of objective inertia in our society that hinders the carrying out of radical changes."[53] On the intra-bloc scene, he did advocate greater Soviet and East European participation in the world financial system. On another matter of contention, he showed his sensitivity to East European concerns that the CEMA pricing system generally appears to work in Moscow's favor when he admitted that "no doubt, we need a real exchange rate of the transferable ruble vis-à-vis the dollar."[54] The Secretary-General of CEMA confirmed that such discussions were taking place at the highest level within the bloc when he stated that delegates to CEMA from member countries had stressed the need for the "perfection" and "modernization" of the bloc's monetary and currency system.[55]

Another indication of the growing strength of the "new line" was that some authors who had previously expressed conservative opinion on Eastern Europe changed their tune after the 27th CPSU Congress. This was especially obvious in the case of the prominent Soviet theoretician, Yegor Bugayev, who published an article in *Kommunist* on the occasion of the 10th Congress of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP).[56] In 1984, Bugayev had been the author of a *Kommunist* article criticizing another article by Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, and causing him to retract it. Ambartsumov had suggested that just as worker dissatisfaction had been the cause of the 1921 Kronstadt revolt, so too had it led to the 1980-81 Polish crisis. Both crises, Ambartsumov had argued, had been caused not by external factors (the forces of imperialism), but by antagonistic contradictions between the regime (the superstructure, in Marxist terms) and society (the base). Bugayev had held that the causes of both crises—which in any case

[51]He was, for example, present at an official ceremony in Moscow at the unveiling of a memorial to the German interwar communist leader Ernst Thälmann, an "ardent internationalist," in October 1986. See report on the Thälmann ceremonies in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 6, 1986, p. F/1.

[52]Shakhnazarov's initial statements outlining electoral reforms appeared in *Moscow News*, Jan. 18–25, 1987. They seemed to form the basis for Gorbachev's own, less radical, proposals which he put forward in his speech to the Central Committee plenum in January 1987. See *The New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1987.

[53]Interview with Oleg Bogomolov given to Jacek Poprzeczko, "There Is No One Recipe," *Polityka* (Warsaw), June 7, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, June 26, 1986, pp. BB/1–6.

[54]Ibid., p. BB/4.

[55]*Népszabadság* (Budapest), May 1, 1987, *FBIS-EEU*, May 12, 1987, p. BB/2.

[56]Ye. Bugayev, "A Realistic Appraisal of What Has Been Achieved, an Optimistic View of the Future," *Kommunist*, No. 14, September 1986, pp. 93–105.

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he believed had taken place before the advent of mature socialism—had been external and could not be blamed on the failings of socialism per se.[57]

In his 1986 article on the PUWP Congress, however, Bugayev made assertions directly contradicting what he had written two and a half years earlier. In 1984, he held that "to put them [contradictions] in the same category as mistakes made as a result of incorrect appraisals of the objective situation at a given moment . . . is impermissible."[58] Yet, in 1986, he admitted that "even in the present stage of the construction of socialism in Poland, antagonistic contradictions manifest themselves."[59]

Another important shift was that he made no mention of Polish loyalty to socialist or proletarian internationalism. Bolstering the opinion that the Soviets were concerned more with performance than adherence to a specific model, Bugayev summarized the PUWP resolution on agricultural reform, yet also noted that some Poles were of the opinion that socialist transformations in the village can wait, so long as food is produced. "It is not for me to judge which side is right in this argument," he wrote, "but Polish communists must also listen to opinions which are not to their liking. The party of the working class cannot arbitrarily, without considering the situation, set tasks which are correct from the point of view of Marxist-Leninist theory, but which are impracticable in the given concrete circumstances."[60]

A juxtaposition of the two Bugayev articles illustrates the transformations that have taken place since Gorbachev became General Secretary. It appears that reform in Eastern Europe is supported but not demanded by the Soviets. The main criterion is performance, and many different economic experiments are being conducted with this in mind. As for Bugayev, his own ideological transformation appears to have been insufficiently profound to prevent his removal from the editorial board of *Kommunist* in December 1986.[61]

A Brezhnev Doctrine Without Brezhnev?

In sum, many topical questions in the Soviet-East European debate were far from resolved by early 1987. The 27th CPSU Congress had done little to indicate the extent to which the Soviets would demand adherence to the concept of socialist internationalism; in fact, the Soviets themselves confused rather than clarified the issue by using a somewhat new phrase in the editorial on the CEMA meeting—"proletarian socialist internationalism." Similarly, the role of small states, and thus the question of intra-European détente in the absence of superpower détente, was also left undecided. And while the Soviets appeared to be dropping their former insistence on adherence to a single model of socialism, post-Congress formulations were sufficiently ambiguous to hearten both non-reformers and reformers.

Therefore, several explanations for the absence of clear policy toward Eastern Europe remain equally valid. One was that, as at the 27th CPSU Congress, East European questions remained "too controversial" to lend themselves to quick resolution. Thus, the easiest way out, although by no means the best, was to simply avoid their discussion. A second explanation rests on Gorbachev's personal concentration on US-Soviet affairs and on domestic restructuring early in his tenure. As a result, Soviet party and state bureaucracies were simply following his lead and ignoring Eastern Europe.

Even though Gorbachev has given his attention to the question of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe since about late 1986, major disagreements within the Soviet leadership do not seem to have disappeared entirely. On the occasion of General Wojciech Jaruzelski's recent visit to Moscow, a Declaration on Soviet-Polish Cooperation in Ideology, Science and Culture was signed, which contained prominently in the second paragraph a Polish and Soviet commitment to socialist internationalism.[62] This was only the second time that Gorbachev had lent his signature to a document containing affirmation of this principle. Though Gorbachev did not mention socialist internationalism in his speech on this occasion, the inclusion of the phrase in the Declaration nevertheless lends credence to the view that socialist internationalism retains many adherents in the CPSU Central Committee, and possibly in the Soviet military as well.

For example, an article published in *Krasnaya Zvezda,* the military newspaper, ruffled the serene atmosphere that has come to envelop Polish-Soviet relations. The piece treated rather harshly the persistence of religion in Poland, stating that "the influence [of the Church] is not harmless, as some would like to argue."[63] Yet, in Hungary, the widely acknowledged second-in-command to Gorbachev, Yegor Ligachev, was at the

[57]Ye. Bugayev, "A Strange Position," *Kommunist,* No. 14, 1984, pp. 119–26.
[58]Ibid., p. 122.
[59]Bugayev, 1986, p. 94.
[60]Ibid., p. 100.
[61]Compare the list of editorial board members in *Kommunist,* Nos. 17 and 18, 1986.
[62]"Declaration on Soviet-Polish Cooperation in Ideology, Science and Culture," *Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 22, 1987, *FBIS-EEU,* Apr. 23, 1987, p. F/1.
[63]V. Kocherov, "Polish Meetings," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), May 5, 1987.

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same time declaring: "It is not true that Moscow's conductor's baton, or Moscow's hand is in everything, and in that way others form their policies . . . ." He went even further by stating that a slavish imitation of Soviet reform efforts by the East Europeans "causes serious political, economic, and moral damage."[64]

Thus, it would seem that policy toward Eastern Europe remains a bone of contention among the Soviet leaders, increasing the likelihood of directionless or at least ineffective policy. This would bode ill for Soviet–East European relations for the remainder of the decade. Every country except Poland has an elderly general secretary, and it is inevitable that leadership changes will take place before the next round of congresses in the early 1990's. If the Soviets still do not have a coherent policy by the time these successions begin, a repetition of the situation that prevailed in 1968 with regard to Czechoslovakia may take place. That is, a Soviet leadership preoccupied with other matters may pay insufficient attention to rapidly unfolding events in Eastern Europe and fail to reach a consensus on what to do in time to prevent a full-scale crisis. It is one thing for a Soviet leader distractedly to tell his East European counterparts that succession struggles are "your own affair"[65] (as happened during the Prague Spring), and quite another for an East European leader to believe that they actually are. Lest the East Europeans feel that the Brezhnev doctrine really is dead, it is well to remember that in two of the intra-bloc agreements reached by Gorbachev–the Soviet-Polish Declaration and the renewal of the Warsaw Treaty—the General Secretary has endorsed the doctrine.[66]

It may well be that all Gorbachev really wants from Eastern Europe for the time being is better quality goods and quiet times. When Gorbachev came to power he promised that his "first commandment" would be to strengthen relations with East European countries.[67] Indeed, he appeared to pay heed to the views of East European leaders by convening more multilateral meetings in two years than the bloc had seen for a long time. While his speeches and other pronouncements admit that substantial errors have been made in intra-bloc relations in the past, little has yet been done to suggest that either the system of Soviet control or the fundamental theoretical principles underlying that system have been jettisoned. It is all very well to say that "no baton" exists; but what would happen if the first violinist were to get up and leave the orchestra?

Nevertheless, if Gorbachev makes good on his promise to take into account East European sensitivities, this fact, combined with his generally more robust and intelligent leadership style, may ensure that the doctrine of limited sovereignty will never need to be invoked again.

[64]Budapest Television Service in Hungarian, Apr. 26, 1987, *FBIS-EEU*, Apr. 27, 1987, p. F/6.

[65]As quoted in Karen Dawisha, *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1984, pp. 371–72.

[66]See *Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 27, 1985, and source cited in fn. 62.

[67]Ibid., Mar. 12, 1985.

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Warsaw Pact/CEMA Military-Economic Trends

Michael Checinski

A central concern in Moscow's dealings with the postwar communist regimes of Eastern Europe has been to direct their economic activities toward implementation of military-economic programs. Over the years, the Soviet Union has levied tasks in this area through a variety of bilateral and multilateral channels—the latter including various organs of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). With the steady increase in the technological and economic complexity of such activities as the design, production, sale, and delivery of arms, there have come changes in the instrumentalities by which the Soviet Union attempts to exert control as well as in the degree and nature of such control. As a result, a number of objective factors seem to be affording the East European states modestly increased influence in the making of defense-industrial decisions within the bloc.

Various recent writings—in particular, works by several Polish experts—have shed new light on the coordinating institutions, their functioning, and their relative weight in military-economic decision-making. Before exploring this evidence, though, it is useful to trace briefly the early postwar history of military-economic relations within the bloc.

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Background

Beginning in the late 1940's, Soviet advisers were assigned to the main sectors of the military, political, and economic decision-making bodies of the new communist regimes of Eastern Europe, where they directly oversaw the restructuring of the respective national economies for purposes of defense production and other key goals.[1] The very decision-making structures put in place at that time were purposely created in the image of Soviet counterparts, to facilitate Soviet control.

This control had a clear and visible impact on the so-called industrialization process started in the East European countries in the 1950's. Priority was given to those industrial branches that were important for creating the foundations of defense industries. This emphasis seriously distorted the development of many machine-building branches in Poland and Czechoslovakia, the two biggest arms producers in the bloc after the Soviet Union. The entire economy and society of these countries were militarized, and the efficiency of industry and

[1]See Michael Checinski, *A Comparison of the Polish and Soviet Armaments Decision-Making Systems*, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Report R-2662-AF, January 1981; idem, "The Main Channels of Soviet Influence and Control Over the East European Countries," unpublished manuscript; and Adam Marcinkowski, *Polska w Układzie Warszawskim* (Poland Inside the Warsaw Pact), Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1985, pp. 279–80.

Marcinkowski notes that the Warsaw Treaty Organization collects and assesses intelligence information from a wide variety of sources on Western weapons technology, as a basis for directing research-and-development and construction work connected with new weapons technology (p.244). The author of this article knew of the existence of a WTO "intelligence coordination center" from his years of service in the Polish Armed Forces; existence of such an organization was also confirmed in an interview with Karel Kaplan, a former high-ranking member of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and in a public statement by Viktor Chebrikov, Chairman of the Soviet KGB (see *Polityka* [Warsaw], Aug. 10, 1985, p. 2).

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agriculture was undermined for decades.[2]

The nationalization of industry and foreign trade along Soviet lines permitted local authorities to conceal the real defense burden—the size of the arms sector, its losses and profits. Moreover, Soviet advisers to the respective local general staffs planned and demanded from local authorities a variety of military-oriented investments—in roads, bridges, loading stations, hospitals, etc. These tasks were communicated to planning authorities and military departments of local industries as orders, only the timetables being negotiable. At times, the tasks were so burdensome that national political leaders had to travel to Moscow to plead for relief.[3]

In the aftermath of Stalin's death in 1953, Soviet advisers were gradually withdrawn, and coordination in defense-economic matters increasingly fell to CEMA (which had been created in 1949) and to WTO (created in 1955). Indeed, one could reasonably argue that defense tasks are the basis for the main areas of economic cooperation within CEMA, even though this is never explicitly stated. Since the USSR decides the priorities of the programs to be resolved by CEMA, defense problems dominate the entire activity of this organization even without the input of Warsaw Pact institutions.[4] A Polish observer confirms that Soviet political and defense goals have always occupied a fundamental place in CEMA economic planning.[5]

In the 1960's, several factors had a critical impact on military economics in the bloc. The first was the development of a new military doctrine, geared to the age of nuclear weapons. This doctrine required the modernization and reconstruction of the arms industry of non-Soviet WTO members. As a consequence, the East European arms sector grew very rapidly, becoming an important economic and military factor increasingly influencing the entire character of Warsaw Pact/CEMA relations. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and, more recently, Romania developed large research-and-development (R&D) and arms production capabilities, while Hungary, East Germany, and even Bulgaria came to play an increasing role as producers of such defense-related technologies as computers, optics, chemicals, and robots.[6] The shift in weapons technology led to significant East European purchases of Soviet arms.

Second, a variety of factors contributed to new requirements and incentives to produce arms for shipment and/or sale outside of the WTO. There was Soviet pressure on its East European allies to make gratis transfers of East European arms to Cuba, Vietnam, Egypt, and various other countries in Asia and Africa. Though the main decisions in this area are made by the WTO's Political Consultative Committee (PCC), their detailed coordination and elaboration must be effected by permanent institutions of the individual states and of CEMA—in particular, the military departments (usually called "engineering departments") of the ministries of foreign trade, the CEMA Foreign Trade Commission, and CEMA's Department for Coordinating Economic and Technological Aid to Developing Countries. (It is worth noting that the last-mentioned department, as well as the CEMA Military-Industrial Commission are surrounded by strict secrecy.)[7] Simultaneously, East European arms producers developed an interest in gaining a foothold in such lucrative arms markets as Libya, Syria, Iraq, and India, and consequently were anxious to receive licenses from the Soviet Union to produce weapons of the latest design.[8] All of these factors contributed to make the coordination of arms production and the arms trade an even more important political and economic issue.

In effect, military-economic issues became of greater relative importance in relations of the USSR with its East European allies. As one Soviet expert recently put it:

The economic basis of the defense of the Warsaw Treaty countries is the ability of the fraternal alliance to meet its military-economic requirements . . . Its

[2]Aleksander Mueller, Ed., *U zródeł polskiego kryzysu* (On the Source of the Polish Crisis), Warsaw, PWN, 1985, pp. 106, 205–06.

[3]For example, in the 1950's, the Soviet generals who headed the mobilization and transportation directorates of the Polish General Staff demanded that all Polish roads, railroads, and bridges on the axis used by the Soviet army operating in the Warsaw Pact Northern Tier be reconstructed in line with Soviet mobilization plans. The costs of such a reconstruction could have amounted to twice the entire current budget of the Polish Ministry of Transportation. It required the intervention in Moscow of members of the Polish United Workers' Party Politburo to get these requirements eased. I obtained this information in an interview with the former head of the Military Department of Poland's Ministry of Transportation.

[4]Interview with Karel Kaplan; also, Michael Checinski, "Poland's Military Burden," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1983, pp. 31–36.

[5]See Zygmunt Żytomirski, "The Conditioning of the Industrial and Scientific-Technological Cooperation of CEMA," *Handel Zagraniczny* (Warsaw), No. 6, 1985, p. 24.

[6]East Germany boasts the largest and most advanced computer industry in Eastern Europe, and leads in production of robots; by 1985 they had installed 35,000 robots against Russia's 25,000. Bulgaria is CEMA's biggest net exporter of electronics and also the main producer of magnetic disks. See *The Economist* (London), Jan. 19, 1985, p. 67.

[7]Petre Nicolae, *CMEA [CEMA] in Theory and Practice*, Falls Church, VA, Delphic Associates, Inc., 1984 (Nicolae was a long-term staff member of CEMA in Moscow); see also interview with Kaplan, and Chechinski, "The Main Channels . . . ."

[8]This may explain why in the late 1970's, Romania became one of the biggest arms producers and arms sellers among East European countries. For 1979–83, Romania's total exports of arms is estimated at US$3,100 million; for the same period, Czechoslovakia's arms exports totaled $3,455 million, and Poland's, $1,990 million. See *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985*, Washington, DC, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1986, p. 78.

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Soviet-bloc military equipment supplied to the Egyptian armed forces in the aftermath of the 1973 Middle East war.

—René Burri/Magnum.

further growth and enhancement depend on the growth and consolidation of national economies and the development of international economic ties.[9]

Another Soviet author emphasizes that maximum use should be made of the advantages arising from close economic cooperation within the framework of socialist integration, and adds that

the more multilateral the cooperation, the more expediently joint efforts are employed in resolving issues, the more fruitful will be the production of military hardware, both that of domestic origin and that resulting from the participation of several armies. Multilateral cooperation also permits the systematic resolution, based on principles of specialization and cooperation, of issues concerning the modernization of existing weapons . . . the international division of labor, which is achieved through logical specialization and cooperation in defense production, the expedient use of the military-economic resources of each country and of the alliance as a whole, and the effective employment of natural resources, the transportation system, and the achievements of modern science and technology for defense needs . . . .[10]

This military-technological coordination is aimed less at the stated goal of "socialist integration" than at strengthening the military might of the Warsaw Treaty Organization by reducing the growth in the cost of research and development and of production in the defense sector. Today, the efficiency of WTO arms production depends more than ever on each member's technological level and industrial modernization, and

[9]Captain First Class I. Maslennikov, "The Economic Base of the Defense of the Warsaw Pact States," in *Tyl i Snabzheniye Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 12, 1985, p. 7. See also idem, *Ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo i kollektivnaya oborona sotsialisticheskikh stran* (Economic Cooperation and Collective Defense of the Socialist States), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976.

[10]Colonel General M. Fabrikov, "Military-Technological Cooperation," *Tekhnika i Vooruzheniye* (Moscow), No. 5, 1985, pp. 16–17. Similar arguments appear in a recent article in an East German military journal, see Major General J. Oreschko, "On the Military Economic Integration of the Warsaw Pact States under Conditions of Complex Intensification," *Militärtechnik* (East Berlin), No. 4, 1985, pp. 169–70.

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this in turn requires a more carefully articulated and coordinated cooperation in the arms sector, and hence a greater voice for the non-Soviet members of the WTO and CEMA.

Let us now examine the various decision-making and advisory institutions of WTO and CEMA that engage in these coordination activities.

WTO and Economic Coordination

In 1969, the Soviet Union responded to the growing demands for coordination and conflict-resolution in defense-economic matters by establishing several new institutions within WTO—a Military Science and Technology Council (MSTC) and a Technology Committee (TC). While it is conceivable that the creation of these new bodies was in part a response to the demands of the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact, Moscow itself doubtless welcomed the channeling of the handling of such matters into new military institutions, over which the Soviet military might hope to exercise pre-eminent sway.

The functioning of these institutions has been described at considerable length in a recently published Polish book:

After the Warsaw Treaty was set up, the framework of technological cooperation was broadened to include all its members, who started to produce more modern types of arms and equipment. The creation in 1969 of the Technology Committee of the WTO Supreme Command initiated a new stage of technological cooperation. This embraced technological training, production, exploitation, and repair. An important result of this cooperation is the creation of unified tactical-technological standards for arms and military equipment and the preparation of recommendations on the introduction of new technologies. This made possible the further standardization of arms and equipment in the WTO. Cooperation (in arms production) was broadened. Specific scientific-technological production and exploitation problems are solved in bilateral and multilateral cooperation, in which the Technology Committee plays a coordinating role . . . .

In 1969, the Military Science and Technnology Council (MSTC), an advisory body, and the Technology Committee of the Joint Armed Forces were established. Their job is to analyze the state and development of the enemy's arms and, on this basis, to indicate lines of research and design for improving the arms and combat equipment of the allied armies. The Council plans and coordinates research in the area of military technology, coordinates the activity of the arms industry, and prepares guidelines for standardization of arms and military equipment and for the supplying of modern military hardware to the allied armies. The Council does not have the right to make independent decisions. It places its conclusions and proposals before the leading organs of the WTO, the authorities of its member states, and also the organs of the CEMA. The executive organ of the Council is the Technology Committee of the Joint Armed Forces . . . . Both the Council and the Technology Committee bring together representatives of all the WTO armies, including their leading scientists and designers. . . . The fruits of the activities of both bodies are a crucial factor in advancing the defense capacities of the alliance. They make possible the specialization of each state in specific arms production areas and thereby ensure higher quality of goods produced and lower costs of production . . . . ***The cooperation of the WTO states in the areas of science and technology and arms production is an important component of economic ties in the framework of CEMA. It is coordinated by the Military-Industrial Commission of CEMA.***[11]

The importance of the two WTO institutions under consideration here derives from their subordination to the pact's Military Council (MC), which was also created in 1969. Although some refer to the MC as an "advisory body,"[12] it is actually a high-level organ of management, command, and control. The MC *is* an advisory body, but only to the Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief. Given the MC's high-level composition, when it gives advice to national military commanders and defense ministries of the East European WTO members, it is issuing *commands*, as emphasized by a Polish source.[13] The chairman of the MC, which meets twice a year, is the Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief. Other MC members are: the Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, all deputies of the WTO Commander-in-Chief, the Commander of Warsaw Pact Air Defense Forces,

[11]Marcinkowski, op. cit., pp. 279–80, emphasis added.

[12]A well-known Western analyst argues that the Military Council "advises the [Warsaw Pact] commander on matters of planning and operational control . . . in a real sense reviews the work of the WP staff and reports to the Committee of Defense Ministers—an intermediary rather than a decision-making role." See William J. Lewis, *The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine and Strategy*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1982, p. 5. For another Western assessment, see A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier*, New York, Crane, Russak, 1982, p. 155. For a Soviet commentary, see Lieutenant General D. A. Volkogonov, Ed., *Armii stran Varshavskogo dogovora* (Armies of the Warsaw Pact States), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1985, p. 28.

[13]Marcinkowski, op. cit.

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

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Soviet Marshal Viktor Kulikov, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, addresses a May 22, 1985, conference on military science arranged for delegations to the regular session of the WTO Military Council in Budapest, May 20–23, 1985. At left is the meeting's host, Hungarian Minister of Defense Colonel-General István Oláh.

—Interfoto MTI from Eastfoto.

and the Chief of the Military Science and Technology Council.[14] According to General D. A. Volkogonov, Deputy Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy,

*the Military Council . . . **is in charge** of matters of combat and mobilization readiness of the Joint Armed Forces and the organizational structure of the army and navy. At the sessions of the Military Council . . . **the means to perfect weapon systems and military equipment,** to improve C³, . . . and other issues are **discussed in a regular way** .*[15]

The MC has its own staff of high-ranking Soviet officers, who are attached to each national military command as representatives of the WTO Command and who thereby serve as direct links with the national military-economic planning bodies. In Poland, the main representative of the Warsaw Pact for many years was Soviet Army General A. Shcheglov. In 1985, Shcheglov was replaced by three WTO representatives in Poland (who were identified first in the summer of that year and apparently continue to fill these posts to this date): Colonel General V. Sivenok, WTO Representative with the Polish Armed Forces; Lieutenant General V. A. Sharygin, Deputy Representative for Military-Political Affairs; and Major General Vitaliy Kubrakov, Representative for Military Technology Affairs.[16] General Sivenok usually attends meetings between the highest level of the Polish military command and the WTO Command-in-Chief, Marshal Viktor Kulikov. General Sharygin has been noted at sessions of the Main Political Administration of the Polish Army and at the Military-Political Academy. Gen-

[14]*Ibid.*, p. 243.

[15]Volkogonov, op. cit., p. 28, emphasis added. The expression translated as "is in charge of" was "*vedayet*" in the Russian.

The Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary defines the Military Council as a body with the authority to recommend plans and programs about the development of the national armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. High-ranking commanders and experts are invited to Council sessions, which agree on recommendations and proposals that are conveyed to the allied armies for implementation. See *Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar'*, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1983, p. 147.

[16]*Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny* (Warsaw), No. 3, 1985, p. 288, and No. 4, 1985, pp. 282, 289; also *Żołnierz Wolności* (Warsaw), July 14, 1986, p. 2.

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eral Kubrakov was present at the graduation ceremonies of Poland's Military-Technology Academy; we should not exclude the possibility that he is a member of WTO's Technology Committee.

According to Soviet and Polish sources, the MSTC is a specialized segment of the WTO's Military Council. There is no clear distinction made between the roles of the MC and MSTC in "perfecting weapon systems and military equipment,"[17] the inference being that the MSTC makes decisions under the direct supervision of the WTO Commander-in-Chief, who also serves as chairman of the Military Council.

The responsibilities of the MSTC include planning and coordination on the following issues:

- The activity of the member states' arms industries;
- Which new weapon systems to introduce, which to modernize, and which to retire from use;
- The size and timetable of arms supply programs thus approved for each Warsaw Pact member's armed forces;
- Which country will be the main or the secondary supplier and for which particular state's armed forces.

It is hard to imagine that such crucial issues are decided without the participation of the WTO Chief of Staff, and all deputy defense ministers for armaments of Warsaw Pact member states (in the Polish case, Colonel General Zbigniew Nowak, Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the Main Inspectorate for Technology [Armaments]). The WTO Commander-in-Chief may be presumed to attend critical sessions of the MSTC. Since most of the officers on the MSTC are members of their respective countries' defense councils, they provide a personal link between the MSTC and the highest national defense decision-making bodies. However, the MSTC has no direct links with such national economic executive bodies as central planning commissions or industrial ministries.

Implementation of an MSTC decision produces a set of military, technical, organizational, and economic problems, all of which are passed to the Warsaw Pact Technology Committee, an executive body of the MSTC.[18] The head of the TC serves simultaneously as the deputy commander for armaments of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, and thus also is a member of the MSTC. It is important to note that the head of the TC is appointed on the basis of a formal agreement *among the governments* of all WTO members,[19] possibly arrived at in the context of WTO's PCC. In this way, he is at least formally independent from the WTO Commander-in-Chief, acting as an agent of the Pact's highest national authorities.

As is common in Soviet-bloc institutions, the TC, as a committee, tends to be more operational than the MSTC (councils normally have functions of a more general, conceptual nature).[20] Although the TC is believed to be primarily a body for coordinating Warsaw Pact programs of military research and development and weapons acquisition in conjunction with CEMA's Military-Industrial Commission,[21] General Volkogonov depicts a broader, more operational role for the Committee:

The Technology Committee occupies an important place among the organs of the Joint Armed Forces. It resolves tasks connected with the development and improvement of arms and equipment, their ***standardization and unification,*** *and coordinates research and experimental design aimed at providing the armies of Warsaw Pact member states with new kinds of arms and equipment. The activity of the Technology Committee is based on each allied country's economic and research and development capacity. It is carried out* ***in close contact with the relevant national organs responsible for arms and equipment*** *in the armies of the Warsaw Pact member states.*[22]

The last sentence strongly suggests that the TC is the only WTO institution directly linked with the national arms production, supply, and acquisition establishments, in particular with the directorates (or inspectorates) for armaments of the respective defense ministries, and the military directorates (or departments) of the respective national central planning commissions.

Each main inspector for armaments has a deputy responsible for the acquisition of military hardware. In Poland, this is Colonel Engineer Ryszard Wieczorek (his title in Polish being, *Szef Zamówień i Dostaw Techniki Wojskowej*—Chief of the Requisitioning and Supply of Military Technology [Armament]).[23] This official is in close contact with the military directorate of the central planning commission regarding all issues connected with the supply of military hardware. Although there is no explicit evidence, it is safe to assume that this individual serves on his country's military industrial commission and is simultaneously a member of—though not neces-

[17]Volkogonov, op. cit., p. 28; and Marcinkowski, op. cit., pp. 242–45.
[18]Marcinkowski, op. cit., p. 244.
[19]*Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar'*, p. 738. It is worth noting that the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, published only three years earlier, contains no entry about the WTO Technology Committee.
[20]Yu. M. Kozlov, *Koordinatsiya v upravlenii narodnym khozyaistvom SSSR* (Coordinating the Management of the National Economy of the USSR), Moscow, Moscow University Publishing House, 1976, pp. 117–19.
[21]Johnson et al., op. cit., p. 155.
[22]Volkognov, op. cit., pp. 29–30, emphasis added.
[23]*Żołnierz Wolności*, July 15, 1986, p. 5, and Aug. 11, 1986, p. 5.

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sarily the chief representative of his country to—the WTO Technology Committee.

To understand better the role and personal composition of the TC and its links with national economic institutions, it is useful to examine in more detail the national system of arms production, acquisition, maintenance, and military R & D, using the Polish case as an example. Poland appears to have a number of deputies of the Main Inspector for Armaments (MIA), each of whom is responsible for a specific area of arms planning and acquisition (air force, navy, tanks, trucks, engineering equipment, chemical means, repair and production factories, etc.).[24] Of these deputies, the most important appear to be the above-mentioned Col. Wieczorek (responsible for the ordering and supply of military equipment); the chief of the Directorate for Research and Development of Military Technology (*Szefostwo Badań i Rozwoju Techniki Wojskowej*), the chief of the Directorate for Armament and Electronics (*Szefostwo Służby Uzbrojenia i Elektroniki*), and the Chief of Staff of the Armament Services (*Szef Sztabu Służb Technicznych*), identified as Brig. General T. Kusmierski, who is a deputy MIA. Kusmierski's staff serves as the principal coordinator and planner of the main R & D and supply programs providing military equipment for the entire Polish Armed Forces.[25]

From among the deputies to the main inspector for armament and the deputy commanders responsible for arms planning and supply and R & D, one individual is selected to be Poland's chief representative on the TC. The appointment depends on personal abilities—among others, a good knowledge of the Russian language is required. In the early 1980's, I identified Poland's General S. Kalugin in this role (he was a deputy chief of the TC).[26] Kalugin was at the time a deputy MIA for air force matters. In addition, two other Poles attend TC sessions, depending on the agenda: Col. Eng. Wieczorek and the chief of the military directorate of the central planning commission, currently Division General J. Zielinski.[27] As we shall discuss below, presence of the latter is needed to allow the TC to deal with matters affecting national plans for producion and R & D.

The TC agenda encompasses the following main issue areas:[28]

- Establishing the concrete terms (timetables, quotas, suppliers) for the replacement of old models of arms in production with new ones. This may be particularly important for the industries of such major arms producers as Czechoslovakia, Poland, and—recently—Romania. It is obvious that the Soviet Union, as "the first among equals," has a decisive voice on such matters, and the most important military hardware is produced under Soviet license. But conflicts also arise between other members, say Poland and Czechoslovakia.
- Resolution of conflicts with regard to standardization of military equipment. These problems are of a different order than those between members of NATO, inasmuch as the Warsaw Pact basically produces Soviet-model arms. However, over the years, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, and even Romania and Bulgaria, have built up a fairly large non-Soviet arms and R & D capacity, with new military equipment and original technologies. A variety of helicopters, armored personnel carriers, trucks, floating bridges, engines, radars, and communication means incorporate Western know-how and technology—e.g., Austrian, West German, and British engines or licenses are sometimes used. In some cases, these are produced cooperatively by non-Soviet CEMA members (e.g., by Poland and Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, or Bulgaria and East Germany); in other cases, in cooperation with the Soviet arms industry.[29] The East European arms producers are motivated primarily by economic or technological considerations, but there is also the matter of national pride and—even if never acknowledged—the ultimate wish to achieve greater independence from Moscow in these as in other matters.

The existence of not fully standardized arms and equipment creates many difficulties in the area of military mobilization plans and the establishment of reserves and stockpiles for the Soviet Armed Forces and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. This, in turn, creates problems in planning and organizing rear or logistical services. To fit non-standardized arms and equipment into the Soviet rear system, or an "alien" technological solution into the well-developed Soviet arms industry, represents a complex technological task. It also complicates military training and exercises.

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[24]Michael Sadykiewicz, *Wartime Missions of the Polish Internal Front*, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Report, N-2401-OSD, July 1986, p. 49, Fig. 13, and the author's own information.

[25]*Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny*, No. 3, 1984, p. 302, and author's personal knowledge.

[26]Michael Checinski, *A Comparison . . .*, p. 19.

[27]Zielinski was formerly a deputy to MIA Novak, and had previously been responsible for all military repair production plants and commander of the associated banch of the army. Today he is identified as General Director of the Central Planning Commission, a position usually reserved for the head of the Commission's Military Department. Zielinski spoke before the Defense Commission of the Sejm (Poland's parliament) on the Defense Ministry's budget plans and other defense-related socio-economic programs. See *Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny*, No. 4, 1985, pp. 285–86.

[28]See Marcinkowski, pp. 244–45; and author's first-hand experience.

[29]John W. Taylor, Ed., *Jane's All the World's Aircraft*, New York, Jane's Publishing, for various years; Arthur Volz, "Standardization in the Armies of the Warsaw Pact," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (Munich), RL 306/76, June 14, 1976.

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It should be noted here that CEMA's Military-Industrial Commission (MIC) also plays an important role in coordinating standardization in defense-related industries. While it is commonly asserted that greater standardization would contribute to "socialist economic integration" and would, in many respects, be convenient economically for all CEMA members, the fact is that the country whose standards are recognized as the common one gains great economic advantage. In the arms area, this country is the USSR, which automatically gives it preponderance over all other CEMA states, including such industrialized ones as East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The fact that CEMA's Standardization Commission is headed by an East German citizen does not alter the situation much, because Soviet experts head the organization's Standardization Institute and all of the Institute's subsections for specific arms industries.[30] In the words of one observer, the Institute "has access to all the industrial permanent commissions [of CEMA] as well; it presents recommendations and proposals for introducing new standards to these permanent commissions. In this regard, the Institute *has a certain degree of independence*."[31]

In the past, Moscow could force its Pact "allies" to produce only Soviet models of arms. However, as we shall see below, the purely economic aspects of such matters are becoming increasingly decisive, necessitating a more cooperative relationship between Soviet and East European industry, and this means to accept more non-Soviet models of military hardware.

- A third item on the TC agenda is the coordination and assignment of military R & D programs. These tasks may not necessarily be convenient technologically or economically from respective national viewpoints, whatever the contribution they may make to the overall military-economic effort.

It is perhaps ironic that the 1969 "militarizing" of CEMA cooperation plans in the defense area, reflected in the transfer of some authority to the MSTC and TC within the WTO framework, afforded non-Soviet members the possibility to convey their national economic desiderata directly to the Warsaw Pact supreme military command. Warsaw Pact command and control bodies can no longer make decisions relating to national economic, technological, and R & D capacities without discussing them in detail with representatives of individual member states. Previously, WTO communicated only the purely military plans of its command to the member states, while the economic and financial aspects of such plans, the cost of arms supply and arms production and cooperation, the development of the military infrastructure, and problems of human resources were discussed and decided *beyond* the Warsaw Pact decision-making bodies themselves. Now, such plans are developed on a "foundation" of the economic realities, limitations, and capacities of member states.

At the same time, the more carefully analyzed, complex approach to defense planning and development has its benefits for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Warsaw Pact military commanders are now more realistically oriented regarding what they can and cannot demand from their putatively "equal" partners than they were in the past.[32] By placing the MSTC and TC among the supreme Warsaw Pact decision-making bodies, the Soviet Union may be able to make much better use of the national economic R & D and production capacities of all CEMA members, and to effect a more detailed coordination of defense and economic planning.

But, to reiterate, this very mechanism of coordination implies a growing role for economic institutions—both joint organs such as CEMA's MIC and those institutions of individual states tasked with defense-economic planning—the national defense councils (or committees) and the military directorates of the central planning commissions. Indeed, under the Warsaw Pact statutes, all programs and individual decisions in the defense area must be approved by the highest national defense decision-making bodies and by the relevant CEMA bodies. In this context, let us take a closer look at CEMA's MIC.

CEMA's Military-Industrial Commission

Even prior to the formal establishment of MIC within CEMA in 1956, a variety of intergovernmental committees and commissions—in effect informal military-industrial institutions—had operated under direct Soviet dictate. They had dealt with problems of prices, economic terms of cooperation, and deliveries of specific machines, parts and raw materials, as they related to the arms industries of the non-Soviet Pact members.[33] But with the departure of Soviet "advisers" from their posts

[30]Nicolae, op. cit., pp. 20–30, 48–51.

[31]Ibid., p. 50, emphasis added.

[32]Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, head of the Strategic-Defense Planning Department of the General Staff Operational Directorate of the Polish Armed Forces from 1976 until his defection in November 1981, reminds us that "in long-term cycles, Moscow determines the size of the Polish Armed Forces for peace and war-time, its organizational structure, arms and equipment, the battle and mobilization readiness, its training directions, tasks, and plans for war-time deployment, etc. . . . ." See interview with Col. Kuklinski in *Kultura* (Paris), No. 4, 1987, p. 55. The author's own experience confirms this view of overriding Soviet control of Polish defense decisions.

[33]Checinski, *A Comparison . . .*, pp. 11–17; idem, *The Interaction of the Soviet and Polish War Economies in the Framework of CMEA [CEMA]*, Ebenhausen, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 1982, SWP-AZ 2341. Chap. 3.

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in Eastern Europe, the role of coordinating standardization of industries of the region with respect to defense production fell to CEMA's MIC.

The MIC is an organ for addressing and formulating defense-economic problems in a more thorough way than is possible in the Technology Committee of the WTO; it has the further advantage of serving to establish direct links to the principal economic planning and management institutions of the respective member states (for example, chairmen of national military-industrial commissions are members of CEMA's MIC). At the same time, it should be noted, the Secretariat of the CEMA body is made up exclusively of Soviet officials, and the commission chairman is a Soviet expert.[34]

It is perhaps indicative of the importance of the CEMA MIC that Soviet published sources avoid mentioning it altogether when discussing the MSTC and TC. Moreover, even a Polish author who mentions the CEMA Military-Industrial Commission is silent about the counterpart military-industrial commissions of the CEMA member states.[35]

In most East European countries, the deputy chairman of the central planning commission who oversees that body's military directorate (department) serves simultaneously as chairman of the national military-industrial commission. In other cases, the chairman of the national military-industrial commission may be a different official, e.g., a deputy prime minister responsible for armament supply. National military-industrial commissions engage in direct discussions with one another only on very general issues of cooperation. Specific branch problems, or issues of trade or pricing, are resolved at the level of subcommissions of CEMA's MIC; such subcommissions exist for electronics, engines, machine-building, tanks, aircraft, chemicals, etc.

At the subcommission level, discussions are very practical and business-like; cooperation between military industries of CEMA states is governed by generally accepted rules of efficiency.[36] At the operational level, the head of the military department of the ministry that has to produce an item, or is to be supplied with machines or parts from another CEMA country, usually participates in discussions. Although uniformed military officers, these people tend to be less solicitous of the military's interest per se than of those of the industry their department oversees.

Since military-industrial cooperation encompasses almost all industrial branches, the subcommissions of the CEMA MIC operate as a subgroup within virtually all CEMA committees and commissions, thus influencing the activities of most CEMA institutions. Of course, all these subgroups are subordinate to and coordinated by one or another leading official of the CEMA MIC. As a result, in the words of Polish military-economic expert W. Stankiewicz, the CEMA commissions "integrate almost all economic branches that are of decisive importance for the potential of the defense economy. . . . The permanent CEMA commissions are ordinarily capable of dealing with defense problems."[37] These problems include the size of investments in the arms industries, matters of trade and pricing of arms, and conditions of industrial cooperation.

However, the critical point is that whether the agreements are signed by the highest representatives of communist parties and governments (e.g., members of the PCC), by WTO's MSTC or TC, or by CEMA commissions and subcommissions, everything related to economic issues must be carefully analyzed and approved by the *national* central planning commission. This procedure is supported by legal arguments and prescriptions. According to leading juridical experts on CEMA economic cooperation, the approval of such programs takes the following course:

The harmonizing of the plans of countries must obtain a legally compulsory endorsement and become the subject of the necessary contractual link in the field of joint planning activity. In coordinating five-year plans on a bilateral basis, the initial form of contractual links is a protocol signed by representatives of the central planning organs. . . . ***Both states must bring the most important instrument of economic management—the national economic plan of each—into conformity with the agreement reached between them.*** *This can only be done in the process of drafting the plan itself.*[38]

Military Directorates of Planning Bodies

In the drafting of military-economic measures in national plans, the military directorate (or department) of a given state's central planning commission is of decisive

[34]Nicolae, op cit., pp. 25–28.

[35]See Volkogonov, op. cit., and Marcinkowski, op. cit. The existence of such a commission is confirmed by the former Polish party Politburo member and Central Planning Commission member, Mieczysław Jagielski at a secret session of the "Grabski Commission." See *Protokoły tzw. Komisji Grabskiejo: Tajne Dokumenty PZPR* (Reports of the so-called Grabski Commission: Secret Documents of the PZPR), Paris, Instytut Literacki, 1986, p. 329. The author also has interviewed a former member of the MIC.

[36]Interview with J. Lewandowski, a former member of the Polish Military-Industrial Commission and of a subcommission of the CEMA MIC; also, Nicolae, op. cit.

[37]Wacław Stankiewicz, *Ekonomika Wojenna* (The War Economy), 2nd ed., Warsaw, Defense Ministry Publishing House, 1981, p. 407.

[38]*Pravovyye voprosy deyatel'nosti SEV* (Legal Problems of CEMA Activity), Moscow, Izd. Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1977, pp. 39–41.

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importance. This stature is suggested by the secrecy surrounding the institution.[39] This department is an executive body, whereas the respective national military-industrial commissions are only bargaining institutions, preparing and giving advice on proposals that may or may not be approved by the military directorate.

In the case of Poland, the chairman of the Central Planning Commission's military directorate is a member of Committee of Defense of the Country (*Komitet Obrony Kraju*—KOK), which has overall national responsibility for national defense preparations. Within this large mandate, KOK makes decisions on major issues regarding the development of the war-economic potential and long-range economic plans to secure defense activities. According to a recent Polish book, the "special establishment" (read "military directorate") of the Central Planning Commission plays an important role in KOK decision-making.[40]

The duties of Poland's Central Planning Commission (CPC) in the area of national defense are defined as follows:

[The CPC] is responsible for the overall organization of the process of planning and projecting the war economy, for preparing plans for the development of the defense potential, and for economic mobilization plans. In all these activities the CPC cooperates with the relevant ministries and with the General Staff of the Armed Forces . . . in times of political crisis and war the CPC is transformed into a central war-economic planning organ.[41]

Thus, on the national level, it is not Poland's Military-Industrial Commission but the Military Directorate of the CPC (MDCPC)—an economic and not a military body—that is the decisive institution for all issues related to the military economy. The MDCPC is responsible for planning the size and structure of defense expenditures; planning the types and quotas of military hardware to be produced; developing the arms industry and R & D military establishments; preparing plans for strategic material reserves; developing military-related infrastructures and logistics; and planning the import and export of arms and defense-related machinery, equipment, and know-know.

Unlike the Military-Industrial Commission, the MDCPC has no integrated Warsaw Pact or CEMA counterpart. This effectively shields this directorate from an overwhelming Soviet presence such as exists in the Secretariat of CEMA's MIC. Proposals and decisions adopted by CEMA or WTO have no substantive basis until they have been discussed and approved in detail by the national MDCPC's, because as noted above, only the latter have the authority to assess the current and future industrial, R & D, and economic capacities and plans of the country concerned.[42]

Drawing the Balance

Having looked in some detail at the workings of the various WTO and CEMA defense-economic institutions, it is now possible to venture some conclusions about their relative weight and functional importance. The Military-Industrial Commission of CEMA is basically an economic institution, while the Warsaw Pact Military Science and Technology Council and Technology Committee deal with military technology. The latter discuss plans for arms standardization, military equipment supply, and R & D programs, and questions of infrastructure and logistics common to the Warsaw Pact forces. The MIC discusses and decides practical economic issues and terms of military production and cooperation plans after such programs have been approved by governments of the Warsaw Pact states.

The Warsaw Pact organizations encompass all the members' armies and their supply, since all members are equally interested in the planning and implementation of the proper arms supply decisions. By contrast, CEMA's MIC covers primarily those countries that are producers of specific military equipment (or its components); that cooperate in carrying out joint production and programs of material supply for defense industries; and that must discuss and decide problems such as prices, terms of cooperation, the size of production lines and their modernization, the supply of machines, raw materials and semi-finished products, the economic conditions for using foreign trade and Warsaw Pact licenses and technologies in the arms sector, and, last but not least, the system for supplying and financing "revolutionary movements" and allied states (Vietnam,

[39]The Polish military newspaper *Żołnierz Wolności* runs a regular column entitled "Farewell to Arms" in which military officers leaving the service are listed, together with a description of the posts they held. In the case of Engineer Colonel Michal Klimaszewski, a former staff member of the "Military Group" ("*Zespół Wojskowy*"—read Military Directorate) of the Central Planning Commission, it is noted that "he fulfilled a number of responsible functions . . . of great importance for the modernization of military armaments . . . and was highly evaluated by the plants with which he cooperated." See *Żołnierz Wolności* (Warsaw), July 15, 1986, p. 5.

[40]Stankiewicz, op. cit., pp. 429–30. Something about the current role of the Polish Defense Council (KOK) can also be learned from a note in a recent issue of a Polish journal which indicated that on March 27, 1986, the KOK held a session at which "the defense preparations of the country were assessed and the directions for the improvement of the defense system for the years 1986–1990 were outlined." See *Życie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), Apr. 6, 1986, p. 2).

[41]Stankiewicz, op. cit., pp. 429–30.

[42]Checinski, *A Comparison* . . . , p. 14.

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

Warsaw Pact–style SA–6 "Gainful" surface-to-air missiles of the Libyan armed forces displayed September 1986 in Tripoli at observances of the 17th anniversary of the founding of Muammar Qadhafi's revolutionary government.

—Chip Hines/Gamma-Liaison.

Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, etc.) and also for apportioning the "fat" international arms trade paid for in hard currencies. Both issues are directly connected with national economic planning and development and must therefore be fit into the appropriate annual and five-year plans. This can only be done by the respective central planning commissions, with subsequent coordination via CEMA institutions. These issues are often more complex, and of greater importance to the members' economies, than are the general programs of arms supply approved or recommended by WTO bodies.

Relations within WTO and CEMA have additional dimensions. Neither organization formally possesses any supranational executive institutions. The condition for a decision being adopted by the Warsaw Pact or by the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance is unanimous approval by all members. The Warsaw Pact is not adapted to making decisions binding on only some of its members, despite the fact that in particular cases not all members act similarly in all respects (e.g., Romania is not willing to accept Warsaw Pact maneuvers on its territory). Thus, general decisions, if accepted, are binding so long as they are not formally vetoed by a particular member. But within CEMA even such "passive consensus" on principles is not binding if, in addition, a specific agreement is not signed by two or more CEMA member states.[43] Such agreements are not necessary within the WTO setting.

Although both WTO and CEMA can be viewed as political instruments of the USSR, the Warsaw Pact coordinates a united front of its members with respect to all issues relating to the outside world and to the foreign and defense policy of its members toward non–Warsaw Pact states. The WTO cannot and will not tolerate an independent defense policy on the part of its members, such as separate political or military agreements with "outside" states. The Council for Economic Mutual Assistance is oriented primarily toward internal economic activities of the organization's membership (which also includes Cuba, Vietnam, and Mongolia) and permits

[43]See source cited in fn. 38 above.

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considerable independent behavior in the economic field: trade agreements, "capitalist" credits, and even cooperation with some Western companies are to a considerable degree the prerogatives of national policy. This broader margin of national economic autonomy can become a factor of extremely great political and even military significance.[44] Such was the case with the Polish turn to the West for credits and trade relations, a policy of the 1970's that brought first economic crisis and then a long-term political crisis with consequences for the Warsaw Pact and its members that are still difficult to gauge.

Still there are numerous economic projects of clear defense-security significance that are undertaken jointly by the various WTO allies. Such projects are not restricted to arms production and supply; they may relate more generally to the fact that the area comprises the Soviet Union's and WTO's European Theatre of Military Operations. Planning in this context can require the construction of very costly defense-related infrastructure—including land, sea, and air transportation lines and bases; communications lines and reserve command and control arrangements; supply systems, pipelines, stockpiles, and material reserves; and hospitals, health sanitation centers, deactivation, anti-chemical and anti-biological arrangements—infrastructures that are drastically "overdesigned" if one takes into account only the requirements of the civilian economy.[45]

In planning for such investments, there must be a full coordination of defense and economic aspects. Only CEMA's MIC has effective channels and possibilities to examine the capacities of each member's economy to deal with such tasks. Yet, the principal and most costly of such investments are probably decided on the basis of bargaining by specially established bilateral working groups or even by the highest military commanders and party-government officials of the USSR and the particular East European country.

A salient example of such a project is the Baltic Sea ferry line currently being completed between the Soviet port Klaipeda and the Mukran port in the East German city of Rostock. There is no doubt that this line, whose construction began in April 1982 and has consumed billions of dollars, has a primarily military purpose. The Mukran port is estimated to be able to handle daily 1,250 Soviet-style railroad cars with a capacity of 84 tons each. There are also clear indications that the entire line and port arrangements were constructed with military needs in mind.[46]

Based on Polish experience, one can reasonably deduce who is paying for this project, how costs are divided, and which bodies are responsible for planning and carrying out the project.[47] There could not be any such major project without direct engagement of the national central planning bodies, in particular their military departments (directorates). In addition, on the national level, the head of the military departments of the ministries sponsoring the particular project must participate in implementing the investment project. In the case of the Klaipeda-Mukran ferry line, one can assume that these were the military departments of the ministries of transportation of the USSR and of the German Democratic Republic. These departments are directly subordinated to the mobilization and transportation department of each general staff, which doubtless also had representatives and experts in on the planning of the line. Such teams most likely did not work as a formal subcommission of the WTO command or of CEMA's MIC, but as an ad hoc binational group. This is because the project involved the Soviet Union and a given East European country. If, however, such a project were to involve two East European states, the USSR would try, in one way or another, to incorporate such plans into the network of WTO/CEMA planning institutions.

The Soviet Union appears to be casting about for new operational and formal (juridical) ways of coping with recent economic difficulties and centrifugal tendences within the WTO-CEMA nexus. Such thinking is evident in a recent article by Yuriy S. Shiryayev, Director of the International Institute of Economic Problems of the World Socialist System and member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Shiryayev wrote:

The process of forming a new economic mechanism for CEMA requires reorganization not only in the structure and functions of its representative organs but also, it would seem, in the functions of the permanent apparatus of the Council, and the scientific and information infrastructure that services its activity. It would be a good idea, in particular, to study the question of whether this permanent apparatus should perform not only ancillary but also, to a certain extent, independent functions . . . . The apparatus of

[44]The close linkage between defense and economic matters in Soviet eyes was highlighted in 1981, when a possible Soviet military intervention in Poland was being planned. On March 27, 1981, a special group of 30 high-ranking Soviet officials arrived secretly in Warsaw. Among them were military officers, KGB officials, and experts from the USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan). See Kuklinski, loc. cit. Very possibly some of the Gosplan officials were from the Military Directorate and members of the Soviet Union's Military-Industrial Commission.

[45]See the discussion in Michael Checinski, "Poland's Military Burden," loc. cit., pp. 42–43, and sources cited therein.

[46]Helmut Kujawa and Peter Zerbe, "A Road for the Supply of the Red Army," *Die Welt* (Bonn), July 28, 1986, p. 3.

[47]From interviews with former Polish staff members of the Military Department of the Central Planning Commission and with Karel Kaplan.

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the Council would perform much more successfully its role in deepening economic integration if it relied in this role on the collective organ of interparliamentary cooperation. Regular meetings of the relevant commissions of the highest legislative organs of the fraternal countries could promote the desirable convergence of standards of national legislation in the interests of facilitating and simplifying mutual contacts at all levels of economic activity.[48]

Shiryayev evidently deemed unsatisfactory the work of CEMA's Conference of Legal Representatives, a body created in 1970 (and normally headed by a Soviet specialist) for the purpose of developing uniform legal norms and provision for the regulation of economic, scientific, and technological cooperation.[49] No doubt, unification of the military-economic and defense legislation of the East European countries is of great importance for the entire system of war-economic planning within the WTO environment, and, indeed, for some time the matter has been introduced as a goal in the defense laws of the WTO members.[50]

Focusing on the defense aspects of Soviet/WTO/CEMA relations provides useful insight into the complex political, economic, military, and social factors involved in bloc dealings. The key to what direction Soviet–East European relations will take lies in carefully analyzing the most sensitive—and, by its nature, most national—area of activity: the economy. Economic relations within CEMA and the relations of each of its members with the world as a whole will, in the long run, have the strongest impact not only on the formal and informal links of both CEMA and the WTO themselves but also on the entire complex of Soviet influence and control in the East European countries.

The Soviet Union is still able to paralyze any independent action by its East European allies in the political and military fields, but it does not have such untrammeled sway in the economic arena. Despite the expansion of all kinds of institutional links and the Soviet use of various forms of coercion (here an important role is played by the artificial CEMA pricing system), the margin for independent action by the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members is likely to grow with each passing year, even in such politicized areas as military industry.[51] The East European allies' lack of freedom to pursue independent policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, so clearly demonstrated in everything connected with the Warsaw Pact, is becoming less pronounced in CEMA activities. Moreover, the possibility cannot be excluded that some of the East European economies—those of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and even Poland, for example—may in the long term become instruments of coercion against the USSR.

The importance of economic policy in the whole complex of Soviet–East European relations will continue to grow as a result of the internal mechanisms of the economies themselves, which show a tendency to become more flexible. No leadership successions in the USSR and the East European countries, ideological dogma, or military and political ambitions will have as great an impact. Recent Soviet arms control proposals may even accelerate the process of moving the center of coordination of political decisons still further from the Warsaw Pact institutions to CEMA, because the tendency to focus the competition with the West more on technological than on purely military issues perforce will result in increasing the role of economic institutions. This trend may afford East European countries greater room for maneuver in both domestic and international politics.

[48]Yu. S. Shiryayev, "The Mechanism of Cooperation: New Criteria," *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 30, July 1986, p. 20.

[49]Nicolae, op. cit., p. 36.

[50]See, for example, *Dziennik Ustaw PRL* (Warsaw), No. 44, Nov. 29, 1967, and No. 18, Aug. 6, 1979; and *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Mar. 27–28, 1982. This issue is also discussed by Gen. D. A. Volkogonov, Ed., *Marksistko-Leninskoye ucheniye o voyne i armii* (Marxist-Leninist Teachings on War and the Army), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1984, pp. 194–95, 202.

[51]Michael Checinski, "The Warsaw Pact, Comecon, and the Non-Soviet Military-Industrial and Research and Development Sector," in *Osteuropa Wirtschaft* (Munich), No. 4, 1987.

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Electoral Choice in the Soviet Bloc

Werner Hahn

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev used the occasion of the January 27–28, 1987, Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to announce a landmark program of political reform or "democratization." This program is a sequel to the extensive economic reforms Gorbachev has proposed since becoming general secretary. The most striking and concrete of his democratization proposals was the call for a choice of candidates and for secret balloting in party elections, for nominations of more than one candidate in elections to the soviets, and for elections rather than appointments of factory directors and other economic officials. The idea of choice—regardless of how genuine—in Soviet elections sounds revolutionary and appears to run counter to the long-established emphasis on tight control from above, that is, on "democratic centralism."

Gorbachev's proposals suggest a willingness to risk challenging the entrenched position and privileges of the party and state apparatus by giving the public increased say in political life—a new departure for a Soviet regime. He is apparently motivated by the realization that both average citizens and rank-and-file party members must be given a greater sense of participation in governing the country (and the party) and in influencing decisions affecting their lives if they are to be expected to work harder and more efficiently to help overcome the country's current socioeconomic malaise. According to the version of his plenum report published in *Pravda* on January 28, Gorbachev argued that "a house can be put in order only by a person who feels he is the owner."

Gorbachev also sees such democratization as the only real guarantee against the recurrence of abuses of power, corruption, and gross mismanagement that have been exposed since Leonid Brezhnev's death in 1982. In his January plenum speech, Gorbachev argued that traditional "control from above" needs to be balanced with more "control from below." Similarly, a close ally of the General Secretary, CPSU Secretary Aleksandr Yakovlev, recently stated that "democracy and openness are the most effective remedies for any antisocial phenomena," and added that "if democracy had operated reliably everywhere, it would surely not have been possible for glaring problems to pile up in the social sphere."[1]

Gorbachev's democratization proposals—though radical for the Soviet Union—are not unprecedented for communist states and, in fact, appear patterned on practices already introduced in several other communist countries. Poland introduced choice in party elections in 1980–81 (although it has largely backed away from this practice since martial law was imposed in December 1981); Hungary introduced elections of factory directors in 1984; and electoral laws in Poland, Hungary, China, Vietnam, and Cuba now all require that in elections to state institutions the number of candidates exceed the number of positions to be filled.[2]

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[1]In a speech before an audience of Tadzhik intelligentsia. See *Kommunist Tadzhikistana* (Dushanbe), Apr. 12, 1987.

[2]See B. A. Strashun's article on state election systems in communist countries, in the December 1986 issue of *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (Moscow), p. 69; also his article in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Jan. 30, 1987.

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The experience in Hungary, Poland, and other communist countries may have suggested to Gorbachev, Yakovlev, and others that a communist regime can live—albeit uneasily—with more democratized electoral procedures. The Gorbachev regime admittedly studied this experience before formulating the proposals presented at the January plenum. CPSU Secretary Yegor Ligachev stated at an April 1987 press conference in Hungary that "we of course took into account the experience of Hungary . . ."[3] in providing a choice of candidates in the upcoming local soviet elections in the USSR. Indeed, the changes in the Soviet electoral system that Gorbachev has proposed bear marked similarity to some of the changes introduced earlier in Poland and Hungary. Given this similarity, a brief examination of Gorbachev's proposals and then of the Polish and Hungarian experience can provide us with some insight into how Gorbachev's proposals may eventually be implemented and with what effect.

Gorbachev's Proposals

Speaking on "Restructuring and the Party's Cadre Policy," Gorbachev outlined a program of political reforms aimed at significantly increasing rank-and-file participation in party, government, and economic decision-making.

Party. Gorbachev reported that many people were saying that party secretaries, "including first secretaries," should be elected by secret ballot and that party committee members should be allowed to nominate several candidates.[4] He expressed the view that this was a good idea because elections would "increase the responsibility of secretaries to the party committees that elected them."

Gorbachev added that the Politburo also supported further democratization of the "central leadership organs of the party." However, he hastened to add that the principle according to which decisions of higher party committees—even on personnel matters—are binding on lower committees should not be changed, thereby acknowledging the threat to democratic centralism implicit in a relaxation of controls over local elections.

Soviets. According to Gorbachev, the Politburo also wanted to change the system for electing deputies to the soviets. He mentioned that many citizens had proposed a discussion of multiple candidates, rather than just one, at public nomination meetings. Although the General Secretary did not specifically propose that a choice of candidates appear on the ballot as well, he did speak about moving away from having small districts with only one representative toward having larger districts represented by several people, thus raising the possibility of at least some choice (for example, four candidates for three seats). He noted approvingly that such changes would "enable every citizen to express his attitude toward a wider circle of candidates." In February, in a conversation with a crowd in Latvia, Gorbachev specifically proposed experimentation in the upcoming election of local deputies: "Let them nominate 3, 4, 5, or 10 people," so as to permit the authorities to "accumulate enough experience to draft a new law on the electoral system."[5] The experiment was officially announced in *Izvestiya* on March 29. According to *Izvestiya*, in the local soviet elections to be held on June 21, 1987, some districts would be combined into multi-representative districts, and the ballots would list more candidates than the number of seats to be filled.

Economic enterprises. Gorbachev was more direct in his call for a change in the selection of economic leaders, asserting that directors of industrial and agricultural enterprises, heads of departments within enterprises, and production team leaders and foremen should be elected rather than appointed from above. The party leader praised a recent experiment in Krasnodar that allowed work collectives and primary party organizations to discuss candidates for promotion to major enterprise posts before their appointment. He reported that this

[3] *Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 26, 1987.

[4] CPSU election rules already provide for secret balloting and a choice of candidates in some lower-level elections but not in those at higher levels or in the election of secretaries. The "Instructions on Conducting the Elections of Leading Party Organs," confirmed by the Central Committee on March 29, 1962 (*Spravochnik Partiynogo Rabotnika* [Party Worker's Handbook], Moscow, Politizdat, 4th ed., 1963), provided for secret balloting in elections of delegates to conferences and congresses and in elections of members of party committees, and gave delegates the right to nominate candidates from the floor. The instructions, however, noted that these apply only up through the republic level. When it came to electing leaders (rather than delegates or committee members), the rules specified that open balloting was to be used for electing bureaus and secretaries from the district (*rayon*) level up through the republics' central committees, and did not even describe procedures for electing the CPSU Politburo and Secretariat at Central Committee plenums, where open balloting is apparently used. The 1986 party congress amended the party statutes, but the new statutes, published in *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 4, 1986, like earlier ones, do not detail voting procedures, and no new election rules have yet been adopted.

[5] Moscow Radio, Feb. 18, 1987, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter cited as *FBIS-SOV*), Feb. 24, 1987, p. R/16. Present laws do not limit the number of candidates. As TASS analyst Boris Prokhorov said in a TASS broadcast on February 11, nomination of one candidate is "merely the existing practice." See *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 12, 1987, p. R/1. B.A. Strashun in the January 30, 1987, issue of *Izvestiya* stated that "no one directly forbids nominating a second candidate;" the one-candidate practice "just developed" (*tak slozhilos*).

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Moscow Television on February 18, 1987, pictures Mikhail Gorbachev talking about elections with a crowd in Latvia.

practice had led to the rejection of over 200 nominees.[6] A draft "Law on State Enterprises" was published in *Pravda* on February 8, 1987. It envisaged the election of directors by either open or secret vote at a general meeting of each plant's collective, subject to confirmation by higher organs.

Of the three suggestions, the proposal for a choice of candidates in party elections is clearly the most sensitive. This was no doubt the reason why the resolution adopted by the January CPSU Central Committee plenum failed to mention the idea of multiple candidates in party elections and only vaguely approved the "principled way" in which the Politburo had raised the question of "broadening intra-party democracy." In contrast, the resolution clearly endorsed the moves to "enable the voter to express his attitude toward a larger number of candidates" in elections to the soviets, and called "essential" the introduction of procedures allowing for the election of economic managers.[7]

[6]Krasnodar *kray* first secretary Ivan Polozkov in an article published in a November 1986 issue of *Kommunist* (No. 17), described his province's experiment with openness in cadre work. Since 1983, he said, 8,662 party, soviet, trade union, Komsomol, and economic officials had been promoted after labor collectives and party organizations had discussed their candidacies; 224 nominees were rejected as a result. He related how his own nominees for *kray* second secretary and other top posts, while "rated positively" in general, had been subjected to sharp and embarrassing criticism at party committee plenums.

[7]*Pravda*, Jan. 29, 1987. Gorbachev and his allies apparently feel that extending democracy in soviets and enterprises also requires that similar steps be taken in the party. CPSU Secretary Lev Zaykov said in a March 4 speech in Prague: "After all, we cannot conceive of a situation in which the senior officials in state agencies, enterprises, institutions, and social organizations are elected in a democratic way, while in the party apparatus everything remains unchanged." See *Pravda* (Bratislava), Mar. 5, 1987.

Initial Soviet Implementation

The measures proposed by Gorbachev have already begun to be put into effect in some parts of the USSR by officials supportive of his program. In some cases, changes had already been carried out prior to Gorbachev's speech due to local initiative; but in most instances, officials only began to implement such practices after the January plenum, and some specifically cited Gorbachev's speech as the reason for taking such actions.

Election of plant directors. In a January 3, 1987, *Komsomolskaya Pravda* interview, Latvian party First Secretary Boris Pugo reported on the recent election of a plant director in Latvia in a contest between two candidates as well as the election of an agricultural academy rector by secret ballot from a field of five candidates. On February 7, 1987, the same newspaper ran an article which quoted Pugo as saying that the election of team leaders, shop managers, and foremen had become "widespread" in Latvia. Pugo said that he was recommending the extension of the practice to agricultural enterprises as well. The same issue of *Komsomolskaya Pravda* described in detail an actual contest for the directorship of a Latvian bus plant, complete with vigorous campaigning by the five candidates and the presentation of "pre-election platforms." Reportedly, excitement ran high during the January 28 voting by the plant staff.[8]

Komsomol elections. The January 3, 1987, *Komsomolskaya Pravda* interview with Pugo also revealed that some Komsomol organs had begun holding multi-candidate elections on their own: "For the first time in the country" a Komsomol organization at a Riga plant had run several candidates for the post of plant secretary, and a few other Komsomol organizations had followed its lead. Pugo described open challenges to local Komsomol secretaries selected from above, including a case in which the incumbent first secretary was voted out in favor of someone nominated from the floor. Similar contests elsewhere have also been reported: a three-way election race for first secretary of the Donetsk city Komsomol was described by TASS on February 2.

Party elections. On February 10, in the first reports of multi-candidate elections in the party itself, *Pravda* and

[8]The paper's correspondents reported being greeted with cynicism in Moscow: "Are you serious? You believe these democratic games? You even think that they'll really let them elect [the director] themselves there in Yelgava?" A 40-minute documentary on the election appeared on television on March 5.

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From March 5, 1987, Moscow television coverage of elections for director in a Riga plant: above, candidate V. D. Gorbunov addresses the workers as his competitor, S. N. Bossert, listens; at right, a worker selects Bossert by crossing out the name of Gorbunov on the ballot.

Sovetskaya Rossiya described in detail a contest between two candidates for first secretary of a *raykom* in Kemerovo, which was settled by secret ballot, 29 to 20. The contest had been suggested by *obkom* first secretary Nikolay Yermakov, inspired—as he said—by the proposals of the January plenum. He personally nominated the two candidates at the *raykom* plenum. Gorbachev spoke approvingly of this contest in a speech in Riga on February 19.[9] A three-way contest for party secretary in the Kharkiv tractor plant was reported in *Radyanska Ukraina* on February 20, and a two-way contest for *raykom* first secretary in Vinnytsya was described in *Pravda Ukrainy* on February 26.

East European Experience

Although Gorbachev did not mention Poland or Hungary in his speech to the plenum, Ligachev and others have referred to those countries as examples,[10] and Gorbachev's proposals clearly were akin to the democratization initiatives in those countries. Multi-candidate elections have occurred widely in the Polish communist party in recent years, a choice of candidates has been offered in Polish and Hungarian state elections, and the election of plant directors was decreed in Hungary in 1984. Let us examine each of these in turn.

Elections in the Polish party. The ruling Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza—PZPR), under intense pressure from rebellious party organizations, changed its election rules in late 1980 to make secret balloting obligatory, to mandate at least two candidates for every post, to allow nominations from the floor, and to block interference by higher organs.[11] Under the new system, election commissions of party conferences or congresses nominate a slate of

[9]Riga Radio, Feb. 19, 1987, in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 25, 1987, p. R/13. Some have also broached the need for contested elections at the highest levels. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*'s reformist economic editor Aleksandr Levikov reported in *Moscow News*, No. 5, February 1987, that people from the audience attending a lecture he had delivered had raised the question of extending such elections to the very top: "And what do you think—should there be a competitive system among the top leadership of the country also?" Levikov did not report his response.

[10]In addition to Ligachev, TASS analyst Boris Prokhorov in his February 11, 1987, TASS item published in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 12, p. R/1, and B. A. Strashun in *Izvestiya*, Jan. 30, 1987, cited East European models.

[11]The following is drawn from my forthcoming book on reforms and elections in Poland. *Democracy in a Communist Party: Poland's Experience since 1980*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1987.

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candidates equal to the number of posts to be filled. At the conference or congress itself, delegates can then nominate from the floor as many additional candidates as they wish. Likewise, members of party committees can nominate additional candidates in elections to their administrative bodies: for example, the Central Committee members can nominate additional candidates for the Politburo or Secretariat. With respect to secret balloting, it applies to virtually all elections. The traditional list system is still used, but now the list includes more candidates than positions. Delegates or committee members vote by crossing off names until the list is reduced to the number of existing positions. Previously, the voting was often by show of hands, and there had been little or no choice, even on lists of candidates for party organs.[12] Under the new rules, the power of higher organs to dictate personnel decisions was also ended: whereas earlier party rules specified that secretaries elected by lower organizations had to be "confirmed by higher party organs," after 1980, higher organs only had the right to verify the procedural correctness—not the choice itself.[13]

Under these new rules, discontented local party organizations voted out incumbent leaders all over the country in 1981, and the Politburo rarely even ventured to recommend candidates for local positions. At the spring 1981 election conferences preceding the July PZPR congress, delegates had extensive choice in electing party committees[14] and delegates to the congress.[15] Moreover, in 37 of the 49 provinces, there were at least two candidates for provincial first secretary; almost half (24) of the 49 province conferences elected a new first secretary (most incumbents did not even run for reelection); in 14 cases the first secretary won with 60 percent or less of the vote, and in 7 cases it took two or more ballots to select a first secretary. Some out-and-out reformers became provincial first secretaries: Solidarity member Stanisław Jasiński defeated the incumbent in Legnica province,[16] and outspoken activist Edward Skrzypczak was elected in Poznań.[17]

Wojciech Jaruzelski, then Poland's Premier and Defense Minister, and Stanisław Kania, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), at the Ninth Extraordinary PUWP Congress, in July 1981, which saw large numbers of party leaders voted out of the Central Committee.

—Lehtikuva via Photoreporters.

When the Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the PZPR assembled in July 1981, congress managers succeeded in holding down the number of nominees from the floor to 279 candidates for the 200-member Central Committee.[18] Nevertheless, delegates used their right of secret ballot to vote against officials up and down the line, voting out 11 of the 15 incumbent Politburo and Secretariat members who ran for election to the Central Committee.[19] As a result, a drastically different Central Committee emerged from the election. It was almost devoid of party officials,[20] consisting largely of rank-and-file workers and farmers.[21] Moreover, 41 of the 200

[12]According to *Fakty i Komentarze* (Warsaw), June 18, 1986, until 1961, PZPR rules had allowed only as many candidates as there were seats. Before 1981, only 15 percent more candidates than seats were allowed, according to *Życie Partii* (Warsaw), February 1981, p. 8.

[13]The new election rules were published in the February 1981 issue of *Życie Partii*. The rules were further liberalized by the March 1981 Central Committee plenum. See ibid., April 1981, p. 9, and statements by Central Committee Organizational Department deputy head Ryszard Lukasiewicz in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Apr. 2, 1981.

[14]For example, in Łódz there were 196 candidates for 121 seats on the provincial committee. See *Głos Robotniczy* (Łódz), June 23, 1981.

[15]For most provinces where details were reported in the local papers, there were about twice as many candidates as delegate seats available; voting sometimes required 6, 7, or even 8 ballots before enough candidates received the required 50 percent to fill out the whole slate of delegates to the congress. Some Politburo members were already defeated in their bids to be elected as delegates to the congress, thus ruling out the possibility of their reelection to the Central Committee and Politburo.

[16]*Gazeta Robotnicza* (Wrocław-Legnica), June 24, 1981.

[17]*Gazeta Poznańska*, June 25, 1981.

[18]Rather than being directly nominated from the floor, the names of candidates proposed from the floor had to be submitted via delegation heads to the election commission. For example, a Gdańsk delegate stated that "every delegate had the right and possibility of nominating candidates for party leadership bodies by means of his province caucus of delegates." See *Głos Wybrzeża* (Gdańsk), July 21, 1981.

[19]Another four had been defeated or dropped out during the running for delegate: only Stanisław Kania, Wojciech Jaruzelski, Kazimierz Barcikowski, and Stefan Olszowski were reelected.

[20]It included only the premier, one deputy premier, five ministers and deputy ministers, and three Central Committee secretaries.

[21]*Głos Wybrzeża*, July 24–26, 1981, and *Słowo Ludu* (Kielce-Radom), July 21–22, 1981, specified that a majority were workers and farmers.

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members elected belonged to Solidarity.[22]

Martial law brought an end to such uncontrolled elections. Relying on military men to implement his orders, Wojciech Jaruzelski simply suspended the party election rules during most of 1982, sanctioned the removal of a number of elected officials and the expulsion of a considerable number of party members, and managed to reestablish democratic centralism in practice.

Yet, reiterating his commitment to the 1981 "renewal" (*odnowa*), Jaruzelski did not formally abolish the key democratic provisions in the election rules. Instead, he gradually weakened them. Altered election rules were approved at the March 18, 1984, National Conference of Delegates. As published in the March 28, 1984, *Życie Partii,* the changed rules still provided for secret balloting at all levels, "an unlimited number of candidates," and a "number of candidates [exceeding] the number elected." The requirement that there be choice of candidates was evaded by giving party conferences the right to determine the number of candidates for an office. Thus, as the March 28, 1984, issue of *Życie Partii* explained, if a conference decided that it wanted to vote on only one candidate for first secretary, "it has the right to adopt that decision" without being in violation of the provisions in the election rules stipulating more than one candidate.

The 10th PZPR Congress, in June 1986, further amended party statutes and election rules by dropping the provision for an "unlimited number of candidates." The clause stating that "the number of candidates must exceed the number elected," was balanced by the provision that a conference, congress, or committee had the right to set the number of candidates and to do so by open vote.[23]

Jaruzelski has thus managed to live with election rules that mandate secret balloting and allow party members to nominate candidates from the floor to run against the official nominees. Informal control has largely sufficed to keep party conferences from openly attacking leadership decisions and rejecting candidates recommended from above, but it has not prevented occasional challenges.

The regime has apparently made little effort to block the nomination of additional candidates for party committees or for delegations to conferences and the national congress. Reports on party election campaigns in late 1983 and early 1984, as well as in early and late 1986, often mention nominations from the floor. For example, during the May 1986 election of delegates to the 1986 congress, all provincial conferences had more candidates than the allotted number of slots, even though the choice was narrow.[24] At lower levels there were sometimes spirited contests among several candidates for delegate, and nominees from the floor occasionally defeated those nominated by the election commissions.[25]

Efforts at restricting choice have been most obviously focused on the elections of first secretaries—the most critical post. The practice of having the Politburo propose a candidate for the post of provincial first secretary has been revived, and, since the declaration of martial law in December 1981, the regime has managed to have all its candidates for provincial first secretaries elected.[26] Nevertheless, during the elections in early 1984, there was still a choice of candidates for first secretary in five of the 49 provinces, and in three cases the Politburo candidate won by only a narrow margin. In Płock and Gorzów, the first secretary won with only 53 percent of the vote.[27] In Olsztyn, an opposition candidate not only ran against the official candidate but attacked the government for treating agriculture "improperly" and regarding farmers "as a lower category of citizen." He won 120 votes to the incumbent's 203.[28] Occasional wide-open contests for first secretary occurred at lower levels.[29] In provincial elections of committees and secretaries in late 1986, however, there appeared to be no contests for the post of first secretary.

State elections in Poland. In recent years, Poland, like Hungary, has switched to offering a choice of candidates in elections to the parliament. Unlike Hungary, however, it has maintained tight control over the process, making its two-candidate elections almost as meaningless as the earlier one-candidate elections.

The Polish electoral system established for the June 17, 1984, local peoples council elections and for

[22]According to Helena Lazar in *Gazeta Krakowska*, July 24–26, 1981.

[23]The amended statutes and rules were published in a 1986 pamphlet, *Statut Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej, z uzupełnieniami i poprawkami uchwalonymi przez X Zjazd PZPR* (The Statute of the Polish United Workers' Party with Supplements and Corrections Ratified by the 10th PUWP Congress), Warsaw, Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza. See Article 21 of the statutes and Article 6 of the rules.

[24]Of the 49 provinces, 21 had only five or fewer extra candidates. The greatest choice was in Piła, with 36 candidates for 23 seats, and Łomża, with 19 for 12 seats.

[25]Some examples can be found in *Gazeta Poznańska*, Mar. 25, 1986, and *Gazeta Lubuska*, Mar. 17 and Apr. 5–6, 1986.

[26]Some, however, openly objected to this practice of making recommendations. In a February 11, 1984, Polish Radio interview, Central Committee Organizational Secretary Włodzimierz Mokrzyszczak admitted that "some of our comrades did not want recommendations," and at the March 1984 National Conference of Delegates (according to *Trybuna Ludu*, Mar. 19, 1984), some delegates questioned whether it was a "healthy situation" when candidates recommended by the authorities always won and no one nominated from the floor was elected.

[27]*Trybuna Ludu*, Jan. 16, 1984, and *Gazeta Lubuska*, Jan. 23, 1984.

[28]*Gazeta Olsztyńska*, Jan. 16, 1984.

[29]See *Echo Krakowa*, Dec. 14, 1983, and *Gazeta Pomorska* (Toruń-Bydgoszcz), Nov. 29, 1983.

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May 1986 voting for delegates to the 10th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party at a meeting in Poznań province.

—Gazeta Poznańska, May 26, 1986.

the October 13, 1985, Sejm election,[30] provided for two candidates for every seat (except for the national list, explained below). However, the opportunity for real contests was negated by several provisions and practices:

- The candidates were carefully selected by the authorities, and the public could not get a candidate on the ballot if the authorities opposed him. While citizens could—and did—nominate candidates from the floor (in addition to those nominated by official electoral collegiums), the electoral collegiums selected the two finalists.[31] Thus, in the 1984 Olsztyn city council election, of the 346 individuals originally nominated for the 85 seats, the election collegium chose 170 to be placed on the ballot.[32]
- The officially preferred candidates were given an almost unsurmountable advantage by being listed first on the ballot, rather than having their names appear in alphabetical order. Since the electoral law provided that one's vote was counted as cast for the first candidate on the ballot unless the voter had crossed that candidate's name off,[33] and since most voters—following a long-established practice—simply dropped their ballot in the urn without marking it, the first candidate listed on the ballot virtually always won and almost invariably with over 90 percent.[34]
- To further ensure that national leaders would not be voted out of office, a national list was drawn up, a list that included Jaruzelski and other top party leaders who ran unopposed. All 50 candidates were elected with over 96 percent of the vote, although a certain number of voters did make the special effort of crossing off the top leaders. As a result, top party leaders came in with fewer votes than most other candidates on the national list. The highest a Politburo member ranked in percentage of votes was 25th, and Jaruzelski himself ranked only 45th among the 50. Since the 50 candidates included 28 non-communist party members (Democratic Party, United Peasant Party, Catholic or other "non-party" candidates), voters had the opportunity to vote against PZPR members, and many did. The top 10 vote getters included only one PZPR member, and only 6 communists were among the top 25.
- District elections were organized to avoid head-to-head contests between communist and non-communist candidates: there were always two PZPR members running against each other, two United Peasant Party candidates running against each other, two Democratic Party candidates running against each other, or two independents running against each other. This reality was obscured by the failure of most local newspapers to identify the candidates by party affiliation. The Sejm electoral law calls for identification of candidates on the ballot by age, occupation, workplace, and domicile, but not by party (Article 61). Thus, the proportion of seats for the PZPR and other parties had been effectively determined before the elections. For example, there were 280 candidates for 140 seats in the provincial people's council of Nowy Sącz; of these, 124 were PZPR, 48 United Peasant Party, 16 Democratic Party, and 92 independent. This meant that the PZPR was guaranteed to win 62 seats (44 percent of the total).[35]

[30]The text of the January 1984 local election law was printed in the February 28, 1984, issue of *Odrodzenie* (organ of the Patriotic Movement of National Salvation, published in Warsaw); the text of the May 29, 1985, Sejm election law appeared in the government paper *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), June 15–16, 1985.

[31]The process is described in *Trybuna Ludu*, Apr. 26, 1984, pp. 1–2.

[32]*Gazeta Olsztyńska*, May 19–20, 1984.

[33]See Articles 67 and 68 of the 1984 local election law and Article 79 of the Sejm election law.

[34]In the 1985 Sejm election, all number one candidates won, and only five received slightly less than 90 percent (*Trybuna Ludu*, Oct. 16, 1985). In the 1984 local elections, in 11 provinces where I found complete reporting in the papers, I found only one upset—or even close contest: *Nowiny* (Tarnobrzeg-Rzeszów), June 22, 1984, reported that a number two candidate in Tarnobrzeg province had won over the number one candidate, 6,510 to 5,378.

[35]*Gazeta Krakowska*, May 19–20, 1984.

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János Kádár, Secretary General of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, addresses voters at an election rally in a Sports Hall of Budapest's Csepel district on June 6, 1985.

—Interfoto MTI from Eastfoto.

State elections in Hungary. Hungary took a much riskier course than Poland by allowing voters a relatively free choice in voting (although the authorities retained considerable control over nominations). Being much less obviously controlled, the Hungarian system produced results dramatically different from Poland's. The Hungarian public could actually get non-approved nominees on the ballot; preferred candidates were not listed first out of alphabetical order; and voting requirements specified active rather than passive participation. As a result, the authorities had to resort to such tactics as packing nomination meetings to keep unwanted candidates off the ballot, and they had to make a real effort to turn out the vote for the candidates they preferred.

The 1983 Hungarian election law required two candidates (or more) for every seat, except for an unopposed "national list" of 35, which included party leader János Kádár. Unlike the Polish laws, however, it provided all nominees with equal legal opportunity to get on the ballot and established no open favoritism for any of the candidates.

For example, any candidate who could win a set percentage of the votes at public nomination meetings (open meetings where electoral district residents could put up candidates), could get onto the ballot. The Patriotic People's Front nominated two candidates for every seat, but third and fourth candidates were nominated in 58 of 352 districts, providing some alternatives to the official nominees. Some 156 candidates were proposed from the floor at nomination meetings, and 71 of these won enough votes to get on the ballot.[36]

In one exceptional case, a prominent dissident, László Rajk, won the required minimum of votes at a nomination meeting and might have gotten on the ballot had the authorities not packed subsequent nomination

[36]According to *Magyarország* (Budapest), June 16, 1985, p. 21. *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), May 21, 1985, carried a full list of candidates.

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meetings with people instructed to vote against him.[37]

Candidates were listed alphabetically, and voters had to participate actively in the voting process by marking their ballots, rather than simply dropping them in an urn. Failure to cross off all but one name rendered the ballot invalid, and an unmarked ballot did not automatically go to the top candidate (except in the case of the national list of 35 unopposed candidates, who received the vote automatically unless their names were crossed off).[38]

The result of these arrangements in the June 8, 1985, National Assembly election was a series of close contests and occasional upsets, giving the appearance of free elections. For example, of the 352 contested assembly seats (exclusive of the national list), 196 were won with 60 percent of the vote or less, sometimes with only a plurality (in a three- or four-way race). Few winners received 75 percent or more of the vote. In 42 instances, no one had a majority and runoff elections were required. About 25 candidates nominated from the floor were elected.[39] Some prominent political figures were defeated: former premier Jenö Fock lost 44.8 to 54.3 percent,[40] and former interior minister Béla Biszku lost in a runoff, receiving only 26.6 percent of the vote.[41]

Nevertheless, the results were not threatening to the regime. No dissidents won, and no incumbent Politburo members were defeated. Two Politburo members who ran in contested districts rather than on the national list won easily: László Maróthy received 87.7 percent of the vote, and György Aczél, 70.3 percent.[42] The regime managed to control the elections by subtle methods, although the absence of heavy-handedness did not necessarily convince most Hungarians that the election was free or meaningful.

The success of the more democratized Hungarian rules prompted some Polish observers to criticize Poland's election laws and urge dropping some of their restrictive features. For example, legal scholar Barbara Zawadzka argued in the journal of the Polish Institute of State and Law that control over nominations "suffices to prevent candidates taking opposition political positions from getting on the ballot" and that the "system of preferences for specified candidates" (listing a favored candidate first) and encouragement of "passive voting" (allowing voters to cast unmarked ballots and counting these for candidate number one) should therefore be eliminated as an "excessive" precaution. She stated that such a "system of preference should disappear from Poland's election law, just as it disappeared from Hungary's election law," because this step "has not threatened the socialist essence of state authority" in Hungary. "Passive voting," she argued, can "reduce to zero" the value of having a choice of candidates.[43]

Election of factory directors in Hungary. Economic reform laws adopted by the Hungarian Central Committee plenum on April 17, 1984, provide for the election of directors of smaller plants by assemblies of workers, and for the appointment of directors at larger plants by elected councils.[44] On September 12, 1984, Budapest Radio reported the first such secret ballot, which gave a deputy manager two-thirds of vote over a department head in voting for directorship of a Gyor factory.[45]

Relatively little has been written about the results of elections of directors, although they appear to have been undramatic during the initial months. An agricultural official reported that by the end of May 1985, a total of 152 agricultural enterprises had held elections and had voted out the incumbent directors in only five instances,[46] while an industry official noted that by October 1985 only six of a total of 84 industrial enterprise elections had resulted in the defeat of incumbent directors.[47] The latter official also mentioned that "internal" candidates tended to be preferred by factory collectives over "external" candidates recommended by the relevant ministry with jurisdiction over the factory.

Elections and Gorbachev's Intentions

The democratized election systems advanced by Gorbachev and emplaced in Poland, Hungary, and some other communist countries, appear aimed at establishing a mechanism whereby a systematic change

[37]This episode is described in Steven Koppany's "Nomination of Candidates for the Hungarian Elections Completed," Radio Free Europe (RFE), *Background Report* (Munich), No. 51, June 5, 1985. Candidates had to be approved by at least two meetings.

[38]All 35 received over 98 percent of the vote. See *Népszabadság* (Budapest), June 10, 1985.

[39]According to Koppany, "Election Results and Assessment," RFE, *Hungarian Situation Report* (Munich), June 21, 1985, p. 10, and Austrian Television, June 10, 1985, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-EEU*), June 10, 1985, p. F/2. In his article "Political Participation and Developed Socialism: The Hungarian Elections of 1985," published in *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1987, p. 45, Barnabas Racz reports that 78 were nominated from the floor and 43 were elected. These figures are based on data he received from the Patriotic People's Front, rather than the figures published in the press.

[40]See *Népszabadság*, June 10, 1985, or, for the most complete list of election results, *Magyar Közlöny* (Budapest), June 9, 1985.

[41]See the runoff results in *Népszabadság*, June 24, 1985.

[42]*Magyar Közlöny*, June 9, 1985.

[43]*Państwo i Prawo* (Warsaw), No. 2, February 1985, pp. 13, 20, 21, 25.

[44]See *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), May 1984, and *Pártélet* (Budapest), May 1984.

[45]*FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 13, 1984, p. F/5.

[46]Ministry of Agriculture and Food official József Oláh in *Pártélet*, No. 6, 1985, p. 23.

[47]Ministry of Industry official Sándor Major in *Magyar Nemzet*, Oct. 31, 1985.

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Workers at a Latvian auto plant cast ballots in elections for plant director in February 1987.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

in leadership can take place and the serious gap between an increasingly bureaucratized elite and an alienated public can be reduced. In the absence of a mechanism for ensuring regular change and renewal, officials tend to become entrenched and unresponsive to public needs. With too little public input, leaders may continue wrongheaded or ineffective policies, and change is introduced only in periodic convulsions when the situation has deteriorated to the point of disaster.[48] The public and the party's rank-and-file members increasingly view leaders as an unresponsive, distant ruling group immersed in corruption and privilege. In Poland, such an attitude of "them" (in Polish, "*góra*"—those up there, the leaders) and "us" ("*doly*"—we down here, the rank and file) developed during the late 1970's and was vehemently expressed in 1980–81, helping to fuel a revolt against virtually all officialdom.

Gorbachev is well aware of the stagnation that developed under Leonid Brezhnev and of public dissatisfaction over elite privileges—dissatisfaction probably reinforced and intensified by his own regime's increasing exposure of abuses, corruption, and high living by Soviet officals. Rank-and-file resentment over social injustice and unmerited privileges has even spilled over onto the pages of the official press. On February 13, 1986, *Pravda* published letters from workers assailing an "immovable, inert, and flabby 'party-administrative stratum'," which "expects only privileges." The letter writers called for "social justice" and an end to special privileges for the political elite. Moscow City Party First Secretary Boris Yeltsin stated at the 27th CPSU Congress that workers were engaged in "sharp" discussions about "social justice" and were expressing "indignation" over "special benefits for leaders."[49]

This is not to say that this problem has arisen only recently; it has long been prevalent in the Soviet Union.[50] Already at the 1981 CPSU Congress, current Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze called for "democratization" and a new relationship "between the leaders and the led" so as to close the gap between them.[51] The Gorbachev effort to provide some measure of choice in elections is an attempt to form a new relationship. While not offering much opportunity to vote against communists (in the USSR, as in Hungary, there is only one party), it does provide the masses with some opportunity to choose who will implement the party platform and how, as well as the opportunity to remove those officials who are perceived as incompetent, corrupt, or simply unresponsive to the public.[52]

[48]The lack of any mechanisms for removing recalcitrant leaders is a serious flaw of all communist systems. As Edward Szymański, first secretary of Włocławek (Poland), noted at the first Polish plenum after Edward Gierek's ouster (October 4, 1980), "we do not have a good mechanism for giving up posts," and "removal of those holding power at all levels must be something natural and not a desperate act." Polish Central Committee Secretary Andrzej Werblan complained that communist parties have "still not created sufficiently precise mechanisms for changing leadership teams" and each time a first secretary has been removed it has required "dramatic wrenching and conflicts." See *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 10-11 1980.

[49]*Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 27, 1986.

[50]And not only in the Soviet Union. Polish party reformers in 1980–81 consciously sought to create mechanisms to make party leaders more accountable to party organs and party members. This was evident in the discussion at the PZPR plenums of October 4, 1980 and December 1–2, 1980.

[51]*Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 26, 1981.

[52]According to legal scholar B. A. Strashun (see the December 1986 issue of *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*), with the consolidation of power by communist parties it becomes possible to draw voters not only into voting for candidates representing the party's line but also into choosing "which of the candidates is personally most suitable for implementing this line." Recent contests to elect directors and party leaders in the USSR have included talk of personal "platforms" as the basis for making a choice between candidates. See Kemerovo first secretary Yermakov's comments in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Feb. 10, 1987, and comments in a Feb. 6, 1987, *Moskovskaya Pravda* account of a plant election.

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Gorbachev's political reforms appear aimed at arming ordinary citizens and rank-and-file members of the party with some weapon against unresponsive officials, thereby reducing the perception of a gap. Even though limited in their effective scope, multi-candidate elections may give ordinary citizens some sense of being able to influence their leaders, either by directly voting out unpopular ones or by making the unpopular modify their actions to avoid alienating the electorate. During 1980–81, Polish communist party members used this opportunity to vote out most conservative party officials and elect reformers—sometimes even Solidarity members—to party leadership posts.

For Gorbachev, such multi-candidate elections represent a mechanism for limited change in a system with virtually no institutionalized means to restrain or remove leaders who depart too far from party norms. Elections may become his way of generating pressure on conservative officials who resist his reforms and try to hang on to power. While Eduard Shevardnadze was party first secretary of the Georgian republic, he bragged of using "democratization" to exert precisely that sort of pressure. As he himself related at the 1981 CPSU Congress, a conservative leader opposed to his reforms in Georgia had protested that "this democratization of yours will end with me losing my job"—which was precisely what happened, Shevardnadze smugly explained.[53]

Gorbachev's immediate goals are apparently pragmatic, and it still remains to be seen to what degree he is committed to far-going "democratization" of the system. But even the limited changes he has proposed have the potential for disrupting control from above—including Gorbachev's own. Moreover, they contain seeds for future changes in the essentially undemocratic and secretive Soviet system. Leading reformist "thinkers" such as Georgiy Shakhnazarov, Ivan Frolov, Fyodor Burlatskiy, Anatoliy Butenko, and Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, seem already to be visualizing a system based not on coercion, but on public participation. They apprarently believe that the party can, in the future, shift away from the traditional concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat"—with its concentration on seizing power, combating enemies, and controlling all aspects of society—in the direction of open debate among members on party policy and a more democratic system of party decision-making. Needless to say, the dangers of such thinking alarm conservatives, who fear even the slightest relaxation of controls. That political leaders like Gorbachev, Yakovlev, and Shevardnadze are beginning to look to such unconventional solutions for the basic defects in the traditional Stalinist system only indicates how serious they deem these defects to be.

[53] *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 26, 1981.

Party Electioneering Soviet Style

The following are excerpts from the coverage of the first Soviet multi-candidate party election in recent years, a contest between I. V. Malkov and G.V. Sedykh to be first secretary of a party district committee in Kemerovo.

First deputy chairman of the district agricultural association, P. Gnedenko: "I"m for Malkov. We've worked together for a long time. He's coped with every job . . . . Ivan Vasilyevich [Sedykh] has serious shortcomings: rudeness, arrogance . . . " (*Pravda*, Feb. 10, 1987).

Kolkhoz Chairman G. P. Fedorov: "Personally, I'm for Sedyk . . . . He headed a lagging sovkhoz . . . . In two years he turned everything around and changed people's psychology" (ibid.).

Fedorov again: "I think although we have two candidates for one post, we nevertheless should designate a candidate number one and, in any case, a candidate number two. It's wrong that we are creating enormous nervous tension or the candidates by such a method of election. Perhaps I'm just used to old habits. Earlier, we were never forced to make a choice" (*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Feb. 10, 1987).

Sovkhoz party committee chairman L. N. Anikin (asked whether there is too much nervous tension for candidates): "I agree. But on the other hand, how can one not be nervous at such a time? They should be agitated" (ibid.).

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Checklist of Communist Parties in 1986

EDITOR'S NOTE: By arrangement with Richard Staar and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, CA, we present the latest version of the "Checklist of Communist Parties," covering developments in 1986. This Checklist continues a series that has appeared in *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (YICA)* since 1976, and has been jointly published with *Problems of Communism* since 1981. The current list is a slightly modified version of material to appear in *YICA 1986*. The authors and editors welcome corrections, additions, or amendments. Such contributions may be addressed to The Editors, Problems of Communism, 301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.

Richard F. Staar

THE WORLD communist movement has been fragmented for more than a quarter century, although Moscow continues to attempt to exercise leadership over communist and workers' parties the world over. What the 1986 retirement of veteran Comintern functionary Boris Ponomarev, a candidate Politburo member and head of the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), will mean for Moscow's relations with other communist parties is not certain. His successor as ID chief, Anatoliy Dobrynin, gives the impression of a pragmatic style; he also seems to have a highly influential voice in foreign policy decision-making—some have speculated that his voice is heard more than that of the nominal head of the government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze.

Richard F. Staar, coordinator of the international studies program at the Hoover Institution, Stanford (CA), resumed editorship of Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (YICA) *after having served as US Ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna from 1981 to 1983. A revised edition of his monograph,* USSR Foreign Policy after Détente, *has just been published.* *The author is indebted to Dennis L. Bark, Robert Conquest, Thomas H. Henriksen, Ramon H. Myers, James H. Noyes, William E. Ratliff, and Margit N. Grigory—all members of the* YICA *editorial board—for their contributions to this essay.*

Some indication of the extent of the CPSU's ongoing relations with other communist parties and revolutionary movements can be gauged from the 152 delegations, from 113 foreign countries, that attended the 27th CPSU Congress held in Moscow from February 25 through March 6, 1986.[1] Among ruling communist parties, neither the Albanians nor the Chinese were there. All of the communist countries of Eastern Europe sent their top leaders, as did the ruling parties of Afghanistan, Cuba, Ethiopia, and Vietnam. North Korea sent its deputy general secretary, as did the parties of France, Italy, and Japan. In addition to communist and workers' parties, there were delegations from a number of "revolutionary-democratic" parties, liberation movements, and a variety of socialist, social-democratic, and labor parties.

At the Congress, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev claimed that the liberation struggle in the Third World had been triggered by the 1917 Bolshevik revolution and that its course, based on the laws of Marxism-Leninism, could not be stopped. He asserted that although capitalism and imperialism were pursuing aggressive, adventuristic policies that had resulted in neo-colonialist exploitation of the less developed countries, poverty, backwardness, and indebtedness would be overcome through an irreversible process of socio-economic transformation with the assistance of the "socialist" (read, communist-ruled) states.[2]

With regard to world communism, Gorbachev

[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 26, 1986.
[2] For the full text, see ibid.

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stressed comradely consultations, acknowledging that the movement included differences and disagreements and suggesting that unity had nothing to do with uniformity. These remarks notwithstanding, the new CPSU program adopted by the congress states that the advance of world communism depends on fraternal relations based upon "socialist internationalism" (i.e., loyalty to Moscow) and adherence to Marxist-Leninist precepts by all ruling communist parties.[3]

It is interesting to note that Poland's General Wojciech Jaruzelski stated at his ruling party's congress in June 1986 that Polish communists thought a world conference of fraternal movements on the topic of defending peace should be held in the near future. Early in December a ranking Czechoslovak party member (Vasil Bil'ák) told a meeting of his comrades that, although 80 communist parties allegedly supported the proposal, Gorbachev had informed bloc leaders at the June summit of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) that any conference of parties should not weaken the world movement but strengthen it,[4] the logical inference being an indefinite postponement of such a world communist conference.

The Checklist published here names approximately 95 geographic entities with communist parties recognized by Moscow. Seven of these have two (in the case of Spain, three) Moscow-recognized movements each: Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, India, New Zealand, Spain, and Sweden.[5] Non-sovereign territories with Moscow-acknowledged communist parties include Guadeloupe, Martinique, Palestine, Puerto Rico, Réunion, and West Berlin.

Also included in the Checklist are what appear to be the more radical of the 24 or so political movements designated as "revolutionary democratic" by Moscow: namely those in Afghanistan, Angola, Bahrain, Benin, Cambodia, Congo, Ethiopia, Grenada, Mozambique, Nicaragua, South Yemen, and Zimbabwe.[6] These are usually, though not invariably, defined by Moscow as "vanguard revolutionary-democratic" parties. Only the movements in Bahrain and Grenada are not in power. A few of the more important communist parties not recognized by Moscow are given in italics. Some of these are pro-Chinese.

For those movements not designated "Communist Party of . . . ," the acronym of the party name appears in the list, with the full name provided in the legend at the end. Population figures provided for the various geographic entities are estimates as of July 1986.[7] Party membership figures—either the latest officially recorded claims or estimates as of December 31, 1986—come from the respective country profiles in *YICA 1986*. The list also includes the names of party leaders (the secretary general unless otherwise designated in parentheses), dates for the latest congress or national conference, the legal status of the movement, and if applicable, the percentage of votes and number of seats won in the most recent elections to parliament.

Most ruling parties claimed increases in membership: the Albanian (25,000); Afghan (20,000); Bulgarian (20,000); Chinese (4 million); Cuban (90,000); Czechoslovak (25,000); East German (11,000); Laotian (5,000); Mongolian (8,000); Polish (13,000); Romanian (57,000); and Soviet (600,000). The League of Communists of Yugoslavia, by contrast, has lost almost 11,000 members. Among non-ruling parties, the Sudanese, Brazilian, Colombian, Indian (both), New Zealand (Socialist Unity Party), Philippine (the Communist Party of the Philippines), Israeli, Tunisian, Austrian, Finnish, Italian, Maltese, and Dutch parties are estimated to have gained membership. Those in Malaysia, New Zealand (the Communist Party proper), Belgium, France, and West Germany are estimated to have suffered membership declines.

A number of notable changes occurred in party leaderships. Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani was ousted as leader of the Yemen Socialist Party in January 1986 as a result of intense factional warfare. Seydou Sissoko of Senegal's Party of Independence and Labor died in Moscow during the 27th CPSU Congress. Moses Mabhida of the South African Communist Party died in March. Babrak Karmal was removed as leader of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in May. Vietnamese Communist leader Le Duan died in July. Samora Machel of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique was killed in an airplane crash in October. The jailed Nureddin Kiamuri of Iran's Tudeh party was replaced at a party congress held abroad.

Table 1 lists some 27party congresses and four national conferences held during 1986, and identifies (in the footnote) two previously unreported congresses

[3]Ibid., Mar 7, 1986.

[4]Kevin Devlin, "The World Communist Movement," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *RAD Background Report* (Munich), No. 1, Jan. 3, 1987, p. 57.

[5]*The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), Dec. 5, 1986, notes most of these multiple recognitions by Moscow. Although the CPSU opposed the expulsion of the Stalinist minority from the Finnish party, Yegor Ligachev met with both factions of the Finnish communist movement in an autumn 1986 visit to Finland. See "CPSU Documents and Analysis," *Novosti Information Bulletin* (Moscow), No. 44, Nov. 20, 1986.

[6]For a listing, see Table 1.3 in Richard F. Staar, *USSR Foreign Policies After Detente*, Stanford CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1987, rev. ed., p. 14.

[7]US Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook: Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-six*, CR WF 86-001, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1986.

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Table 1: Party Congresses in 1986[1]

Party	Congress #	Date (s)
AKEL (Cyprus)	16th	Nov. 26–30
APK (Sweden)	28th	Nov. 7
CP of Argentina	16th	Nov. 4–7
CP of Austria	National conf.	May 23
CP of Belgium	25th	Apr. 18–20
CP of Bolivia	Extraord.	Apr. 26–29
CP of Bulgaria	13th	Apr. 2–5
CP of Cuba	3rd	Feb. 4–7; and Nov. 30–Dec. 2
CP of Czechoslovakia	17th	Mar. 24–28
CP of Germany (West)	8th	May 2–4
CP of Honduras	4th (cland.)	January
CP of India	13th	Mar. 10–18
CP of Ireland	19th	Jan. 31–Feb. 2
CP of Italy	17th (extraord.)	Apr. 9–13
CP of Netherlands	30th	Nov. 29–Dec. 2
CP of New Zealand	23rd	Apr. 22
CP of Portugal	11th (extraord.)	Feb. 2–6
CP of San Marino	11th	Jan. 27
CP of Soviet Union	27th	Feb. 25–Mar. 6
CP of Syria	6th	July
CP of USA	National conf.	Aug. 6–8
KKE-I (Greece)	4th	May
LPRP (Laos)	4th	Nov. 12–14
MPRP (Mongolia)	19th	May 28–31
PDPA (Afghanistan)	National conf.	Oct./Nov.
PPP (Panama)	8th	Jan. 24–26
PPSh (Albania)	9th	Nov. 3–8
PZPR (Poland)	10th	June 29–July 3
SED (East Germany)	11th	Apr. 17–21
SKJ (Yugoslavia)	13th	June 25–28
Tudeh (Iran)	National conf. (in exile)	1986

[1]Since publication of last year's "Checklist," information has been received regarding a 3rd Congress of the Communist Party of Burma, held September 9 through October 2, 1985; and a 4th Congress of the Communist Party of Iraq, held November 10–15, 1985.

held in 1985. The Communist Party of the Philippines vidently held a 9th Congress at the turn of the year, perhaps in early January 1987. Other major party gatherings scheduled for 1987 are in Denmark, Finland, Lebanon, Norway (the Norwegian Communist Party), Portugal, Spain, and Sweden (Left Party Communists). During 1986, communists in Haiti and the Philippines received legal status.

Voters went to the polls in 23 of the listed countries in 1986. In the case of elections in the communist or "revolutionary-democratic" states of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Mozambique, and North Korea, communists predictably won overwhelming victories in uncontested elections to seats in the national legislatures. Elsewhere, the communists, frequently running as part of a coalition, generally failed to make appreciable gains, except in Brazil, Colombia, and Spain. There were sharp losses recorded in France and its overseas departments.

A discussion of major developments in various regions of the world follows.

Africa (Subsaharan). Mozambique's FRELIMO, a "vanguard revolutionary-democratic" party, suffered a setback this year with Samora Machel's death, which caused a temporary interruption in the country's elections for local, provincial, and national assemblies. Former Foreign Minister Joaquim Alberto Chissano succeeded Machel as head of state and commander of the armed forces. Like his predecessor, Chissano was born in Gaza province and came from the Shangana subgroup of the Tsonga, the second largest of Mozambique's ten ethnic groups. Chissano is regarded as a moderate and pragmatic politician, likely to continue fighting the rebel forces, but also likely to look to the West for aid, even while remaining in the Soviet orbit.[8] Mozambique signed a cooperation agreement with CEMA in May 1986, the first such agreement of its kind between that Soviet-bloc organization and a southern African country.[9]

In nearby Zimbabwe, the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), presumed to be a "revolutionary-democratic" party in Soviet eyes, saw its parliamentary majority of 64 seats strengthened by the support of two deputies who defected from other groups. ZANU-PF President and Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe has begun to move toward a one-party state with a powerful executive. The economy remains divided between private enterprise and government ownership, the latter controlling all major businesses and newspapers. ZANU-PF continues to face deep ethnic rivalries within its ranks and the country itself. Zimbabwe is being drawn deeper into the fighting over the Beira Corridor in Mozambique, alongside FRELIMO. The 8th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement met in Harare and elected Robert Mugabe its chairman until 1989.[10]

Leadership changes took place within Angola's ruling, "revolutionary-democratic" Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party (MPLA-PT). Having re-

[8]*The New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1987, already reported a request for Western aid.

[9]Radio Maputo, May 22, 1986, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* (Washington, DC, hereafter—*FBIS-MEA*), May 28, 1986, p. U/1.

[10]*The New York Times*, Sept. 12, 1986.

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moved his second-in-command and ideological chief, Lucio Lara, in late 1985, President José Eduardo dos Santos in 1986 removed Director of Security and Intelligence Ludy Kissassunda, and Minister of Agriculture Evaristo Domingos.[11] The purge of these veteran revolutionaries from the Politburo suggests a dismissal of those who doubt dos Santos's economic policies and his conduct of the war with UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). Later, Antonio dos Santos Neto was dismissed from his position as head of the Central Committee's department for defense and security and was succeeded by Jose Pereira Teixeira.[12] Charges of corruption were cited as the reason for still more dismissals and the posting of influential party members as ambassadors abroad.[13]

The Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE)—another "vanguard revolutionary-democratic" party in Moscow's parlance—completed drafting a constitution for a regime that is to be known as a "people's democratic republic." The draft calls for the WPE to be the vanguard and only party, which "is the guiding force of the state and the entire society."[14] Ethiopia continued the forced resettlement of its population from the north to the southwest region. Three million people—10 percent of those to be affected—have already been relocated.[15]

In the wake of party leader Moses Mabhida's death in exile in Mozambique, the South African Communist Party (SACP) announced that Joe Slovo, a 60-year-old Lithuanian-born white lawyer active in the party since the 1940's, had been elected chairman, a position vacant since Yusef Dadoo's death in 1983. The SACP characterized this selection as symbolizing "the new era in which our party lives and fights—the era of revolutionary struggle for the final liberation of the South African people. . . ."[16] The SACP continued its long-time affinity for the Soviet Union but, reversing decades of hostility toward the CCP, it also sent a delegation led by Slovo on a 10-day visit to China in September.[17]

The Congolese Party of Labor (PCT), also a "vanguard revolutionary-democratic" party in Moscow's eyes, engaged in an ongoing purge directed at "alien elements."[18] In August a death sentence was passed on Claude Ndalla, a prominent leftist critic of the regime. Five-year suspended sentences were meted out to Jean-Pierre Thystere-Tchikaya, until 1985 the second most powerful man in the country, and Army Colonel Blaise Nzalakanda, indicating problems for the regime with the army. Congo President and PCT Secretary General Denis Sassou Ngouesso stressed the importance of indoctrination and of increased party control in an address to the army on its 20th anniversary.[19]

The Revolutionary Party of the People of Benin (PRPB), still another "vanguard revolutionary-democratic" party, continued its main preoccupation of the previous year, consolidating its organization at the grassroots level. To implement this goal, the PRPB ordered its 12 Politburo members to place greater emphasis on party-building activities (as opposed to administrative duties), established regular party publications, and made plans to establish a party school.[20]

Among the several Marxist and left-leaning parties in Senegal, the one recognized by Moscow is the Party of Labor Independence. There has been a delay in naming a successor for deceased party chairman Seydou Sissoko, since the post had been specifically designated for him as party founder when he stepped down from the general secretaryship in 1984.[21]

In the Sudan, the Communist Party elected five deputies to the parliament, including party Secretary General Muhammad Ibrahim Nugud. The party received 117,736 (2.8 percent) of the overall vote for 264 of 301 seats in the Constitutional Assembly.[22]

The Americas. Nicaragua remained the focus of international attention in Latin America. During 1986, the Sandinista government greatly reduced the already limited freedoms in the country, the most obvious action being the closing at mid-year of *La Prensa,* the only opposition newspaper, for allegedly "stepping up its level of provocation and disinformation."[23] One opposition leader in the country was quoted in the Paris daily *Le Monde* of June 24 as saying Nicaragua's legislative assembly was "designed for export purposes . . . . In practice, it has no power and is a mere sham." Nonethe-

[11]See *Keesing's Contemporary Archive* (Harlow, Essex) April 1986, par. 34280; and Luanda Domestic Service, Feb. 3, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA,* Feb. 4, 1986, p. U/1.

[12]Radio Luanda, Aug. 29, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA,* Aug. 29, 1986, p. U/1.

[13]Radio Luanda, Nov. 19, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA,* Nov. 20, 1986, pp. U/1–3.

[14]Radio Addis Ababa, Sept. 12, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA,* Sept. 18, 1986, pp. R/1–3.

[15]*The New York Times,* Oct. 28, 1986; also *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Jan. 12, 1987.

[16]*African Communist* (London), No. 106, 1986, p. 26. In January 1987, it was reported that the black leader Dan Tloome had become chairman of the SACP; Slovo, who had served as chairman for most of the previous year, was named secretary general. *Morning Star* (London), Jan. 20, 1987.

[17]Xinhua, Sept. 19, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC, hereafter—*FBIS-CHI*), Sept. 19, 1986, p. I/1.

[18]*World Marxist Review* (Toronto), January 1986, p. 44.

[19]*Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), June 20, 1986, p. 3.

[20]*World Marxist Review,* August 1986, pp. 39–40.

[21]Ibid., May 1986, p. 118.

[22]SUNA (Khartoum), May 25, 1986.

[23]*Barricada* (Managua), June 27, 1986, p. 5.

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CHECKLIST OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN 1986

L — legal; O — outlawed; R — ruling; U — unrecognized

Subsaharan Africa[a]	Mid-1986 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
A. Angola (MPLA-PT)	8,164,000	35,000 claimed	José Eduardo dos Santos	2nd, Dec. 2–9, 1985	R	— (1980); all 203 MPLA approved
B. Benin (PRPB)	4,141,000	Less than 2,000	Mathieu Kerekou (Chairman, CC)	2nd, Nov. 18–24, 1985	R	— (1984); all 196 PRPB approved
C. Congo (PCT)	1,853,000	9,000 est.	Denis Sassou-Ngouesso (Chair.)	3rd, July 23–30, 1984	R	95.0 (1984); all 153 PCT approved
D. Ethiopia (WPE)	35,210,000[e]	50,000 est.	Mengistu Haile-Mariam (Chair.)	1st (Const.), Sept. 6–10, 1984	R	n/a
1. Lesotho	1,552,000	No current data	Jacob M. Kena	7th, Nov. 1984	U	(1985)[f]
E. Mozambique (FRELIMO)	14,022,000	110,323 claimed	Samora Moisés Machel (d. Oct. 19) Joaquim Chissano (elect. Nov. 3)	4th, Apr. 26–29, 1983	R	— (1986)[g]
2. Nigeria (SWPP)	94,181,000[h]	No current data	Dapo Fatogun	1st, Nov. 1978	O	(1983)
3. Réunion	552,500	2,000 est.	Paul Vergès	5th, July 12–14, 1980	L	29.2 (1986); 13 of 45 to leftist coalition (7 for PCR)
4. Senegal (PIT)	6,980,000	No current data	Amath Dansoko	2nd, Sept. 28–Oct. 31, 1984	L	0.5 (1983); none
5. South Africa	33,241,000	No current data	Moses Mabhida (died, March 1986) Joe Slovo	6th, (Dec. 1984 or early 1985) in London	O	(1984)
6. Sudan	22,932,000	9,000 est.	Muhammad Ibrahim Nugud Mansur	4th (legal), Oct. 31, 1967	L	— (1986); 5 of 264 seats contested
F. Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF)	8,984,000	No current data	Robert G. Mugabe (President)	5th, Aug. 8–12, 1984	R	76.0 (1985); 64 of 100 (64 of 80 reserved for blacks)

The Americas[a]	Mid-1986 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
7. Argentina	31,186,000	70,000 est.	Athos Fava	16th, Nov. 4–7, 1986	L	2.0 (1985); none (FREPU coalition)
8. Bolivia	6,638,000	500 claimed	Simón Reyes Rivera (First Sec.) Carlos Soria Galvarro (min. fact.)[i]	5th, Feb. 9–13, 1985; Extraordinary, Apr. 26–29, 1986	L	2.2 (1985); 4 of 130 (FPU coalition
9. Brazil	143,277,000	20,000 claimed	Giocondo Dias	7th (Natl. Mtg.), January 1984	L	— (1986); 2 of 487

[a]Arabic numerals indicate the 95 countries or geographic areas in which Moscow apparently recognized the existence of communist parties. Listed with capital letters "A" through "J" are 12 significant "revolutionary democratic" parties (a majority of them ruling)—organizations on the verge of evolving into full-fledged communist parties in Moscow's eyes. In italics are several other important rival communist organizations, often pro-Beijing, that are not recognized by Moscow.

[b]Population figures are estimated totals as of July 1986; from US Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook: Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Six*, CR WF 86-001, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1986, unless otherwise noted.

[c]The party secretary general or general secretary, except where some other official is the most important, in which case the position occupied is noted in parentheses.

[d]An em-dash indicates that the communist party was legal and presumably participated in the election but the percentage of the vote received is not known. Where the party did not participate, the year of the most recent election (where the legislature still sits) is given in parentheses.

[e]Arthur S. Banks, Ed., *Political Handbook of the World 1986*, Binghamton, NY, CSA Publications, 1986, p. 170.

[f]Although the party is countenanced, it was not allowed to participate in the 1985 elections.

[g]Results from five districts could not be finally tallied, so no final percent was reported.

[h]*Political Handbook of the World 1986*, p. 405.

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The Americas[a] (cont.)	Mid-1986 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
10. Canada	25,644,000	2,500	William Kashtan	26th, Apr. 5–8, 1985	L	.05 (1984); none
11. Chile	12,261,000	20,000 est.[j]	Luís Corvalán Lepe	16th, June 1984 (clandestine)	O	n/a
12. Colombia	29,956,000	16,000 est.	Gilberto Vieira White	14th, Nov. 7–11, 1984	L	1.4 (1986); 9 of 199 to Patriotic Union
13. Costa Rica (PVP)	2,714,000	3,500 est.[k]	Humberto Vargas Carbonell	15th, Sept. 15–16, 1984	L	0.8 (1986); 1 of 57 (Pop. Alliance)
(PPC)		No current data	Manuel Mora Valverde	14th, Mar. 10–11, 1984	L	— (1986); 1 of 57 (United People's coalition)
14. Cuba	10,221,000	523,639 claimed	Fidel Castro Ruz	3rd, Feb. 4–7, and Nov. 30–Dec. 2, 1986	R	— (1986); all 499 PCC approved
15. Dominican Republic	6,785,000	750 est.	Narciso Isa Conde	3rd, Mar. 15–17, 1984	L	0.3 (1986); none
16. Ecuador	9,647,000	500 est.	René Maugé Mosquera	10th, Nov. 27–29, 1981	L	3.6 (1986); 3 of 71 to Broad Leftist Front
17. El Salvador	5,105,000	1,000 est.	Shafik Jorge Handal	7th, Apr. 1979	O	(1985)
G. Grenada (MBPM)	92,000	No current data	Kenrick Radix (Chairman)	n/a	L	5.0 (1984); none
18. Guadeloupe	334,000	3,000 est.	Guy Daninthe	8th, Apr. 27–29, 1984	L	— (1986); 22 0f 41 to left. coalition (10 to PCG)
19. Guatemala (PGT)	8,600,000	500 est.	Carlos González[l]	4th, Dec. 1969	O	(1985)
20. Guyana (PPP)	771,000	200 est.	Cheddi Jagan	22nd, Aug. 3–5, 1985	L	16.8 (1985); 8 of 53 elected members
21. Haiti (PUCH)	5,870,000	350 est.	René Theodore	1st, 1979	L	(1984—then illegal)
22. Honduras	4,648,000	200 est.[m]	Rigoberto Padilla Rush[n]	4th, Jan. 1986 (clandestine)	O	(1985)
23. Jamaica (WPJ)	2,288,000	75 est.	Trevor Munroe	3rd, Dec. 14–21, 1984	L	Boycotted 1983 election
24. Martinique	328,000	1,000 est.	Armand Nicolas	8th, Nov. 12–13, 1983	L	— (1986); 3 of 41
25. Mexico (PSUM)	81,709,000	40,800 claimed	Pablo Gómez Alvarez	2nd, Aug. 9–14, 1983	L	3.2 (1985); 12 of 400
26. Nicaragua (PSN)	3,342,000	No current data	Gustavo Tablada	10th, Oct. 1973	L	1.3 (1984); 2 of 96
H. (FSLN)		4,000 claimed	Daniel Ortega (Coordinator, Exec. Commiss.)	n/a	R	63.0 (1984); 61 of 96
27. Panama (PdP)	2,227,000	35,000 claimed [o] 750 est.	Rubén Darío Souza	8th, Jan. 24–26, 1986[p]	L	— (1984); none
28. Paraguay	4,119,000	4,000 est.	Julio Rojas (acting)	3rd, Apr. 10, 1971	O	(1973)
29. Peru	20,207,000	2,000 est	Jorge del Prado Chavez	8th (Extraord.), Jan. 27–31, 1982	L	26.0 (1984); 48 of 180 to Unit. Left coalition (6 PCP)
30. Puerto Rico	3,300,520	125 est.	Frank Irrizarry	Unknown	L	0.3 (1984); none
Suriname (RVP)[q]	*381,000*	*100 est.*	*Edward Naarendorp*	*Unknown*	*L*	*n/a*
31. United States of America	240,856,000	17,500 claimed	Gus Hall	23rd, Nov. 10–13, 1983	L	0.01 (1984); none
32. Uruguay	2,947,000	7,500 est.	Rodney Arismendi	20th, Dec. 1970	L	6.0 (1984); none (in Frente Amp.)
33. Venezuela	17,791,000	4,000 est.	Alonso Ojeda Olaechea	7th, Oct. 24–27, 1985	L	2.0 (1983); 3 of 195

[j]The Soria faction split from the main party at the 5th Congress over the role of the Communist Party in the Paz Estenssoro government.
[l]This seems a reasonable estimate for card-carrying members. *World Marxist Review* (Toronto) of July 1973 estimated 120,000 members.

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Asia and Pacific[a]	Mid-1986 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
34. Australia (CPA)	15,793,000	1,000 est.	Judy Mundey	28th, Nov. 4 1984	L	negl. (1984); none
(SPA)		500 est.	Peter Dudley Symon	5th, Sept. 28–Oct. 1, 1984	L	negl. (1984); none
35. Bangladesh	104,205,000	3,000 est.	Muhammed Farhad	3rd, Feb. 1980	L	— (1986); 5 of 300
36. Burma	37,651,000	3,000 claimed	Thakin Ba Thein Tin (Chairman, CC)	3rd, Sept. 9–Oct. 2, 1985	O	n/a
37. China	1,045,537,000	44,000,000 cl.	Hu Yaobang[f]	12th, Sept. 1–11, 1982	R	— (1981); all 3,202 CCP approved
38. India (CPI)	783,940,000	479,000 claimed	C. Rajeswara Rao	13th, Mar. 12–17, 1986	L	2.7 (1984); 6 of 544
(CPM)		361,500 claimed	E.M.S. Namboodiripad	12th, Dec. 25–30, 1985	L	6.0 (1984); 22 of 544
39. Indonesia	176,764,000	2,200 (including exiles)	Satiadjaya Sudiman (pro-Moscow) Jusuf Adjitorop (pro-Beijing)	7th Extraord., Apr. 1962	O	n/a
40. Japan	121,402,000	470,000 est.	Tetsuzo Fuwa (Chair., Presidium) Kenji Miyamoto (Chairman, CC)	17th, Nov. 19–25, 1985	L	9.5 (1986); 27 of 512
I. Kampuchea (KPRP)	6,388,000	7,500 est.	Heng Samrin	5th, Oct. 13–16, 1985	R	99.0 (1981); all 117
(DK or KCP)		*No current data*	*Pol Pot*	*3rd. Dec. 14, 1975*	*O*	*n/a*
41. Korea, North (KWP)	20,543,000	2,500,000	Kim Il-song	6th, Oct. 10–15, 1980	R	100 (1986); all 706 KWP approved
42. Laos (LPRP)	3,679,000	47,000 claimed[s]	Kaysone Phomvihane	4th, Nov. 13–15, 1986	R	(1975) 46-member Sup. Peop. Ass. all LPRP apptd.
43. Malaysia (CPM)	15,820,000	2,550 est.[t]	Chin Peng	Last known in 1965	O	(1984)
(MCP)		*800 est.*	*Ah Leng*	*Unknown*	*O*	*(1984)*
44. Mongolia (MPRP)	1,942,000	88,150 claimed	Jambyn Batmonh	19th, May 28–31, 1986	R	93.5 (1986); 346 of 370 approved by MPRP
45. Nepal	17,422,000	5,000 est.[u]	Man Mohan Adhikary	3rd (pre-split), 1961[v]	O	n/a
46. New Zealand (CPNZ)	3,266,000	50 est.	Richard C. Wolfe	23rd, Apr. 22 1984	L	— (1984); none
(SUP)		300 est.	George H. Jackson	7th, Oct. 26–27, 1985	L	0.5 (1984); none
47. Pakistan	101,855,000	Less than 200 est.	Ali Nazish	1st, 1976 (cland.)	O	(1985)
48. Philippines (PKP)	58,091,000	200 est.	Felicismo Macapagal	8th, 1980	L	(1986)
(CPP)		*20,000 est.*	*Rafael Baylosis*	*Reest. Dec. 26, 1968*	*O*	*(1986)*[w]
49. Sri Lanka	16,638,000	5,000 est.	Kattorge P. Silva	12th, Jan. 27–29, 1984	L	1.9 (1977); 1 of 168
50. Thailand	52,438,000	600 est.	Pracha Tanyapaiboon	4th, Feb. 1984 (cland.)	O	(1983)
51. Vietnam	61,994,000	1,700,000 claimed	Le Duan (d. July 14); Truong Chinh (replaced Dec. 18); Nguyen Van Linh	6th, Dec. 15–19, 1986	R	97.9 (1981); 496 of 614; all VCP endorsed

[k]There is no good basis for judging what percent of the pre-split estimated membership of the Popular Vanguard Party joined Manuel Mora Valverde in the new Costa Rican People's Party, which held a rump 14th Congress in March 1984.

[l]González leads the "Camarilla" faction; Daniel Rios leads the National Leadership Nucleus Faction of armed revolutionary dissidents.

[m]The Honduran CP is one of six organizations in the Honduran Revolutionary Movement formed in 1982.

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Eastern Europe and the USSR[a]	Mid-1986 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
52. Albania (PPSh)	3,020,000	147,000 claimed	Ramiz Alia	9th, Nov. 3–8, 1986	R	99.9 (1982); all 250 Democratic Front
53. Bulgaria	8,990,000	932,055 claimed	Todor Zhivkov	13th, Apr. 2–5, 1986	R	99.9 (1986); all 400 Fatherland Front
54. Czechoslovakia	15,542,000	1,675,000 claimed	Gustáv Husák	17th, Mar. 24–28, 1986	R	99.0 (1986); all 350 National Front
55. Germany (East) (SED)	16,692,000	2,304,121 claimed	Erich Honecker	11th, Apr. 17–21, 1986	R	99.9 (1986); all 500 National Front
56. Hungary (MSzMP)	10,624,000	870,992 claimed	János Kádár	13th, Mar. 25–28, 1985	R	98.9 (1985); all 352 Pat. Peop. Front
57. Poland (PZPR)	37,546,000	2,125,762 claimed	Wojciech Jaruzelski	10th, June 29–July 3, 1986	R	78.8 (1985); all 460 Fatherland Front
58. Romania	22,830,000	3,557,205 claimed	Nicolae Ceauşescu	13th, Nov. 19–22, 1984	R	97.8 (1985); all 369 Front of Soc. Dem. and Unity
59. USSR	279,904,000	18,500,000 cl.	Mikhail S. Gorbachev	27th, Feb. 25–Mar. 6, 1986	R	99.9 (1984); all 1,500 CPSU approved
60. Yugoslavia (SKJ)	23,284,000	2,168,000 claimed	Milanko Renovica (Pres., Presidium)	13th, June 25–28, 1986	R	— (1986): all 308 Soc. Alliance

Middle East[a]	Mid-1986 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
J. Afghanistan (PDPA)	11,000,000[x]	140,000	Babrak Karmal (deposed, May 4); Mohammed Najibullah	2nd Nat. Conf., Oct.–Nov., 1986	R	Rev. Council rule since Apr. 1978
61. Algeria (PAGS)	22,817,000	450 est.	Sadiq Hadjeres (First Secretary)	6th, Feb. 1952	O	(1982)
K. Bahrain (NLF/B)	422,000	Negligible	Yusuf al-Hassan al-Ajajai (Chair.)	Unknown	O	n/a
62. Egypt	50,525,000	500 est.	Farid Mujahid (?)	2nd, 1984 or early 1985	O	(1984)
63. Iran (Tudeh party)	46,604,000	1,500 est.	Ali Khavari (elected in exile)	National Conf. (in exile), 1986	O	(1984)
64. Iraq	16,019,000	No current data	Aziz Muhammad (First Secretary)	4th, Nov. 10–15, 1985	O	(1984)
65. Israel	4,208,000[y]	2,000 est.	Meir Vilner	20th, Dec.4–7, 1985	L	3.4 (1984): 4 of 120
66. Jordan	2,756,000	No current data	Fa'iq Muhammad Warrad	2nd, Dec. 1983	O	n/a
67. Lebanon	2,675,000	2,500 est.	George Hawi	4th, 1979	L	(1972)
68. Morocco (PPS)	23,667,000	2,000 est.	'Ali Yata	3rd, Mar. 25–27, 1983	L	2.3 (1984): 2 of 306
69. Palestine CP	4,500,000[z]	200 est.	Bashir al-Barghuti	1st, 1984 (?)	U	n/a
70. Saudi Arabia	11,519,000	Negligible	Mahdi Habib	2nd, Aug. 1984	O	n/a
71. Syria	10,931,000	5,000 est.	Khalid Bakhdash	6th, July 1986	L	— (1986); 8 of 195
72. Tunisia	7,424,000	4,000 claimed[aa]	Muhammad Harmel (First Secretary)	8th, Feb. 1981	L	(1986); boycotted election
L. Yemen, Aden (YSP)	2,275,000	26,000 claimed	Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani (deposed Jan. 1986) Ali Salim al-Bayd	3rd, Oct. 11–16, 1985	R	— (1986); all 111 YSP approved

[n]Although Padilla claims to be the leader, there is strong evidence that Mario Sosa Navarro is really in charge.
[o]This claim seems highly exaggerated; militants are estimated at only 500–1,000.

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Western Europe[a]	Mid-1986 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
73. Austria	7,546,000	15,000 est.	Franz Muhri (Chairman)	National Conf., May 23, 1986	L	0.7 (1986); none
74. Belgium	9,868,000	5,000 est.	Louis van Geyt (President)	25th, Apr. 18–20, 1986	L	1.2 (1985); none
75. Cyprus (AKEL)	673,000	12,000 claimed	Ezekias Papaioannou	16th, Nov. 26–30, 1986	L	27.4 (1985); 15 of 56
76. Denmark	5,079,000	10,000 est.	Jorgen Jensen (Chairman)	27th, May 12–15, 1983	L	0.7 (1984); none
77. Finland	4,931,000	20,000 claimed	Arvo Aalto (Chairman)	Extraordinary, Mar. 23, 1985	L	14.0 (1983); 27 of 200
(SKP-JEK)		16,663 claimed	Jouko Kajanoja	1st (for 1987)	L	n/a
78. France	55,239,000	610,000 claimed	Georges Marchais	25th, Feb. 6–10, 1985	L	9.8 (1986); 35 of 577
79. Germany (West)	58,329,000[bb]	40,000 est.	Herbert Mies (Chairman)	8th, May 2–4, 1986	L	0.2 (1983); none
80. Great Britain	56,458,000	10,999 claimed	Gordon McLennan	Special conf., May 18–20, 1985	L	0.03 (1983): none
(NCPB)		*No current data*	*Eric Trevett*	*5th, Nov. 23–24, 1985*	*L*	*n/a*
81. Greece	9,954,000	42,000 est.	Kharilaos Florakis (First Secretary)	11th, Dec. 15–18, 1982	L	9.9 (1985); 13 of 300
(KKE-I)		*12,000 est.*	*Leonidas Kyrkos*	*4th, May 1986*	*L*	*1.8 (1985); none*
82. Iceland (AB)	244,000	3,000 est.	Svavar Gestsson (Chairman)	Biennial cong., Nov. 7–10, 1985	L	17.3 (1983); 10 of 60
83. Ireland	3,624,000	500 est.	James Stewart	19th, Jan. 31–Feb. 2, 1986	L	— (1982); none
84. Italy	57,226,000	1,595,739 claimed	Alessandro Natta	17th, Apr. 9–13, 1986	L	29.9 (1983); 198 of 630
85. Luxembourg	367,000	600 est.	René Urbany (Chairman)	24th, Feb. 4–5, 1984	L	4.9 (1984); 2 of 64
86. Malta	341,179[cc]	300 est.	Anthony Vassallo	Extraordinary, May 18–25, 1984	L	(1981)
87. Netherlands	14,536,000	12,000 est.	Elli Izeboud (Chairman)	30th, Nov. 29–Dec. 2, 1986	L	0.6 (1986); none
88. Norway	4,165,000	5,500 est.	Hans I. Kleven (Chairman)	18th, Mar. 30–Apr. 2, 1984	L	0.2 (1985); none
(AKP)		*10,000 est.*	*Kjersti Ericsson*	*3rd (or 4th), Dec. 1984*	*L*	*— (1985); none*
89. Portugal	10,095,000	200,000 claimed	Alvaro Cunhal	11th, Feb. 2–6, 1986	L	15.5 (1985); 38 of 250 (Unit. Peop. Alliance)[dd]
90. San Marino	23,000	300 est.	Gilberto Ghiotti	11th, Jan. 27, 1986	L	24.3 (1983); 15 of 60
91. Spain (PCE)	39,075,000	60,000 est.	Gerardo Iglesias	11th, Dec. 14–18, 1983	L	4.6 (1986); 7 of 350 to Unit. Left Coal.
(PCPE)		35,000 claimed	Ignacio Gallego	1st, Jan. 13–15, 1984	L	— (1986) part of (Unit. Left Coal.)
(MUC)		No current data	Santiago Carrillo	None		1.1 (1986); none[ee]

[p] *World Marxist Review* of July 1986 mentions (p. 86) a 6th congress of the Panamanian party in 1980 and an 8th congress in 1986, but there is no evidence of a "7th" congress.

[q] The Revolutionary Vanguard Party merged in 1984 with the February 25 United Movement of Lt. Col. Dési Bouterse.

[r] Hu resigned on January 18, 1987, and Zhao Ziyang became acting secretary general.

[s] *World Marxist Review*, October 1986, p. 51; Radio Vientiane, Nov. 13, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC), Nov. 13, 1986, p. I/1.

[t] Includes an estimated 350 members in Singapore.

[u] It is estimated that 75 percent of these are either pro-Beijing or neutral with respect to Moscow and Beijing.

[v] A rightwing faction held its own 3rd Congress in 1968.

[w] The National Democratic Front, in which the CPP was quite active, boycotted the 1986 elections.

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Western Europe[a]	Mid-1986 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
92. Sweden (VPK)	8,357,000	17,500 claimed	Lars Werner (Chairman)	27th, Jan. 3–6, 1985	L	5.4 (1985); 19 of 349
(APK)		5,000 claimed	Rolf Hagel (Chairman)	27th, Nov. 7, 1986	L	(1985)[ff]
93. Switzerland (PdAS)	6,466,000	3,000 est.	Armand Magnin	12th, May 21–22, 1983	L	0.9 (1983); 1 of 200
94. Turkey	51,819,000	Negligible	Haydar Kutlu	5th, Oct. or Nov. 1983	O	(1983)
95. West Berlin (SEW)	1,861,000[gg]	4,500 est.	Horst Schmitt (Chairman)	7th, May 25–27, 1984	L	0.6 (1985); none

[x]US Department of State, "Afghanistan," *Background Notes* (Washington, DC), July 1986.
[y]Excludes population of Jerusalem and the West Bank.
[z]Includes population of E. Jerusalem and the West Bank.
[aa]Actual membership estimated at 2,000.
[bb]Excludes the population of West Berlin.
[cc]Malta Central Office of Statistics.
[dd]Communists reportedly cast 18 percent of the total votes in the February 1986 runoff polling that elected Socialist Mário Soares president. See *Time* (New York), Mar. 3, 1986, p. 50.
[ee]Carrillo, running as head of a Communist Unity ticket, failed to gain reelection to the parliament. See *The New York Times*, June 23, 1986.
[ff]The APK withdrew one month before the 1985 election in order not to split the socialist vote.
[gg]*Political Handbook of the World 1986*, p. 197.

LEGEND OF ACRONYMS

AB	People's Alliance
AKEL	Progressive Party of the Working People
AKP	Workers' Communist Party
APK	Communist Workers' Party
CPA	Communist Party of Australia
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
CPM	Communist Party (Marxist) of India
CPNZ	Communist Party of New Zealand
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines/ New People's Army
DK	Democratic Kampuchea (former Khmer Rouge, also known as the Kampuchean Communist Party—KCP)
FSLN	Sandinista Front for National Liberation
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
KKE-I	Greek Communist Party (Interior)
KPRP	Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party
KWP	Korean Workers' Party
LPRP	Lao People's Revolutionary Party
MBPM	Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement
MCP	Malaysian Communist Party
MPLA-PT	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola–Party of Labor
MPRP	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
MSzMP	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
MUC	Committee for Communist Unity
NCPB	New Communist Party of Britain
NLF/B	National Liberation Front/Bahrain
PAGS	Socialist Vanguard Party
PCE	Communist Party of Spain
PCPE	Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain
PCT	Congolese Labor Party
PdA	Party of Labor
PdP	People's Party
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PGT	Guatemalan Party of Labor
PIT	Independence and Labor Party
PKP	Philippine Communist Party
PPC	Costa Rican People's Party
PPP	People's Progressive Party
PPS	Party of Progress and Socialism
PPSh	Albanian Party of Labor
PRPB	People's Revolutionary Party of Benin
PSN	Socialist Party of Nicaragua
PSUM	Unified Socialist Party of Mexico
PUCH	Unified Party of Haitian Communists
PVP	Popular Vanguard Party
PZPR	Polish United Workers' Party
RVP	Revolutionary People's Party
SED	Socialist Unity Party
SEW	Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin
SKJ	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
SKP-JEK	Finnish Communist Party–Central Organizing Committee
SPA	Socialist Party of Australia
SUP	Socialist Unity Party
SWPP	Socialist Working People's Party
VPK	Left Party Communists
WPE	Workers' Party of Ethiopia
WPJ	Workers' Party of Jamaica
YSP	Yemen Socialist Party
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front

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less, five political parties decided to run as a coalition in the 1987 local elections. The government also escalated its attack on the popular Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo and the Roman Catholic Church.

Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua's president and member of the National Directorate of the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front, admitted to a West German magazine that the government holds about 2,700 political prisoners.[24] A newspaper published in Costa Rica by former *La Prensa* editor Pedro Joaquín Chamorro put the figure at more than 9,000.[25] In October, even Nicaragua's Ministry of the Interior conceded that torture has been used on political prisoners.[26] Nicaragua's economy continued to deteriorate during the year, with inflation running at about 300 percent. By year's end, total Soviet aid was estimated at US$l million daily. Military ties to the Soviet bloc expanded, highlighted by delivery of an additional 15 Mi–17 helicopters.

Political relations deteriorated between the Sandinistas and governments/groups in Western Europe and elsewhere. Anti-Sandinista forces operated abroad under the political umbrella of the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), headed by three prominent Nicaraguans, including two who had served for some time in top positions of the Sandinista government. UNO s military arm is widely known as the "contras." Though efforts to develop a fully unified stance against the Sandinistas repeatedly ran into difficulties, the US Congress, after much debate, finally voted $100 million to support UNO and the guerrillas. Shortly after this vote, news broke of a Reagan administration arms deal with Iran that reportedly had diverted money to the "contras," and by year's end the resulting scandal theatened renewed US support for the guerrillas in 1987.

In El Salvador, the military forces of the Duarte government maintained the upper hand in their war against the leftist Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas. The military penetrated what had previously been insurgent strongholds. Open splits occurred in the political umbrella organization of the guerrillas, the Revolutionary Democratic Front, with some of the more moderate members returning to El Salvador to participate openly in political and labor activities. The guerrillas discussed forming a united, vanguard, Marxist-Leninist party, and three of the five constituents of the FMLN—the Communist Party (represented by Shafik Jorge Handal) and, for the first time, the Armed Forces of National Resistance (represented by Ferman Cienfuegos) and the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (represented by "Nidia Diaz")—attended the 27th CPSU Congress, where they evidently were treated as the same organization politically, militarily, and ideologically.[27]

In Honduras, the military successfully quelled an uprising in the northern part of the country by the Cinchoneros group. The insurgents evidently had been trained and armed in and by Cuba and Nicaragua.[28] They are part of the Honduran Revolutionary Movement (MHR), a loose grouping of six revolutionary groups, which includes the Honduran Communist Party.

In Guatemala, the democratically elected government of Vinicio Cerezo, which took power in January 1986, offered an amnesty to the country's guerrillas, which fight under the umbrella of the National Revolutionary Unity of Guatemala and include leftist elements of the communist Guatemalan Party of Labor. As many as 2,000 accepted it, but there were mixed signals from other insurgents regarding peace overtures, and conflict increased during the second half of the year.

The Cuban Communist Party held its 3rd Congress in two sessions, the principal one in February and a follow-up session, mostly for domestic purposes, in December. Speakers noted that the Cuban economy suffered from work stoppages, absenteeism, discontent, incompetence, and unemployment. Fidel Castro said that convertible currency earnings would drop from US$1.2 billion in 1985 to $600 million in 1987 and announced a wide-ranging austerity program that included drastic cuts in energy available to government and private consumers.[29]

Castro is promoting a "strategic revolutionary counteroffensive" that emphasizes moral rather than material incentives for workers and is evidently intended to concentrate more power in Castro's own hands. Castro spoke of diversifying the Cuban economy even as the Soviet Union is pushing for Cuba's closer integration with CEMA as a provider of raw materials and agricultural products.

Although international policies took second place to domestic matters for Cuba in 1986, Havana continued its support for revolutions in Latin America—ranging from a strong Cuban presence in Nicaragua to the supplying of arms to insurgents in Chile. Castro attended the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Harare, where he promised to maintain Cuban troops in Angola until apartheid has been eliminated from South Africa.[30]

[24] *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Apr. 28, 1986.
[25] *Nicaragua Hoy*, a supplement to *La Nación* (San Jose, Costa Rica), Jan. 31, 1987.
[26] *Barricada* (Managua), Oct. 3, 1986.
[27] *Pravda*, Mar. 3 and 6, 1986; *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Mar. 8, 1986.
[28] *The Los Angeles Times*, Nov. 6, 1986.
[29] *Granma* (Havana), Dec. 27, 1986.
[30] See Havana Television, Sept. 3, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC), Sept. 4, 1986, p. Q/10.

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The pro-Soviet Communist Party of Colombia (PCC) is the leading member of a leftist coalition, the Patriotic Union, that substantially increased its representation in the legislature to six and garnered 4.5 percent of the vote for its presidential candidate, Jaime Prado Leal. The Colombian government's continuing effort to keep a truce with its insurgents worked only with the PCC's Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Otherwise, there was an escalation of guerrilla conflict—one of the groups involved being the M-19—often with a connection to drug dealers. Colombia's new president, Virgilo Barco, adopted an increasingly hard line toward violence by both the left and right.

Leftists in Peru were divided as to whether they should form a loyal opposition to the government of Alan Garcia or expand the level of violence against it. The pro-Soviet Peruvian Communist Party and most other leftist groups participated in a United Left (IU) electoral front, which was the second major political force in the country and the leading parliamentary opposition to the ruling Aprista party. While not that united, the IU did pressure Garcia to live up to his promises of an "anti-imperialist state" with "socialism in freedom." President Garcia's party scored a major victory in November when Aprista candidate Jorge del Castillo defeated IU incumbent Alfonso Barrantes for Mayor of Lima.[31]

Toward the end of the year, Garcia spoke increasingly of the "need to combat international terrorism with the power of national security forces." Although critical of military excesses, he stressed that Peru's main terrorist group, the Sendero Luminoso, struck out at innocent people, and he asked citizens to become "soldiers of the anti-terrorist cause."[32] The independent Marxist Sendero attacks major targets in cities, i.e., state offices and especially local Aprista meeting halls. More than 100 municipal officials have been killed in five years, 30 of them between January and September 1986. Other major targets were police and military officers and the nation's economic infrastructure. In all, nearly 10,000 lives have been lost.

In Chile, most of the violence can be traced directly or indirectly to the Communist Party of Chile (PCC), which 15 years ago was the continent's main advocate of the non-violent road to power. In 1986, the PCC argued that all forms of struggle should be pursued,[33] though its support for violence alienated it from most of the other groups that oppose the continuation of the Pinochet government. Massive amounts of arms and ammunition were discovered during the year, and a clear Cuban link was found. This suggested that the party, and its terrorist group, the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, plan a civil war or violent national uprising. There were some 500 bombings between January and August, the most publicized of which was the attempted assassination of President Pinochet in September.

In Ecuador, guerrilla activities increased, as did losses among guerrilla leaders. There was continuing evidence of ties between the leftist Alfaro Vive! guerrillas of Ecuador and the M-19 group in Colombia. The Argentine Communist Party, at its congress in November, also seemed to be contemplating a more violent strategy, with considerable admiration expressed for the Nicaraguan experience.

Among leftist parties still firmly pursuing the electoral road were those in Brazil, where in November three Marxist groups won a total of 22 seats in the 487-member National Congress; they undoubtedly would have won more had it not been for alliance complications in Sao Paulo. The main winner was the Workers' Party, with strong Trotskyist and radical Christian tendencies. The pro-Moscow Brazilian Communist Party won two seats, and the pro-Albanian Communist Party of Brazil won three.[34] Leftist parties in Venezuela have begun looking toward formation of a coalition for the 1988 elections, even as the Venezuelan Communist Party, a possible holdout, was on the verge of its fifth split. The left in Mexico also began working toward unified participation in that country's 1988 national elections.

In Guyana, the communist People's Progressive Party (PPP) continued to be the main opposition to the ruling People's National Congress (PNC). In 1986, the PNC elevated former PPP theoretician Ranji Chandisingh to deputy party leader. A second significant opposition group is the Working Peoples' Alliance (WPA), which has moderated its line since the overthrow of the New Jewel Movement of Grenada in 1983, according to one WPA leader, out of fear of occasioning a US intervention in Guyana.[35]

In Grenada, the major event of the year affecting the left was the conviction and death sentences given to 14 members of the former People's Revolutionary Government who overthrew and killed Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and more than 100 others. Among those sentenced were Bernard Coard and Hudson Austin.

Haitian Communists rushed back home after "President-for-Life" Jean-Claude Duvalier fled the country in February. But, operating openly for the first time in years, they tried to restrain worker demonstrations for

[31] *Resumen Semanal* (Lima), Oct. 24–30, 1986.
[32] *The Washington Post*, Nov. 10, 1986.
[33] See "Chilean Communist Manifesto," Radio Moscow, Jan. 28, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Feb. 21, 1986, p. K/1.
[34] *The New York Times*, Dec. 7, 1986.
[35] *Intercontinental Press* (New York), July 28, 1986.

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fear of provoking a violent reaction from the military.

In the United States, the Communist Party concentrated on defeating congressional candidates who supported what it termed the "hypocritical racist" Ronald Reagan.[36]

Asia and the Pacific. As the year began, forces of the New People's Army's (NPA), estimated to range in size from 16,500 to 32,000, were operating in as many as 60 different parts of the Philippines, sometimes in groups of company size (200–300 men). This military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) controlled 10–15 percent of the country's villages. The CPP's front organization, the National Democratic Front, chose to boycott the elections in February, which to the party's surprise, voted out the discredited Ferdinand Marcos.

The new government of Corazon Aquino released more than 500 political prisoners, including one of the CPP's founders, Jose Maria Sison, and a former leader of the NPA, Bernabe Buscayno. On August 5, 1986, negotiations between the CPP and the government began, leading three months later to a 60-day ceasefire. Both clearly hoped to utilize the breathing spell to maneuver for political advantage, and by the outset of 1987, it was evident that the ceasefire would expire without any major breakthrough that might avert a resumption of hostilities.[37]

The communist-ruled states of North Korea, China, and Vietnam experienced challenges and difficulties during the year, which in two cases led to change at the top. Kim Il-song and his son, Kim Chong-il (age 45), toured North Korea, with the father seeking to guarantee a smooth transfer of power to his offspring. The defection of a film director and his actress wife—acquaintances of Kim Chong-il—to the American embassy in Vienna, however, probably dealt a severe blow to the younger Kim's succession hopes, by lending credence to rumors about his privileged life style. The sudden, unannounced visit in late October of Kim Il-song to Moscow presumably was related to the succession question among other issues.[38]

Throughout 1986, Chinese newspapers and journals published articles discussing the ideas of major Western thinkers and writers. In December, massive student demonstrations erupted in places such as Wuhan, Nanjing, Shanghai, and Beijing, challenging the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to initiate political reforms as a complement to recent economic reforms. The marches were peaceful and well-organized; security personnel and police refrained from stopping them. Some students were arrested but later released. The major repercussions were not felt until January 1987, when the CCP dismissed several top scholars, including the president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Academy's party boss, members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and the vice president of China. More important, Hu Yaobang was asked to resign as CCP secretary general, to be replaced by Zhao Ziyang, whose former position as premier has yet to be filled at the time of this writing.

China's state-controlled press also went on the offensive with editorials castigating those who had challenged the party's authority and calling for adherence to the four cardinal principles: maintain the socialist road, uphold the proletarian dictatorship, hold fast to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, and retain the supremacy of the Communist Party. The press and party have attacked and condemned "bourgeois liberalism" and "complete westernization." According to the *Organization and Personnel Information Newspaper,* a leader of the CCP Central Committee said of political reform: "We may give play to their respective functions in our propaganda, but not to the division of power between the party and the government."[39]

In Vietnam, the communist regime continues to be plagued by serious economic troubles and declining morale. Of the Politburo's "inner circle of five," only Pham Hung remained on that body at the end of 1986. In mid-December, the 6th Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party revamped the membership of the Politburo, apparently placing emphasis in appointments on people of a more pragmatic orientation geared to solving economic problems. This new group on the Politburo, under Nguyen Van Linh, is to govern collectively. Nguyen replaced Truong Chinh, who had served as party leader since Le Duan's death at midyear. The Congress also called for a massive self-criticism–emulation movement and urged that younger party members be recruited. The political report frankly admitted the party's inability to achieve goals set over the past decade, blaming much of the trouble on economic problems.[40]

In Japan, the Communist Party seemed to be in a state of stasis. Secret talks between the JCP and the Chinese CP during 1985–86 apparently failed to resolve their differences.[41]

In Bangladesh, voters elected six Communist Party members, including Secretary General Muhammad

[36] *World Marxist Review,* May 1986, pp. 5–9.

[37] *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Jan. 6, 1987; *The Wall Street Journal,* Jan. 12, 1987.

[38] *The Wall Street Journal,* Jan. 19, 1987.

[39] *Zuzhi Renshi Xinxi Bao* (Beijing), Jan. 8, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-CHI,* Jan. 8, 1987, p. K/25.

[40] *Nhan Dan* (Hanoi), Dec. 16, 1986.

[41] Devlin, loc. cit.

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Farhad, to the newly revived national assembly. The party had aligned itself with various "bourgeois" groups to mobilize votes for its candidates.

With regard to Burma, a clandestine communist radio broadcast in February 1986 announced that the Burmese Communist Party had held its third congress in 47 years between September 9 and October 2, 1985, with 170 delegates attending. The congress reportedly elected a new Central Committee of 29 members and pledged to rely upon Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought to formulate a new party line.[42]

In India, the two principal communist parties, like other opposition parties, stepped up their criticism of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.[43] As for Indonesia, the communist party's top leaders remained in exile with no sign of any organized activity in the country throughout the year. Little reliable information surfaced about the Communist Party of Thailand.

Eastern Europe and the USSR. During the first half of the year, the communist parties of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Poland convened congresses. Basic continuity in Moscow's relations with its client states was evidenced by the proceedings of the 27th CPSU Congress.

The four East European congresses devoted much time to discussion of economic problems, with their Soviet mentors pressing for greater integration through the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance. All CEMA member states recognize the need for increased efficiency and the benefits to be gained from advanced technology. The USSR apparently has decided not to interfere with local approaches to economic restructuring like the New Economic Mechanism reform in Hungary or private agriculture in Poland.

The first bloc party congress to follow the one in Moscow was held in Czechoslovakia. Besides taking stock of a decade and a half of "normalized" communist rule and assessing the country's economic future, the congress called for the drafting of a new constitution to replace the oft-amended 1960 document. Three new candidate members were added to the party's Presidium (the equivalent of the Politburo in other communist parties). Secretary General Gustáv Husák pointed out that every seventh citizen belongs to the party.[44]

The congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party discussed technology, cadres, and discipline, as well as reorganization of economic management. No leadership changes occurred at the congress, although two Politburo members were dropped earlier in the year. At 75, General Secretary Todor Zhivkov has been in power longer than any other living party head in the bloc, yet no heir apparent can be identified. Parliamentary elections were held for the National Assembly in June, with "practically all" of the 99.9 percent of eligible voters who participated in the election supporting the official list.[45] Soviet leader Gorbachev attended the congress of East Germany's Socialist Unity Party, where Erich Honecker brought three regional secretaries into the Politburo, two as candidate members. Egon Krenz is the heir presumptive to the 74-year-old Honecker, who reportedly had been the target of an unsuccessful coup the previous year.[46] East Germany also held parliamentary elections, with only 7,512 votes cast against the party-approved National Front ticket.

The congress of the Polish United Workers' Party claimed to mark the attainment of "normalization" and reestablishment of communist control over the country. Gorbachev's presence implicitly endorsed the regime of General Wojciech Jaruzelski. Unlike the other congresses of bloc parties, the one in Warsaw made major leadership changes: seven members were dropped from the Politburo and nine added, increasing total membership to 15 and creating what appears to be a more homogeneous ruling body.[47]

At its second congress since the death of Tito, the Yugoslav League of Communists devoted considerable time to self-criticism and inconclusive debates. According to Milovan Djilas, the meeting was a "meaningless repetition of similar past events."[48] Elections for the country's bicameral legislature also took place last year, under a complicated system of delegate selection. Relations with the USSR remain reasonably good, with the president of Yugoslavia visiting Moscow during December.

The Albanian Party of Labor, a holdout from the bloc since 1961, held its 9th Congress in November, at which Ramiz Alia was confirmed as successor to the late Enver Hoxha. Three candidate members were elevated to full membership on the Politburo, which now numbers 13 full members. Earlier in the year, national elections were held. With voting mandatory, Albanians cast some 99.99 percent of their ballots for the official candi-

[42]Voice of the People of Burma (clandestine), Feb. 7, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC), Feb. 12, 1986, p. G/1.

[43]*Times of India* (New Delhi), June 30, 1986.

[44]*Rudé Právo* (Prague), Mar. 25, 1986.

[45]*Rabotnichesko delo* (Sofia), June 9, 1986.

[46]*Bild* (Hamburg), July 24, 1986, pp. 1 and 5.

[47]*Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), July 4, 1986.

[48]*Daily Telegraph* (London), June 27, 1986.

[49]Radio Tirana, ATA, Apr. 27, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC), Apr. 29, 1986, pp. B/1–2.

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dates.[49] Soviet overtures to reestablish normal relations have been ignored, and an Albanian party journal called the Kremlin leadership a "Khrushchevian clique" pursuing neo-colonial policies toward Eastern Europe.[50]

There were no party congresses in Hungary and Romania, which had held such gatherings in 1985 and 1984 respectively. However, the regime at Budapest did host a CEMA meeting in early November, which heard complaints about shortages of electricity (30 percent of needs come from the Mir power pool) stemming from the accident at the Soviet Union's Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Station earlier in the year.[51] Earlier, in January, the Soviet-Hungarian Committee on Economic, Technical, and Scientific Cooperation signed or updated and expanded 28 agreements on specialization.[52] In Romania, an economic and political crisis is taking place, even as Nicolae Ceauşescu basks in a "cult of personality" that excompasses his wife, who is now in charge of key party appointments, and a son, Nicu, who is an alternate member of the Political Executive Committee (the equivalent of a Politburo) and heads the communist youth movement.[53]

The Middle East. The civil war that broke out in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen during January 1986 devastated the Marxist ruling Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) and set the already indigent country's development programs back many years.[54] The region's other ruling "vanguard" Marxist movement, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), although claiming an increased membership, fared poorly in efforts to widen its political base and to achieve any substantial degree of military control over the countryside independent of direct Soviet military force. (A peace offensive launched by Kabul on January 5, 1987, in hopes of negotiating a troop withdrawal,[55] met with profound skepticism among the dispersed and divided guerrilla leadership.)

Neither in Afghanistan nor in South Yemen have the many years of Soviet effort and investment produced reliable and deeply rooted Marxist parties. There seems little doubt that the PDPA would collapse amid slaughter were Soviet occupation troops to be withdrawn. The YSP's fratricidal struggle resulted in the loss by death or exile of almost all the movement's founders, leaving opportunists and bureaucrats to lead the country. Ali Nasir Muhammad's successor as President, Haydar Abu Bakr-al-Attas, lacks popularity, and the new party leader, Ali Salim al-Bayd, is barely more dominant as a political force. The YSP faces exacerbated tribal tensions and stresses with neighboring states as a legacy of the civil war.

The Tudeh party of Iran claims to have held a national conference (location unknown) attended by more than 100 cadres "from all over the world, including the party's clandestine organization in Iran."[56] Newly elected Central Committee secretary, Ali Khavari, criticized the party's early cooperation with the regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni, who subsequently repressed the Tudeh as well as the Fedayeen e Khalq and other "progressive" Iranian groups.[57] The subsequent revelation that the CIA had given the Teheran regime a list of KGB agents and Tudeh collaborators in 1983—which precipitated the execution of over 200 suspects, the banning of the party, and the expulsion of 18 Soviet diplomats from Iran—evoked a torrent of condemnation from Iranians broadcasting with Soviet assistance.[58] The broadcasters were doubtless aware (but failed to note) that the data furnished to Khomeyni were provided to the British in late 1982 by Vladimir Kuzichkin, a senior KGB officer in Teheran.[59] News of US arms shipments to Iran provoked angry responses from the USSR, condemning Iran for helping the US in its undeclared war against Afghanistan and for conducting an "unbridled, hostile campaign" against the Soviet Union over the latter's support for the Kabul government.[60] Nonetheless, Moscow a short time later gave wide publicity to plans for renewed Iranian-Soviet economic cooperation.[61]

Syrian elections in February gave the local communists eight seats in the 195-member parliament (the ruling Baath party—itself considered by Moscow to be a "revolutionary-democratic" group—won 129). With two members in cabinet positions, the Syrian Communist Party gives the appearance, though it does not enjoy the reality, of genuine influence. Veteran leader Khalid Bakhdash deviates from Baath dictates with extreme caution, although he did say that the Palestine Libera-

[50] *Rruga e partise* (Tirana), November 1986, p. 86.

[51] Radic Free Europe Research, *Hungarian Situation Report* (Munich), No. 12, Nov. 21, 1986, pp. 27–30.

[52] *Népszava* (Budapest), Jan. 17, 1986.

[53] Radic Free Europe Research, *Romanian Situation Report* (Munich), No. 3, Feb. 24, 1986.

[54] *Pravda*, Dec. 19, 1986; also David Pollock, "Moscow and Aden: Coping with a Coup," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1986, pp. 50–70.

[55] *Pravda*, Jan. 5, 1987.

[56] *Morning Star*, July 23, 1986.

[57] *Pravda*, Mar. 4, 1986.

[58] Radio of the Iran Toilers (clandestine from the USSR), Nov. 26, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: South Asia* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SAS*), Nov. 28, 1986, pp. I/2–3.

[59] *The Washington Post*, Nov. 19, 1986.

[60] *Izvestiya*, Dec. 1, 1986. The account noted Admiral John Poindexter's assertion that some of the weapons sent to Iran were for the Afghan guerrillas. See also Associated Press, Dec. 9., 1986.

[61] *The Washington Post*, Dec. 13, 1986; Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, Dec. 11, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SAS*, Dec. 12, 1986, pp. I/1–2.

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tion Organization should be the sole representative of Palestinians at a proposed international peace conference on the Middle East.[62] (This suggestion came at the time of Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad's conflict with PLO leader Yassir Arafat.)

The Communist Party of Jordan, which has enjoyed somewhat increased freedom (despite a formal ban) since the US Congress banned the sale of weapons to Amman, suffered a setback after violent demonstrations at al-Yarmouk University in April. The party's entire leadership was arrested and held until September.[63]

Egyptian authorities cracked down late in the year on a communist organization called "Revolutionary Current," whose aim, according to the interior ministry, was to "impose communism on the country by force." The group of 23 persons was arrested while holding a general congress; shortly thereafter, an additional 21 members were detained in other districts. Ministry officials trace the group to individuals arrested in 1977, who resumed revolutionary activity following release from prison. Among those accused of leading the group were prominent professors, journalists, and attorneys.[64]

Western Europe. Communist parties are represented in the parliaments of Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, although party members held no cabinet posts except in San Marino. National elections were held during 1986 in Austria, France, the Netherlands, and Spain. Based on the most recent electoral results, the Italian Communist Party remains the strongest (29.9 percent of the vote and 198 of 630 seats). Cyprus is second, with 27.4 percent of the most recent vote, followed by San Marino (24.3), Iceland (17.3), Portugal (15.5), Finland (14), Greece (9.9), France (9.7), and Sweden (5.4).

The leaders of the French Communist Party (PCF) continued to be preoccupied with the domestic and international ramifications of its continuing decline, highlighted by unprecedented electoral losses in March (it fell from 16.1 to 9.8 percent of the vote).[65] There were calls for an extraordinary party gathering prior to the 26th Congress, currently scheduled for 1990. New changes in the French electoral system threaten to erode even further the PCF's electoral support. This may explain the decision of PCF General Secretary Georges Marchais not to stand as a candidate in the next presidential election (set for 1988).

The Communist Party of Italy (PCI) concentrated on an effort to cultivate the "Euroleft." PCI parliamentary leader Giorgio Napolitano emphasized that "the communist parties can only go forward in the context of a European left . . . ."[66] This analysis provided the background for the 1st PCI Extraordinary Congress, held in Florence in April 1986. At that meeting, the most significant achievements were said to have been made by ". . . members who have participated, and still participate, in the movements characteristic of our time—movements for women's liberation, movements for the emancipation of oppressed peoples, and pacifist and environmental movements." Although the party continued to talk about the goal of "overcoming the capitalist system," it no longer referred to Lenin's teachings.[67]

The communists in Spain are the most deeply divided of the communist movements in Western Europe. They are fragmented into three main groups: the official Communist Party of Spain (PCE), which remains Eurocommunist; the secessionist Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain (PCPE), which is pro-Soviet; and the smallest group, the Committee for Communist Unity (MUC), the Santiago Carrillo rump group. In preparation for the June 1986 Spanish elections, the PCE formed a "United Left" coalition of leftist parties, which also included the PCPE. This won only seven seats, four of them going to the PCE. For its party, the MUC received only 1.1 percent of the vote and no seats; even its leader, Carrillo, failed to gain reelection.[68]

The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) is controlled by one of the most Stalinist, pro-Soviet leaderships in the region. Yet, its support for Socialist Mário Soares contributed to his reelection as president in a February 1986 run-off vote. Endorsement of Soares came at an extraordinary PCP congress, convened earlier the same month; the gesture was mocked by the press as a decision to "swallow the live toad."[69] For the remainder of the year, the party concentrated its energies on an unsuccessful effort to negotiate a "democratic convergence" in the national assembly.

The Communist Party of San Marino is an extension of the Italian party. In 1983, it had received 24.3 percent of the vote. In mid-1986, it formed its first formal exclusive coalition with the Christian Democrats (who had won 42.1 percent of the votes three years earlier). Of the country's three executive secretaryships, the CPSM received internal affairs.[70]

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[62]*Pravda*, Mar. 6, 1986; also *The Soviet Union in the Middle East* (Jerusalem), Nos. 3-4, 1986, pp. 18–20.

[63]*Jordan Times* (Amman), Sept. 5, 1986.

[64]Radio Cairo, Dec. 16, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Dec. 17, 1986, p. D/1.

[65]*Le Monde* (Paris), Mar. 17, 1986.

[66]*The New York Times*, Feb. 3, 1986.

[67]*L'Unità* (Rome), Apr. 10, 1986.

[68]*Diario 16* (Madrid), July 3, 1986, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service *JPRS-WER* (Washington, DC), No. 86-085, Aug. 19, 1986.

[69]*The New York Times*, Feb. 19, 1986; also *Pravda*, Dec. 31, 1987, which mentions a visit by PCP leader Alvaro Cunhal to Moscow.

[70]*La Repubblica* (Rome), July 16, 1986.

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On Malta, the Communist Party exerts little impact on political life. It planned to participate in national elections scheduled for April 1987. The CPM continued to maintain extensive contacts with communist parties in both Eastern and Western Europe. The Maltese Labour government, which itself has extensive economic relations with the USSR, significantly increased the number of official economic and cultural agreements with the countries of Eastern Europe.[71]

The communist party of Cyprus, the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL), draws its primary support from the Greek majority, which comprises approximately 80 percent of the island's population. AKEL is proscribed in the region of the island known as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Party Secretary General Ezekias Papaioannou is 78 years old, and the average age of other senior leaders is well over 65. Although the issues of an aging leadership and succession were not on the agenda at the party's 16th Congress in November 1986, they pose a major problem for the future.[72] Change may take place after the presidential elections in February 1988.

In Greece, the communist party remains split into pro-Soviet and Eurocommunist factions. The latter, known as KKE-Interior, has adopted an increasingly independent position and retains little of its Marxist-Leninist heritage. It is represented with one seat in the Greek parliament, but announced at its 4th Congress in May that it would dissolve itself in the spring of 1987 and reemerge as a major component of the non-communist left, to be known as the New Greek Left (NEA).[73] The much stronger pro-Soviet KKE refused to support candidates of the ruling Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in the second round of October municipal elections, which led to PASOK's loss of some 20 mayorships, including those of Athens, Piraeus, and Saloniki.

Membership in the Communist Party of Great Britain dwindled to its lowest level since World War II—some 11,000. The party has not been represented in the House of Commons since 1950; it has but one member in the upper house, Lord Milford. The party's basically Eurocommunist leadership has not succeeded in wresting control of the party newspaper, *Morning Star,* from a pro-Soviet minority faction (not to be confused with the separatist New Communist Party of Britain).[74]

In Denmark, a former Central Committee member described the leadership as a clique that prohibits open debate and rejects efforts by the rank and file to participate in policy-making.[75]With the next party congress scheduled for April 1987, discussion within the party at the end of 1986 year focused on possible successors to Chairman Jorgen Jensen, who may resign at age 65 with a meager record.

In an effort at renewal, the Belgian communist movement modified its structure and leadership at its 25th Congress in April 1986. Although Louis Van Geyt retained his position as party president, both vice presidents (for Wallonia and Flanders) resigned,[76] removing a tier of administration in a move toward a federalized party structure.

The internal affairs of the Finnish Communist Party (SKP) were characterized by factional strife throughout the year. The draft of a new party program appeared, to be presented at a June 1987 congress. The program seeks to "examine Finland and the world in terms of the future," and to develop the SKP into a popular movement.[77] The most striking feature is the absence of doctrinal phrases and of professions of allegiance to Marxism-Leninism. In what seems to be a genuine split, a hard-line minority, constituting itself as the Finnish Communist Party-Central Organizing Committee (SKP-JEK), elected a "Democratic Alternative" duplicate set of officials from among those expelled from the SKP.[78]

[71] *The Times* (Malta), Dec. 7, 1986.
[72] *The Economist* (London), Nov. 16, 1986.
[73] Devlin, loc. cit., p. 57
[74] Ibid., p. 56.
[75] *Socialistisk Weekend* (Copenhagen), Aug .15, 1986.
[76] *Drapeau Rouge* (Brussels), June 17, 1986.
[77] *Kansan Uutiset* (Helsinki), Jan. 24, 1986.
[78] *Tiedonantaja* (Helsinki), Apr. 15, 1986, trans. in *JPRS-WER*, No. 86-048, May 16, 1986.

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Communist Fronts in 1986

Wallace Spaulding

THE INTERNATIONAL communist front organizations established since World War II are counterparts to organizations created by the Comintern after World War I. Their function today is similar to that of the interwar organizations: to unite communists with groups of various political persuasions in order to support, and thereby lend strength and respectability to, Soviet foreign policy objectives. In Table 1, I have listed in alphabetical order the major identifiable front organizations controlled by Moscow. This control is evidenced in their faithful adherence to the Soviet policy line as well as in the sorts of organizations that have withdrawn from membership in the fronts over the years (certain pro-Western groups after the Cold War began, Yugoslav affiliates following the Stalin-Tito break, and the Chinese and Albanians as the Sino-Soviet split developed).

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is said to control the fronts through its International Department (ID),[1] and in at least two cases an ID sector chief has been publicly identified as having oversight for front affairs: Yuliy P. Kharlamov for the World Peace Council (WPC) and Grigoriy V. Shumeyko for the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). More often, such officials appear to work through the Soviet national affiliate of the front in question, which usually has a representative at the international headquarters who can give on-the-spot direction. This person is usually a member of the front's Secretariat, but where there is no Soviet representative in a position of responsibility on the Secretariat, the front's Soviet vice president does the job.[2]

Aside from indirect coordination of the various fronts by virtue of a common ultimate control by the CPSU through its ID, more direct coordination also takes place. First, since at least 1981 these fronts, defining themselves as "closely coordinating" international nongovernmental organizations, have met together periodically with the apparent intention of hammering out joint policies. Attendance at such meetings (see Table 2), in fact, is the basis on which we have included fronts in the present listing. As a consequence of this analysis, the list of the major communist front organizations has been expanded by seven from the 10 listed in the March-April 1984 issue of *Problems of Communism*.

Second, the WPC—the largest and most important of the international fronts—provides slots for the leaders of most of the other front organizations in its main bodies, so that they are organically connected with one another. For example, according to my latest information, all but six (the World Federation of Teachers' Unions [FISE], the International Federation of Resistance Movements [FIR], the International Institute for Peace [IIP], the International Radio and Television Organization [OIRT], the World Federation of Scientific Workers [WFSW], and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers [IADL]) have organizational representation on the WPC Presidential Committee.[3] And at least for the 1983–86 period (the latest one for which such material has been made available), the IADL had an organizational slot on the WPC proper, and the FISE president was a member of the Sri Lankan delegation to the WPC.[4]

Finally, the *World Marxist Review* appears to perform

Wallace Spaulding, a Colonel in the USAR (ret.), is a Washington-based observer of international communist affairs. The present article is a slightly revised version of Col. Spaulding's contribution to the Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1986, forthcoming from the Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA.

[1] *The CIA and the Media*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, US House of Representatives, Dec. 27, 1977–April 20, 1978, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 574.

[2] See Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (hereafter—*YICA*), Stanford, Ca, Hoover Institution Press, 1981, pp. 455; on Kharlamov and Shumeyko, see Robert W. Kitrinos, "International Department of the CPSU," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1984, p. 73.

[3] *New Perspectives* (Helsinki), No. 5, 1986, p. 2. The WFSW and the IIP had previously had such representation. See ibid., No. 5, 1979, p. 2, and No. 3, 1986, p. 2.

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Table 1: Major International Communist Front Organizations

	Year founded	Headquarters	Claimed membership	Affiliates	Countries
Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)	1957	Cairo	No data	87	No data
Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace (ABCP)	1970	Ulanbaator	No data	15	12
Berlin Conference of European Catholics (BCEC)[1]	1964	East Berlin	No data	No data	45
Christian Peace Conference (CPC)	1958	Prague	No data	No data	Ca. 80
International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)	1946	Brussels	25,000	No data	Ca. 80
International Federation of Resistance Movements (FIR)[2]	1951	Vienna	5,000,000	68	29
International Institute for Peace (IIP)[3]	1957	Vienna	No data	No data	No data
International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)	1946	Prague	200,000+[4]	No data	120+
International Radio and Television Organization (OIRT)[5]	1946	Prague	No data	No data	23
International Union of Students (IUS)	1946	Prague	10,000,000+	122[6]	114[6]
Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAL)	1966	Havana	No data	No data	No data
Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)	1945	East Berlin	200,000,000	136[7]	118[7]
World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)	1945	Budapest	150,000,000	Ca. 270	123
World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)	1946	London	740,000[8]	Ca. 46	70+
World Federation of Teachers' Unions (FISE)[9]	1946	East Berlin	25,000,000+	124	72
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)	1945	Prague	214,000,000[10]	92	81
World Peace Council (WPC)	1950	Helsinki	No data[11]	No data	143[12]

[1]Union of International Organizations, *Yearbook of International Organizations 1985–86*, Munich, K. G. Saur, 1986, entry E4111.
[2]Ibid., entry D1996; and Warsaw, PAP, Sept. 12, 1986. FIR stands for Federation Internationale des Résistants.
[3]*Yearbook of International Organizations 1985–86*, entry E2128.
[4]*Rabotnichesko delo* (Sofia), Oct. 20, 1986.
[5]*Yearbook of International Organizations 1985–86*, entry C2391. OIRT stands for Organisation Internationale de Radiodiffusion et Télévision.
[6]*World Student News* (Budapest), No. 4, 1986.
[7]*Women of the Whole World* (East Berlin), No. 3, 1986, p. 1.
[8]*Moscow News*, July 24–25, 1986.
[9]*Yearbook of International Organizations 1985–86*, entry B3535; *Flashes from the Trade Unions* (Prague), Oct. 10, 1986. FISE stands for Féderation Internationale Sindicale de Enseignement.
[10]*Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Nov. 28, 1986.
[11]However note that the Soviet affiliate alone claims 150,000,000 members. See *Morning Star* (London), Oct. 23, 1986.
[12]*O Diario* (Lisbon), Jan. 25, 1987.

some sort of coordination functions vis-à-vis the fronts. The journal is a Soviet-dominated policy guidance organ working with nearly 70 communist parties. It has a speparate Problems of Peace and Democratic Movements Commission that is oriented toward the international fronts.[5] It might be noted in this context that reports on the 1979 meeting of "closely coordinating" non-governmental organizations as well as one of the two reports on a similar meeting in 1983 indicated that representatives of the magazine had participated.[6] The inconsistency in the 1983 reports may mean that such representatives did not have full official status at the meeting and/or that their presence was not meant to be advertised. This suggests that representatives of the *World Marxist Review* may have attended some or all of the other such coordination meetings. The *WMR* itself is not listed as a front because its editorial board, with one recent exception,[7] is fully communist in composition.

It must be pointed out, however, that the fronts themselves vary widely with respect to the degree of explicit communist affiliation. This ranges from the World Federation of Trade Unions (the vast majority of whose members are affiliated with officially communist trade unions) to the World Peace Council (whose leadership organs have a fairly good balance among communists, socialists, "revolutionary democrats," and independents), to the basically non-communist Christian Peace Conference.

Front Personnel and Organization

Below, we provide a major update of the information on front personnel and organization that appeared in the March-April 1984 issue of *Problems of Communism*.

The fronts are treated in alphabetical order. Question marks indicate (depending on their placement) uncertainty about the current incumbent of an identified country slot, about the nationality of the incumbent, or about the very existence of such a country slot itself. In addi-

[4]World Peace Council, *List of Members, 1983-1986*, Helsinki, WPC Information Center, n.d., pp. 162, 129.
[5]See Wallace Spaulding, "New Head, Old 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1982, p. 60.
[6]See sources cited in Table 2.
[7]The recently added "vanguard" Yemen Socialist Party.

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Table 2: Attendance of Fronts at Coordinating Meetings, 1979-86

X = present ? = attendance in question or unknown — = evidently not in attendance

Front[1]	Host organization and date							
	WFDY Mar. 1979	IUS Sept. 1981	WFTU Mar. 1982	CPC[2] Oct. 1983	IOJ Feb. 1984	WPC Apr. 1985	OSPAAL Oct. 1985	WIDF Sept. 1986
WPC	X	X	X	X	X	X	?	?
WFTU	X	X	X	X	X	X	?	?
WIDF	X	X	X	X	X	X	?	X
IUS	X	X	X	X	X	X	?	?
IOJ	X	X	X	X	X	X	?	?
CPC	X	X	X	X	X	X	?	X
WFDY	X	X	X	X	—	X	?	?
AAPSO	X	—	X	X	X	X	?	?
IIP	X	—	X	X	X	—	?	?
WFSW	X	—	—	?	X	—	?	?
FIR	X	—	—	—	—	X	?	?
IADL	X	—	—	—	—	—	?	?
FISE	—	X	X	X	X	X	?	?
OSPAAL	—	—	X	X	X	X	X	?
BCEC	—	—	—	X	X	X	?	?
OIRT	—	—	—	—	X	—	?	?
ABCP	—	—	—	—	—	X	?	?
World Marxist Review	X	—	—	?	—	—	?	?

[1]List in general order of frequency of attendance and importance of meetings attended.
[2]The sources give conflicting information on the groups attending.

SOURCES: *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Mar. 21, 1979, and Budapest, MTI, Mar. 22, 1979; Prague, CETEKA, and Radio Prague, Sept. 13, 1981; and *Neues Deutschland*, Sept. 16, 1981; *Flashes from the Trade Unions* (Prague), Mar. 23, 1982; ibid., Oct. 21, 1983; and *Religious Persecution Behind the Iron Curtain*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate., Nov. 14, 1985, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1985, p. 182; *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Mar. 9, 1984; *IOJ Newsletter* (Prague), No. 8, April 1985; ibid., Nov. 21, 1985, and *CPC Information* (Prague), Nov. 1, 1985; and ibid., Nov. 26, 1986.

tion to information on front meetings, related organizations, and publications, I list the most recent article by a major official of the front in *World Marxist Review*, and the front's membership status in various United Nations organizations.

Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)

Presidential board. President: Abd-al-Raman al-Sharqawi (Egypt). Vice presidents: Aziz Sharif (Iraq), Vassos Lyssarides (Cyprus), Abdul Aziz (Sri Lanka), Nguyen Thi Binh (Vietnam), Mirza Ibragimov (USSR), Ahmad al-Assad (Syria), Anahita Ratebzad (Afghanistan), Chona Biswas ? (India), Vital Balla (Congo), Abd-al-Wahhab al-Zintani (Libya), Alfred Nzo (South Africa), Aaron Shihepo (Namibia), Kaddour Belkacem (Algeria), and unknown persons from Palestine, Western Sahara, Ghana, Tanzania, Angola, Ethiopia, Lebanon, and Zambia.

Secretariat. Secretary general: Nuri Abd-al-Razzaq Husayn (Iraq). Deputy secretaries general: Chitta Biswas (India), Facine Bangoura (Guinea), Mirpasha Zeynalov (USSR), Khadr Salah Hamza (South Yemen). Secretaries: Zubayr Sayf al-Islam (Algeria), Daniel Kouyela (Congo), Muhammad Sobyah (Palestine), Fathi Abd-al-Fatah (Egypt), Herbert Roland (East Germany), Dan Cindi (South Africa), Nestor R. Embululu (Namibia), Nguyen Trung Hieu (Vietnam), Julien Randriamacinelo (Madagascar), Vidasekera (Sri Lanka), Ivan Plechaty (Czechoslovakia) ?.

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. Abd-al-Raman al-Sharqawi, Nuri Abd-al-Razzaq Husayn (plus Aziz Sharif, Vital Balla, Alfred Nzo, and Anahita Ratebzad, who represent their respective countries as WPC vice presidents).

Last WMR *article.* August 1980 (Nuri Abd-al-Razzaq Husayn).

Publications. Solidarity (monthly), *Development and Socio-Economic Progress* (quarterly), *Afro-Asian Affairs* (quarterly).

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Status with UN. UNESCO (C), ECOSOC (II), UNCTAD, UNIDO.

Last top-level meeting. Sixth AAPSO Congress (Algiers, May 1984).

Major 1986 meetings. Second Conference on the New International Information Order (Kabul, April), 14th Council Meeting (Moscow, May), Presidium Meeting (Ulanbaator, October).

Related organizations. Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (presumed Latin American extension of AAPSO); has a particularly close relationship with WPC.

Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace (ABCP)

Presidential board. President: The Most Ven. Kharkhuu Gaadan (Mongolia). Vice presidents: The Most Ven. Thong Khoune Anantasounthone (Laos), The Most Ven. Kushkok G. Bakula (India), The Most Ven. Shojun Mibu (Japan), The Most Ven. Thich Minh Chau (Vietnam), The Most Ven. Mapalagama Wipulasara (Sri Lanka), Jimla Jamso Erdyniyev (USSR).

Secretariat. Secretary general: G. Lubsan Tseren (Mongolia). Deputy secretary general: Ishtsogiyn Ochirbal (Mongolia).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. Kharkhuu Gaadan, G. Lubsan Tseren.

Last WMR *article.* None noted.

Publication. Buddhists for Peace (quarterly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (C).

Last top-level meeting. Seventh General Conference (Vientiane, February 1986).

Other major 1986 meetings. None.

Related organizations. Christian Peace Conference (relationship acknowledged).

Berlin Conference of European Catholics (BCEC)

Presidential board. Chairman: Otto Hartmut Fuchs (East Germany). Other Presidium members: Karl G. M. Derksen (Netherlands), Jan Mara (Czechoslovakia), Franco Lionori (Italy?), Yves Grenet (France), Imre Biro (Hungary), Witold Jankowski ? (Poland).

Secretariat. Unknown.

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. Fuchs and Grenet (in addition, Derksen fills WPC vice presidential slot for the Netherlands).

Last WMR *article.* None noted.

Publications. Unknown.

Status with UN. Unknown.

Last top-level meeting. Plenary session of unknown date.

Major 1986 meetings. None noted.

Related organization. Christian Peace Conference (see below), which is largely limited to Protestant and Orthodox believers).

Christian Peace Conference (CPC)

Presidential board. President: Bishop/Dr. Karoly Toth (Hungary). Vice presidents: The Rev. Dr. Richard Andriamanjato (Madagascar), Prof./Dr. Sergio Arce-Martinez (Cuba), Prof./Dr. Gerhard Bassarak (East Germany), Dr. Alexey S. Buyevskiy (USSR), Metropolitan/Dr. Paulos Mar Gregorios (India), General Bishop/Dr. Jan Michalko (Czechoslovakia), The Rev. Hans-Joaquim Oeffler (West Germany), Metropolitan Pankraty of Stara Zagora (Bulgaria), Mrs. Bernadeen Silva (Sri Lanka), Ms. Alice Wimer (US), The Rev. Canon Kenyon Wright (UK), The Rev. Shoji Hirayama (Japan), Metropolitan Nestor of Oltenia (Romania), Prof. Luis Rivera Pagan (Puerto Rico), the Rev. Vo Tanh Trinh (Vietnam). Continuation Committee chairman: Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Galicia (USSR). Continuation Committee vice-chairmen: Archbishop Timothy Olufosoye (Nigeria), Ms. Imelda Tijerina Tristayn (Mexico).

Secretariat. Secretary General: The Rev. Dr. Lubomír Mirejovsky (Czechoslovakia). Deputy secretaries general: Archpriest Georgiy Goncharov (USSR), The Rev. Alfred Christian Rosa (Sri Lanka), The Rev. Christopher W. Schmauch (US). Office director: The Rev. Ferenc Dusicza (Hungary).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. Toth (in addition, Andriamanjato represents Madagascar as a WPC vice president).

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Last WMR *article*. December 1981 (Toth).

Publications. CPC (quarterly), *CPC Information* (semi-monthly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (C), ECOSOC (III).

Last top-level meeting. Sixth All-Christian Peace Assembly (Prague, July 1985).

Major 1986 meetings. Working Committee meeting (Sofia, March), African CPC Meeting (Dar-es-Salaam, June), Fourth Latin American CPC Continuation Committee meeting (Quito, August), International Conference on the International Year of Peace (Hannover, October).

Related organizations. Official regional subsidiaries: African CPC, Asian CPC, CPC in Latin America and the Caribbean. Complementary organizations, with different religious constituencies, cooperating with the CPC: Berlin Conference of European Catholics, Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace.

International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)

Presidential board. President: Joe Nordmann (France). First vice president (pre-1984 information): Gerhard Stuby (West Germany). Vice presidents (all pre-1984 information except for Gumede): Archie Gumede (South Africa), Ahmad al-Khawaga (Egypt), Shahib al-Maliki (Iran), Abderrahmane Bouraoui (Algeria), Solange Bouvier-Ajam (France), Joao Cruz Pinto (Guinea), Apoliner Díaz Callejas (Colombia), Zuhayr al-Midani (country unknown), Gloria Gabuardi (Nicaragua), V. R. Krishna Iyer (India), Igor I. Karpets (USSR), Karl J. Lang (Finland), Adam Lopatka (Poland), Josef Ondrej (Czechoslovakia), Susumu Ozaki (Japan), Stane Pavelic (Yugoslavia), John Platts-Miils (UK), Jean Salmon (Belgium), Jamal Surani (Palestine), Boris Spasov (Bulgaria), Tchoe Minsin (North Korea), Umberto Terracini (Italy), Armando Uribe (Chile), Francisco Varona y Duque Estrada (Cuba), Doris Brin Walker (US).

Secretariat. Secretary general: Amar Bentoumi (Algeria). Secretaries (all pre-1984 information except for Masov and Toeplitz): Eduardo Barcesat or Nelly Minyerski (Argentina), Tudor Draganu (Romania), Ahmad al-Hilaly (Egypt), Lennox Hinds (US), Sergio Insunza (Chile), Vasiliy Masov (USSR), Lorand Jokay (Hungary), Pierre Lavigne or Roland Weyl (France), Ugo Natoli (Italy), Phan Anh (Vietnam), Kazuyoshi Saito (Japan), Jitendra Sharma (India), Heinrich Toeplitz (East Germany ?).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. No representation (but had positions on 1983–86 WPC).

Last WMR *article*. None noted.

Publication. Review of Contemporary Law (semi-annually).

Status with UN. UNESCO (B), ECOSOC (II).

Last top-level meeting. Twelfth Congress (Athens, October 1984).

Major 1986 meetings. Meeting of "socialist countries" Lawyers' Associations (Moscow, March); IADL Council Meeting (Paris, December).

Related organizations. De facto regional affiliates: Arab Lawyers Union (joint affiliations), Anti-Imperialist Tribunal of Our America (TANA).

International Federation of Resistance Movements (FIR)

Presidential board (incomplete data). President (pre-1986 information): Arialdo Banfi (Italy). Vice president: Robert Vollet (France).

Secretariat (incomplete data). Secretary general: Zygmunt Bieszczanin (Poland?).

Representation in WPC Presidential Committee. No representation.

Last WMR *article*. None noted.

Publications. Resistance unie—Service d'information (monthly), *Cahiers d'informations medicales, sociales et juridiques* (quarterly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (B), ECOSOC (II).

Last top-level meeting. Ninth Congress (East Berlin, September 1982).

Major 1986 meetings. Consultative Meeting of Member Organizations (Prague, November), World Meeting of Veterans for Peace (Vienna, December—cosponsored by FIR and non-communist veterans' organizations).

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International Institute for Peace (IIP)

Presidential board (incomplete data). President: George Fuchs (Austria). Vice president: Gerhard Kade (West Germany).

Secretariat (incomplete data). Director: Dimitriy N. Mochalin (USSR).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. No representative since April 1986 (Fuchs served on committee prior to that date).

Last WMR *article.* January 1983 (Fuchs).

Publication. Peace and the Sciences (quarterly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (B), ECOSOC (Roster).

Last top-level meeting. General Assembly (date unknown).

Major 1986 meetings. None noted.

Related organization. The IIP is the de facto research body for the World Peace Council.

International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)

Presidential board. President: Kaarle Nordenstreng (Finland). Vice presidents: Viktor Afanas'yev (USSR), Li Song Bok (North Korea), Charles Chikerema (Zimbabwe), Cheik M. Diarra (Mali), Fernando Diogo (Portugal), Saber Falhout (Syria), Gérard Gatinot (France), Saad Qassim Hammoudi (Iraq), Eberhard Heinrich (East Germany), Adrian Ionescu (Romania), George Izobo (Nigeria), Marian Kruczkowski (Poland), Tsukamoto Mitsuo (Japan), Juan Molina Palacios (Nicaragua), Ibrahim Nafee (Egypt), Alice Palmer (US), Armando Sobral Rollemberg (Brazil), Bassam Abu Sharif (Palestine), Bayi Sinibagui-Mollet (Congo), Luis Suárez López (Mexico), Manuel Tomé (Mozambique), Asdrubal de la Torre (Ecuador), Guillermo Torrez (Chile), Boian Traikov (Bulgaria), Lodongiin Tudev (Mongolia), Dao Tung (Vietnam), Ernesto Vera (Cuba), Imiru Worku (Ethiopia).

Secretariat. Secretary general: Jiri Kubka (Czechoslovakia). Secretaries (pre-1986 information): Kosta Andreev (Bulgaria), Elson Concepción (Cuba), Marek Jurkowicz (Poland), Boris Sakharov (USSR), Victor Stamate (Romania), Leopoldo Fernandez Vargas (Colombia), Manfred Wiegand (East Germany).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. Kubka.

Last WMR *article.* December 1974 (Kubka).

Publications. Democratic Journalist (monthly), *IOJ Newsletter* (semi-monthly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (B), ECOSOC (II).

Last top-level meeting. Tenth Congress (Sofia, October 1986).

Other major 1986 meetings. Latin American and Caribbean Journalist's Seminar (Havana, July), International Seminar on Central America (Managua, November [with WIDF]).

Related organizations. De facto regional affiliates: Federation of Arab Journalists (joint affiliations), Federation of Latin American Journalists (joint affiliations), Union of African Journalists (joint affiliations).

International Radio and Television Organiization (OIRT)

Presidential board (incomplete data). President (1984 information): Nivaldo Herrera (Cuba ?). Chairman of board of directors (1986 information): Achim Becker (East Germany). (These two positions may be identical, i.e., Becker may be Herrera's successor.) A director: Anatoliy Kachel (USSR).

Secretariat (incomplete data). Secretary general: Gennadij Codr (Czechoslovakia). Deputy secretary general: Zygmund Tszebiatowski (East Germany).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. No representation.

Last WMR *article.* None noted.

Publications. Radio and Television (six times a year), *OIRT Information* (monthly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (B), ECOSOC (Roster).

Last top-level meeting. General Assembly presumably met in 1985.

Major 1986 meeting. Fifth World Conference of International Radio and TV Unions (Prague, February).

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Related organizations. Member of International Film and Television Council; links (unspecified) with Asia Pacific Broadcasting Union, European Broadcasting Union, Ibero-American Television Organization, International Electrotechnical Commission, Union of National Radio and Television Organizations of Africa.

International Union of Students (IUS)

Presidential board. President: Josef Scala (Czechoslovakia). Vice presidents: Georgi Georgiev (Bulgaria), Jorge Maturana (Chile) ?, Alfredo Ruiz (Cuba) ?, Pallab Sen Gupta (India), Kim Guang Hub (North Korea), Leonard Candieiro (Mozambique), Petrus Schmidt (Namibia), Jose de la Rosa Castillo (Panama), Jerzy Kozminski (Poland), Ravane Kone (Senegal), Sergey Chel'nikov (USSR), Ong Dung (Vietnam), Andrei Hashiyana (country unknown), an unknown person from Palestine.

Secretariat (incomplete data). Secretary general: Georgios Michaelides (Cyprus). Secretaries: Victor Paredes (El Salvador) ?, Ababe Hankore (Ethiopia), Philip Gardiner (Ghana), Karoly Gyorgy (Hungary), Norbert Randriamampiainina (Madagascar) ?, Manuel Coss (Puerto Rico) ?, Nicolae Daravoinea (Romania) ?, Rashid al-Amin (Sudan) ?, Faysal al-Miqdad (Syria), Benjamin Liberoff (Uruguay) ?, Ahmad Salim al-Wahishi (South Yemen), Petr Krpata (Czechoslovakia) ?, A. Morozov (USSR) ?, Juan Emilio Rodriguez (Cuba) ?, V. Zlatinov (Bulgaria) ?, Don Rojas (Grenada) ?

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. Scala and Michaelides.

Last WMR *article*. August 1983 (then-president Miroslav Stepan).

Publications. *World Student News* (monthly), *IUS Secretariat Reports* (irregular).

Status with UN. UNESCO (C), ECOSOC (II), UNCTAD, UNIDO.

Last top-level meeting. Fourteenth Congress (Sofia, April 1984).

Major 1986 meetings. Executive Committee meeting (Pyongyang, January), Science and Education for Peace Seminar (Vienna, April [with IIP]), International Conference of Support for Chilean People (Florence, June), All-European Forum on Education (Helsinki, October), Education and Society World Student Forum (Prague, November).

Related organizations. De facto regional affiliates (presumed joint affiliations): All-Africa Students Union, Latin American Continental Students' Organization; co-sponsor of World Youth Festivals with World Federation of Democratic Youth.

Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAL)

Presidential board (incomplete data). President (1984 information): Susumu Ozaki (Japan).

Secretariat. Secretary general: Rene Anillo Capote (Cuba). Secretaries (identities unknown) from Angola, Guinea, Puerto Rico, North Korea, Syria, and Vietnam.

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. Capote.

Last WMR *article*. None noted.

Publication. *Tricontinental* (six times a year).

Status with UN. Unknown.

Last top-level meeting. Unknown.

Major 1986 meetings. None noted.

Related organization. Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (presumed overlap).

Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)

Presidential board. President: Freda Brown (Australia). Vice presidents: Issam Abdul Hadi (Palestine), Aruna Asaf Ali (India), Luisa Amorim (Portugal), Vilma Espin de Castro (Cuba), Fatima Zohra Djaghroud (Algeria), Fanny Edelman (Argentina), Fuki Kushida (Japan), Salome Moiane (Mozambique), Nguyen Thi Dinh (Vietnam), Valentina Nikolayeva-Tereshkova (USSR), Ilse Thiele (East Germany).

Secretariat. Secretary general: Mirjam Vire-Tuominen (Finland). Currently-noted secretaries: Brigitte Kubisch (East Germany), Helga Dickel (West Germany), Natalya Beresnaya (USSR), Millah Seperepere (South Africa), Therese Abdel Nour (Lebanon), Anna Durcheva (Bulgaria), Nancy Ruiz (Cuba), Jeanette Fuentes (country unknown), Victorine Gassakys (Congo), Sonia Rosen (country unknown). Secretaries noted prior to 1984 and possibly still serving: Mercedes Alvarez

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Moreno (country unknown), Evgenia Andrei (Romania), Aurora Barcena (Mexico), Hanna Busha (Iraq), Olga Gutierrez (Argentina), Norma Hidalgo (Chile), Surjeet Kaur (India), Vesselina Peytcheva (country unknown), Wanda Tycner (Poland), Soledad Parada (country unknown).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. Brown (WPC vice president), Vire-Tuominen.

Last WMR *article.* May 1986 (Brown).

Publications. Women of the Whole World (quarterly), *Documents and Information* (frequency unknown).

Status with UN. UNESCO (B), ECOSOC (I), UNICEF, ILO (Special List).

Last top-level meeting. Eighth Congress (Prague, October 1981). Ninth Congress to be held in Moscow, June 1987.

Major 1986 meetings. Bureau meeting (East Berlin, March), International Conference on Libya (Athens, June), Seminar for Asian Women (Tashkent, October).

Related organizations. De facto regional affiliates (presumed joint affiliations, all participate with WIDF in WPC activities): All-Africa Women's Organization, Arab Women's Federation, Continental Front of Women (Against Intervention in Central America).

World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)

Presidential board.[8] President: Walid Masri (Lebanon). Vice presidents (pre-1986): Alfred Junion (Angola), Cesar Navarrao (Chile), Francisco Moya (Cuba), Li Jong Gun (North Korea), Binoy Vishwam (India), Francisco Phillipe (Portugal), Abd-al-Basit Musa (Sudan), Vsevolod Nakhodkin (USSR), Nguyen Van Ky (Vietnam).

Secretariat.[8] Secretary general: Vilmos Cserveny (Hungary). Deputy secretaries general: Miguel Gonzalez (Colombia), Turay Saidu (Sierra Leone). Secretaries (pre-1986): Atanas Rupchev (Bulgaria), Michel Nkoli (Congo), Vladimir Johanes (Czechoslovakia), Henrik Andersen (Denmark), Markku Soppela (Finland), Konstantin Stathis (Greece), Joachim Brueckner (East Germany), Akira Kassai (Japan), Andrzej Gerhardt (Poland), Mihai Botorog (Romania), Jackei Selebi (South Africa), Freddy Fernandez (Venezuela), Salim Obayid al-Tamimi (South Yemen), Luis Guillermo Schenone (Argentina).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. Masri and Cserveny.

Last WMR *article.* None noted.

Publications. World Youth (monthly), *WFDY News* (semimonthly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (B), ECOSOC (I), FAO, ILO (Special List).

Last top-level meeting. Twelfth Assembly (Budapest, November 1986).

Other major 1986 meetings. International Conference on Arab Peoples (Athens, March), International Youth Meeting on Peace in Asia (Hanoi, May), Latin American Youth Congress for Peace (Managua, July).

Related organizations. Official subsidiaries: International Bureau of Tourism and Youth Exchange, International Commission of Children's and Adolescents' Movements, International Voluntary Service for Friendship and Solidarity of Youth. De facto regional affiliates: Arab Youth Union (presumed joint affiliations), Pan-African Youth Movement (joint affiliations).

World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)

Presidential board. President: Jean-Marie Legay (France). Vice presidents (information prior to July 1986): N. G. Basov (USSR), Kiril Bratanov (Bulgaria), Pierre Biquard (France), T. Hirone (Japan), N. P. Gupta (India).

Secretariat. Secretary general: Stan Davison (UK). Other officers (all information prior to July 1986): deputy secretary general: M. A. Jaegle (France); organization secretary: unknown; 2 assistants to the secretary general: G. Durrafourg (France), Grigoriy Kotovskiy (USSR).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. No representation since January 1980 death of E. H. S. Burhop.

[8]The 12th WFDY General Assembly confirmed the slots as listed here, but information on incumbents (other than the president and secretary general) predates the Assembly. It is assumed that most, but not all remain in their offices.

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Last WMR *article.* April 1973 (by then-president Burhop).

Publications. Scientific World (quarterly), *Bulletin* (about six times a year).

Status with UN. UNESCO (A), ECOSOC (Roster).

Last top-level meeting. Fourteenth General Assembly (Moscow, July 1986).

Other major 1986 meeting. International Scientists' Forum (Moscow, July).

Related organizations. World Federation of Trade Unions (stated relationship).

World Federation of Teachers' Unions (FISE)

Presidential board. President: Lesturuge Ariyawansa (Sri Lanka). Vice presidents (as of 1981): Abdallah Hassan (Palestine), Mamadou N'Doye (Senegal), Abani K. Boral (India), Raymond Martinez Mar(t)in (Mexico), Paul Ruhig (East Germany), Tamara Yanushkovskaya (USSR).

Secretariat. Secretary general: Daniel Retureau (France). Secretaries: Rudolf Tagtmeyer (East Germany), Eulogio Suarez (Chile), Mikhail Kolesnikov (USSR).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. No representation (Ariyawansa serves on the Sri Lankan delegation to the WPC itself).

Last WMR *article.* None noted.

Publications. International Teachers News (eight times a year), *Teachers of the World* (quarterly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (A), ECOSOC (Roster).

Last top-level meeting. Thirteenth Conference (Sofia, May 1985).

Major 1986 meeting. Teachers for Peace Conference (Copenhagen, August [this was not officially an FISE meeting]).

Related organizations. Exists as a Trade Union International of the World Federation of Trade Unions. De facto regional affiliates: All-Africa Teachers' Organization, Federation of Arab Teachers, Confederation of American Educators.

World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)

Presidential board. President: Sandor Gaspar (Hungary). Vice presidents: Ernest Boatswain (Australia), Ramon Vilon Guezo (Benin), Indrajit Gupta (India), Elias Habre (Lebanon), Karel Hoffmann (Czechoslovakia), Henri Krasucki (France), Bat-Otschiryn Luwsanzeren [Luvsatseren] (Mongolia), Izz-al-Din Nasir (Syria), Valentin Pacho (Peru), Stepan A. Shalayev (USSR), Tadesse Tamerat (Ethiopia), Roberto Veiga (Cuba), Andreas Ziartides (Cyprus).

Secretariat. Secretary general: Ibrahim Zakariya (Sudan). Secretaries: Ernesto Araneta (Chile), Marie Frybortova (Czechoslovakia), Debkumar Ganguli (India), Siegfried Katzschmann (East Germany), Vsevolod Mozhayev (USSR), Jan Nemoudry (Poland), Alain Stern (France), one African slot unfilled.

Representation on the WPC Presidential Committee. Zakariya (a WPC vice president).

Last WMR *article.* December 1986 (Zakariya).

Publications. World Trade Union Movement (monthly), *Flashes from the Trade Unions* (weekly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (A), ECOSOC (I), UNCTAD, UNIDO, UNICEF, FAO, ILO.

Last top-level meeting. Eleventh Congress (East Berlin, September 1986).

Other major 1986 meetings. Annual Consultative Conference of Trade Unions International (Prague, January); World Trade Union Conference on Disarmament (actually sponsored by "Dublin Committee" [see below], Dublin, May); International Trade Union Meeting on Peace, Development and the Social and Economic Aspects of Disarmament (actually sponsored by "Dublin Committee", Geneva, June); Energy Workers' Trade Union International Extraordinary Conference (Podbanske, Czechoslovakia, June); Trade Union Conference on Economic and Social Development (Brazzaville, July).

Related organizations. Trade unions international (TUI's) coordinated by a WFTU department and represented on the WFTU Council: Agriculture, Building Industry, Chemical Industry, Commerce, Energy, Food Industry, Metalworkers, Public Service, Teachers (World Federation of Teachers' Unions—treated separately above), Textile, Transport. De facto regional affili-

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ates (high percentage of joint affiliates with WFTU), Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of Latin American Workers (CPUSTAL), International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU), Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU), Asian and Oceanic Trade Union Coordinating Committee (AOTUCC), International Mineworkers Organization (evolved out of former TUI of Miners and Energy Workers), International Trade Union Committee for Peace and Disarmament (the "Dublin Committee"—it has many WFTU-affiliated personnel).

World Peace Council (WPC)

Presidential board. President: Romesh Chandra (India). Secretary general: Johannes Pakaslahti (Finland). Vice presidents: Nadim Abd-al-Samad (Lebanon), Richard Andriamanjato (Madagascar), Eduard Arevalo Burgos (Colombia), Olga Aviles Lopez (Nicaragua), Muhammad Jabir Bajbij (Syria), Vital Balla (Congo), Freda Brown (Women's International Democratic Federation), Martha Buschmann (West Germany), Vasco Cabral (Guinea-Bissau), Kerfala Camara (Guinea), Francisco de Costa Gomes (Portugal), Sonja Davies (New Zealand), Jacques Denis (France), Karl Derksen (Netherlands), Georgi Dimitrov-Goshkin (Bulgaria), Guenther Drefahl (East Germany), Luis Echeverría (Mexico), Orlando Fundora Lopez (Cuba), George Georges (Australia), Feleke Gedle Ghorgis (Ethiopia), Han Jong Du (North Korea), Rubens Iscaro (Argentina), Kaneko Mitsuhiro (Japan), Hieronim Kubiak (Poland), James Lamond (UK), Daniel Lisulo (Zambia), Pascal Luvualu (Angola), Rodolfo Mechini (Italy), Khalid Muhyi-al-Din (Egypt), John Hanley Morgan (Canada), Eugene "Gus" Newport (US), Alfred Nzo (South Africa), Abd-al-Ati Obaydi (Libya), Camilio O. Perez (Panama), Phan Anh (Vietnam), E. M. Primakov (USSR), Anahita Ratebzad (Afghanistan), Matti Ruokola (Finland), Ilona Sebestyen (Hungary), Boubakar Seck (Senegal), Liber Seregni (Uruguay), Aziz Sherif (Iraq), Nageshwar P. Singh (Nepal), Filifing Sissoko (Mali), Andre de Smet (Belgium), T. B. Subasingh (Sri Lanka), Mikis Theodorakis (Greece), Emma Torres (Bolivia), Tomas Travnicek (Czechoslovakia), Ibrahim Zakariya (World Federation of Trade Unions).

Secretariat and Information Center. Secretary general: Johannes Pakaslahti (Finland). Information Center chief: Alexi Treskin (USSR). Other secretaries and Information Center officers: Sana Abu Shakra (Lebanon), Paivi Arolainen (Finland), Djanghir Atamali (USSR), Nathaniel Hill Arboleda (Panama), Pierre Huguenin (France), Kosta Ivanov (Bulgaria), Oleg Kharkhardin (USSR), Karoly Lauko (Hungary), Rolf Lutzkendorf (East Germany), Irma Milnes (Canada), Max Moabi (South Africa), Bahig Nasser (Egypt), Marilyn Olsson (Sweden), Kvetoslav Ondracek (Czechoslovakia), Robert Prince (US), Jésus Reyes Arencibia (Cuba), Mamadou Sako (Mali), Philip Spillmann (Switzerland), Karen Talbot (US), Ryszard Tyrluk (Poland), Bhagat Vats (India), Mark Waller (UK).

Last WMR *article.* March 1986 (Chandra).

Publications. New Perspectives (six times a year), *Peace Courier* (monthly), *Disarmament Forum* (monthly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (A), ECOSOC (Roster), UNCTAD, UNIDO.

Last top-level meeting. World Peace Council meeting (Sofia, April 1986).

Other major 1986 meetings. International Conference on the Mediterranean (along with AAPSO, WFDY, CPC, etc., Athens, January-February), "socialist countries" Peace Committees Meeting (Uzhgorod, USSR, May), World Congress Devoted to International Year of Peace (Copenhagen, October [not officially WPC]).

Related organizations. International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces (though Chandra is its head, it involves additional and more innocuous organizations pursuing WPC aims), International Institute for Peace (research body left behind when the WPC moved to Helsinki—see above), International Committee for European Security and Cooperation (pursues WPC aims regionally; its head, Raymond Goor, is, or was a WPC "observer"), Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (its secretary general, Edith Ballantyne, played a leading role in the 1983 World Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War; she is a vice president of the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces).

Emphases of Front Activities in 1986

The main theme of front propaganda during the year remained nuclear disarmament. However, opposition to "Star Wars" (i.e., the American Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI), the main focus in 1985, was *relatively* deemphasized in favor of the theme of cessation of all nuclear testing.[9] The WPC's *Peace Courier* in May and

[9]On 1985 themes, see Wallace Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1985," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1986, pp. 72-78; and *YICA*, 1986, p. 398.

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an item by WPC President Chandra in the November-December issue of *New Perspectives* presented a test ban as an effective means for halting SDI research. The Declaration coming out of the April WPC meeting had presented a test ban as a first step toward the elimination of all nuclear weapons.[10]

The Appeal of the October Copenhagen "World Congress Devoted to the International Year of Peace"—the most important front gathering of 1986—seemed to give SDI and the test ban equal emphasis: "To halt the nuclear arms race on Earth and to prevent it in outer space, to eliminate all nuclear weapons, we demand as urgent practical steps: Stop all nuclear-weapons tests immediately! No to Star Wars!"[11] The document coming out of the July General Assembly of the WFSW was basically identical.[12] On the other hand, the April WPC Declaration had buried these points in a long statement calling for the gradual elimination of nuclear *and* chemical and conventional weapons; establishment of nuclear-free and chemical-weapons-free zones; and the ultimate disbanding of military alliances (together with the foreign basing arrangements they sometimes entail).[13]

The Appeal of the 12th WFDY Assembly, held in November, similarly added a call for nuclear-free zones to the anti-SDI and test ban lines and also added an anti-proliferation statement.[14] By contrast, the statement issued by the 11th World Trade Union Congress, in October, included only the anti-SDI clause and was silent on the other three topics in its brief paragraph on the prevention of nuclear war and elimination of all mass-destruction weapons.[15] The report by that Congress's Peace and Disarmament Commission, however, called for the test ban and most of the other items noted in the comprehensive April WPC Declaration (see above).[16]

As a secondary theme, front propaganda continued to link Western armament expenditures with reduced funding for economic development and to decry the alleged depredations of Western creditors and "transnational corporations," all in the context of calling for a "New International Economic Order (NIEO)" to redress the imbalance between the West and the Third World. Western intellectual "exploitation" was decried in the call for a "New International Information Order (NIIO)"—an appeal for the Third World to assert control over its own news sources. The NIIO was the subject of two thematic conferences during the year (one sponsored by AAPSO in April, the other, by IOJ in July) and also was a major focus of the 10th IOJ Congress, in October. Finally, there were the inevitable campaigns for solidarity with Afghanistan, Cyprus, Libya, and Nicaragua, and with the "peoples" of Chile, El Salvador, Namibia, Palestine, and South Africa. Such solidarity campaigns, as well as the NIEO, were stressed at the World Trade Union Congress.[17] In the context of these "solidarity campaigns," the terms "neo-globalism" and "state terrorism" were used to describe certain aspects of US foreign policy.

Techniques

The tendency, noted in 1985, for conventional fronts and their top leaders to remain in the background in the conduct of much of their activity continued into 1986.[18] Nowhere was this better seen than in the aforenoted Copenhagen World Congress Devoted to the International Year of Peace. This largest front meeting of the year played down connections with the WPC even though a WPC spokesman had made what was apparently the first public mention of the then-projected meeting back in July 1984, and even though the gathering fit in the basically triennial cycle of such congresses that the WPC clearly has been sponsoring ever since 1950.[19] For the first time, such a congress was separated in time and space from the policy-determining and administrative sessions of the WPC proper (held this year in Sofia in April). The congress was chaired by an individual with no direct connection with the WPC—World Federalist President Hermod Lannung—and only some 200 of the 1,457 listed members of the 1983 WPC could be found among the congress's 2,468 delegates.[20]

The congress attempted to identify itself with the United Nations and with the latter's International Year of Peace (IYP), hence the choice of the conference title and the solicited support from that world body (including a warm message of greetings from UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, and attendance by one of the UN's undersecretaries general and by the head of the United Nations' IYP Secretariat).[21]

The Appeal, the main operational document coming out of the congress, attempted to identify itself with the

[10] *Peace Courier* (Helsinki), May 1986 supplement, "Together for a World Without Nuclear Weapons."
[11] *Copenhagen Appeal* brochure.
[12] *Trud* (Moscow), July 26, 1986.
[13] *Peace Courier*, May 1986 supplement, op. cit.
[14] *Appeal* brochure of 12th Assembly of the WFDY.
[15] *World Trade Union Movement* (Prague), November 1986, p. 24.
[16] Ibid., pp. 14-16.
[17] See *World Trade Union Movement*, November 1986, pp. 17-20, 25-31.
[18] See Spaulding, loc. cit.
[19] *Berlingske Tidende* (Copenhagen), Oct. 12, 1986; *Soviet Analyst* (Richmond, England), Nov. 19, 1986.
[20] World Peace Council, op. cit.; The World Congress Devoted to the International Year of Peace, *Preliminary List of Participants*, n.p., n.d.
[21] *Peace Courier*, November-December 1986; The World Congress . . . , op. cit., p. 23.

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peace efforts of the "Delhi Six," the non-aligned leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania; it was sponsored by "representatives of public opinion" from these very six nations.[22] An apparent earlier attempt to identify with the "Delhi Six" resulted in messages of greetings to the congress from prime ministers Rajiv Gandhi of India and Andreas Papandreau of Greece, as well as from President Raúl Alfonsín of Argentina.[23]

These efforts were only partially successful at best. The apparent attempt to involve the other strands of the peace movement, most notably those connected with the non-aligned European Nuclear Disarmament (END) largely fell through. Very few END supporters attended the congress, and they did so as individuals rather than as a group.[24] At the April meeting of the WPC, Soviet Peace Committee Chairman Yuriy Zhukov had placed top priority on cooperation with such groups and laid principal blame on the WPC Secretariat for not having brought this about.[25] (Ironically, Zhukov had been the chief culprit in antagonizing END back in early 1983.)[26]

The Copenhagen press went to great length to point out the WPC, and ultimately Soviet, inspiration and control of the congress.[27] Such efforts were aided by the congress's failure to grant Afghan rebels and East European civil rights spokesmen a fair hearing (or even admission, in most cases). More subtle, circumstantial evidence of Soviet/WPC control was furnished by the fact that virtually the whole Soviet contingent for running the WPC turned up at the meeting (including Zhukov, CPSU International Department operatives Vitaliy Shaposhnikov and Yuliy Kharlamov, WPC Secretaries Oleg Kharkhardin and Djanghir Atamali, and WPC Information Center Chief Aleksey Treskin.[28] So did 19 of the 25 full-time WPC headquarters officers, all but eight of whom were, significantly, buried in their respective country delegations rather than being included in that of the WPC.[29] It should also be noted that the UN undersecretary general (one of 26 holding that position) who attended is a Soviet and that the head of the IYP Secretariat is a Pole. Finally, eight of the 13 "representatives of public opinion" sponsoring the *Copenhagen Appeal* are, or at least had been, members of the WPC.[30]

The second major front meeting of the year, the September East Berlin 11th World Trade Union Congress, also played down its ultimate front sponsor, in this case the WFTU. In a Moscow TV broadcast of July 22, 1986, it was announced that this meeting was to be open to all trade unionists and was not to be the exclusive province of the WFTU.[31] As a result, the 1,014 delegates could claim to represent "almost 300 million" trade unionists (rather than the slightly more than 200 million attributed to the WFTU), and the Congress's Appeal could be addressed by ostensibly individual trade unionists equally to "the WFTU, the ICFTU [International Congress of Free Trade Unions], the WCL [The World Congress of Labor], and other worldwide and regional trade union organizations."[32] Internal WFTU matters were taken care of exclusively by the Congress's 14th Session, which was limited to representatives of WFTU affiliates.[33]

Other attempts during the year by the fronts to widen their base by concealing their hand could be seen in the First International Conference of the Teachers for Peace Movement held in Copenhagen in August (in which FISE apparently played an important role), the emergence of a "Journalists for Peace" group at the end of the Peace Congress in Copenhagen in October, the formation in Moscow in November of the International Movement of Jurists for the Protection of Peace and Prevention of Nuclear War (in which the IADL apparently figured), and the 11th World Meeting of Veterans for Peace held in Vienna in December (in which FIR was just one of four ex-servicemen's organizations involved). Whether these meetings will result in groups clearly identified with traditional fronts, like the Generals for Peace and the International Trade Union Committee for Peace and Disarmament—with their overlapping memberships in the WPC and WFTU respectively—or whether they will be less easy to categorize, like the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, remains to be seen.[34]

[22]Copenhagen *Appeal* brochure.
[23]*Peace Courier*, November-December 1986.
[24]See The World Congress . . ., op. cit.
[25]*Land og Folk* (Copenhagen), May 3-4, 1986.
[26]See *YICA*, 1984, p. 434.
[27]See especially *Morgenavisen Jyllands Posten*, June 29, 1986, and *Berlingske Tidende*, Oct. 12 and 16, 1986).
[28]On these individuals, see pp. 57 above; *YICA*, 1986, p. 397; and The World Congress . . ., op. cit., pp. 18-19, 25.
[29]The World Congress . . ., op. cit., pp. 4-25; p. 1.
[30]*New Perspectives*, November-December 1986, p. 2; World Peace Council, op. cit., pp. 95, 118, 145.
[31]Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, July 24, 1986, p. CC/5.
[32]*World Trade Union Movement*, November 1986, pp. 1, 24.
[33]Ibid., p. 3.
[34]*YICA*, 1982, p. 532; ibid., 1986, p. 399.

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Books

Western Images of the Warsaw Pact

Robin Alison Remington

IN APRIL 1985 the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) gained a new lease on life when the members of this Soviet–East European political/military alliance extended it for another 20 years. The renewal represented one of the first foreign policy undertakings by Mikhail S. Gorbachev after becoming General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985. Two years later, as Western scholars evaluate the opening Gorbachev chapter of Soviet–East European relations, it is appropriate to ask what we know about the regional dynamics in Moscow's front yard. In doing so, this essay will be less concerned with the track record of the Warsaw Pact itself than with the track record of Western scholarship on the subject of communist coalition politics.

After 30 years of the Pact's existence, there is finally a Western literature to analyze. When the Warsaw Treaty Organization was established in 1955, it was largely dismissed by policy-makers and scholars as a fig leaf concealing continued Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. The alliance was seen as an institutional substitute for Stalin's cult of personality that—even before that dictator's demotion from demi-god to demi-devil at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956—was eroding due to the submerged power struggle among his would-be successors. Apart from scattered attention to the modernization of the East European military forces in the 1960's, speculation concerning the 1969 organizational reforms, and some interest in East European political maneuvering on the road to the signing in 1975 of the Helsinki agreement at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Warsaw Treaty Organization was virtually a non-topic during the Pact's first two decades.[1] My own attempt to consider the impact of intra-bloc conflict upon the institutional development of the WTO, the Franck and Weisband comparison of verbal strategies used to justify the US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the "allied socialist" invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Mensonides and Kuhlman's provocative speculation regarding the impact on inter-alliance dynamics of reduced bipolar confrontation in Europe, were relatively isolated efforts.[2] By the 1980's, however, scholarship had begun to catch up with the events that have buffeted East-bloc alliance politics. Indeed, the proliferating volumes and chapters are hard to keep up with, never mind evaluate.

WHAT has changed? Why the sudden visibility of this previously largely ignored aspect of Soviet–East European relations? The attention drawn to East Central Europe during the Helsinki Conference negotiations and the strategic implications

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[1]For scholarship in the early period, see A. Ross Johnson, *The Warsaw Pact "European Security,"* Santa Monica, CA, The RAND Corporation, R-565PR, 1970; Roman Kolkowicz, "The Warsaw Pact: Entangling Alliance," *Survey* (London), Winter-Spring 1969, pp. 86–101; and Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact," *Adelphi Papers No. 58*, London, Institute for Strategic Studies, June 1969.

[2]Robin Alison Remington, *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1971; Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, *World Politics: Verbal Strategy Among the Superpowers*, New York, London, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1972; Louis J. Mensonides and James A. Kuhlman, Eds., *The Future of Inter-Bloc Relations in Europe*, New York, Praeger, 1974.

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of the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna undoubtedly increased awareness. So did the 1976 American presidential campaign, during which Gerald Ford's correct but politically unwise remark about increasing East European autonomy was turned against him. The growing commercial relations with non-Soviet members of the Pact in the wake of US-Soviet détente as well as the conviction of Western bankers that East European governments were stable enough to make the recycling of petro-dollars into loans attractive doubtless also contributed.

But perhaps most important was the emerging awareness in civilian and military circles in Washington that more than half of the divisions facing NATO in standard attack scenarios consist of East European forces. This raised the question of the reliability of those non-Soviet troops. Such security concerns dovetailed conveniently with the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact. As a result, funding was made available for a number of conferences and projects out of which came many of the scholarly works discussed here.[3]

In short, studies on the Warsaw Pact are strongly influenced by who wants to know what, why, and when. Not surprisingly, national security policy-makers want to know what the Soviets are up to and what the implications of Soviet aims are for the ongoing strategic chess game in Europe. Hence the tendency to focus on capability and reliability, given the implicit assumption that the Warsaw Pact is an extension of Soviet power. This is not to suggest that the authors, editors, or contributors to such conference-generated volumes are coopted by their source of funding. Rather, in what must be seen as an academic market place, the questions addressed in these

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ROBERT W. CLAWSON, and LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN, Eds. *The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose & Military Means*. Wilmington, DE, Scholarly Resources Inc., 1982.

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JEFFREY SIMON, Ed. *The Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Command and Control*. Boulder, CO, and London, Westview Press, 1985.

MICHAEL J. SODARO and SHARON L. WOLCHIK, Eds., *Foreign and Domestic Policy in Eastern Europe in the 1980's*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983.

SARAH MEIKLEJOHN TERRY, Ed. *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1984.

IVAN VOLGYES, Ed. *The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier*. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1982.

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[3]Funding/sponsoring institutions include the US Department of State; the US Army Russian Institute; the US Defense Department; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the Rockefeller, Ford, and Allen-Heath foundations, the Social Science Research Council; the Royal Institute of International Affairs of London, and the New York Council on Foreign Relations. This essay focuses primarily on US and British scholarship. Although a number of continental European scholars have contributed to the collective volumes discussed here, there is also a substantial number of European, particularly Swedish and West German, studies that deserve to be treated separately.

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books are influenced by what the conference organizers think the buyers will want as well as by intrinsic scholarly considerations. If the questions were drawn up by scholars of the functionalist theory of integration, such as Ernst Haas, by disciples of Karl Deutsch's concept of a security community,[4] or by adherents to James Rosenau's theory of linkage between national and international systems,[5] they would be very different. Not necessarily better or worse, just different.

Moreover, Eastern Europe presents a conceptual problem for scholars and policy-makers alike. As with the proverbial debate of the blind men investigating the elephant, conflicting perceptions reflect differences of approach and emphasis. Scholars divide over empirical, hierarchical, and systemic models; tilt toward theories of dependency or realpolitik; and disagree over whether Soviet–East European relations are "organic."[6] These divisions, in turn, interact with those of political leaders in Washington, Bonn, Paris, or London who are driven by their own policy imperatives and harbor different expectations and potentially incompatible hopes and fears.

There is simply no academic consensus among scholars—whose perceptions vary from concurrence in Christopher D. Jones's view of the Warsaw Pact as an effective instrument of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe (*Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe*) to adherence to Daniel N. Nelson's belief that the Warsaw Pact is "more of a symbol of Soviet weakness than Soviet strength" (*Soviet Allies*, p. 266). Since scholars representing both views are frequently included in the same collective work, it is not surprising that these volumes exhibit a certain lack of analytical coherence.

Jones's study of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe is a major contribution in several respects. His carefully documented argument that the Soviets have used joint military structures to substantially limit East European political and military options is persuasive, if somewhat one-sided. His use of Soviet sources is impressive. The problem is that no matter how accurately his book may describe Soviet goals and principles, it does not give a realistic account of the obstacles that confront those policy-makers in the Kremlin who attempt to translate Moscow's priorities into political reality.[7]

Jones's meticulous treatment of Soviet efforts to indoctrinate and socialize politically the East European officers leaves an uninitiated reader with the impression that the Czechoslovak military was successfully reintegrated into the Warsaw Pact in the years since 1968 (p. 203). This not only contradicts evidence presented in the chapter on Czechoslovakia in A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev's pioneering analysis, *East European Military Establishments*, but is internally inconsistent as well. In fact, Czechoslovak officers who rejected Soviet military doctrine for the Warsaw Pact in 1968 were products of precisely those Soviet indoctrination and alliance integration efforts that Jones views as such a formidable barrier to East European autonomy. These same officers emerged in the front lines of Alexander Dubček's struggle to sweep the ashes of Stalinism from the Czechoslovak road to socialism. Condoleezza Rice's in-depth study of the Czechoslovak armed forces in *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948–1983*, documents that the euphoria of the Prague Spring infected military and civilian leaders alike. Jones cannot be faulted for not taking account in his book of as yet unpublished works, but his own analysis of the Gottwald Memorandum calling for a more national Czechoslovak military doctrine and of Lt. Gen. Vaclav Prchlik's demands for expanded East European access to Warsaw Pact decision-making councils also begs this question.

Yet whether or not one agrees with Jones, his painstaking work with primary sources combined with his original approach to the mix of Soviet socialization/integration efforts have earned him a place at most conference tables where the Warsaw Pact is the topic. Indeed, his chapters function as articulate, significant endposts for the spectrum of scholarship on Soviet–East European alliance politics in Nelson's *Soviet Allies*, in *The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition?* edited by David Holloway and Jane M.O. Sharp, and in Jeffrey Simon and Trond Gilberg's recent collection, *Security Implications of Nationalism in Eastern Europe*.

Jones is not the only repeat contributor to the volumes discussed here. For example, Malcolm Mackintosh, a long-time observer of Pact dynamics despite his shifting assignments in the British Home Office, has contributed chapters to Ka-

[4]Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1954.

[5]James N. Rosenau, Ed., *Linkage Politics. Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems*, New York, Free Press, 1969.

[6]For a systematic elaboration of the hierarchical model, see William Zimmerman, "Hierarchical Regional Systems and the Politics of System Boundaries," *International Organization* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1972, pp. 18–32; and idem, "Soviet–East European Relations in the 1980's and the Changing International System," in Morris Bornstein, Zvi Gitelman, and William Zimmerman, Eds., *East-West Relations and the Future of Eastern Europe*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1981, pp. 88–104.

[7]This essentially agrees with A. Ross Johnson's conclusion that the Jones study "must be read with caution." See Johnson's "Eastern Europe: The Challenges from Within," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC) September-October 1983, p. 85.

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ren Dawisha and Philip Hanson's *Soviet–East European Dilemmas*, to Arlene Idol Broadhurst's *The Future of European Alliance Systems*, and to the Holloway and Sharp volume. Mackintosh's assignment in all three cases was to provide an overview, which he does with consistent competence. Ivan Volgyes, whose own book, *The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies*, demystifies the concept of reliability, has a chapter devoted to this question in the Broadhurst volume, and deals with the "mobilization potential" of Bulgaria and Hungary for Daniel Nelson's *Soviet Allies*. Volgyes is more openly concerned than other scholars in this field with the policy implications of his analysis and he makes a credible case against the Sonnenfeldt doctrine's interpretation of the "organic" relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Broadhurst, p. 176). John Erickson has first-class chapters on the tensions stemming from military management/modernization issues in both the Dawisha/Hanson collection and in Robert W. Clawson and Lawrence S. Kaplan's *The Warsaw Pact: Political Purposes and Military Means*.

Thus, the proliferation of literature on the Warsaw Pact is not actually as varied and rich as it seems. These conference volumes tend to recycle chapters that are essentially variations on a theme by a still relatively small group of scholars dedicated to the study of different aspects of communist coalition politics. It is not that such chapters do not make a contribution to the individual books. They do, and undoubtedly their authors made even more substantial contributions to the conference discussion. But when the literature is looked at as a whole, it appears to be continually reinventing the wheel.

This problem is exacerbated by what David Holloway refers to as the "realistic ambiguity" that arises when the term "Warsaw Pact" is variously used to refer to the official institutions of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, all military ties between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and to the totality of Soviet–East European relations. (Holloway/Sharp, pp. 19–20). Analyses of the Warsaw Pact do go back and forth between narrow and broad definitions. On balance, such ambiguity is more confusing than realistic. It makes it exceedingly difficult to agree on basic facts.

For example, was the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 a Warsaw Pact operation? Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev say "no" on the basis that "allied socialist" troops were commanded by the Commander of Soviet Ground Forces, while the Warsaw Pact Commander's activity was limited to maneuvers in and around Czechoslovakia during the crisis. Edgar O'Ballance in the Clawson/Kaplan book would agree. Jorg K. Hoensch—same book but preceding chapter—flatly says that Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia (p. 41). Jeffrey Simon appears to skirt the issue by noting that the Warsaw Pact Commander, Marshal Ivan Yakubovskiy, did "not command the invading force," and then concluding that Soviet management of the 1968 crisis "clearly signaled a new function of the Warsaw Pact" (*Warsaw Pact Forces*, pp. 51–53). F. Stephen Larrabee combines the Hoensch and Simon views to assert that the invasion was "undertaken by the Pact as a whole" (with the exception of Romania) and "politically . . . marked an important expansion of the Warsaw Pact's responsibilities." (Holloway/Sharp, pp. 126–27).

Quite apart from the incongruous scenario of Czechoslovakia invading itself, this interpretation ignores the fact that from its inception the Warsaw Pact has had an implicit intra-bloc as well as an explicit East-West mission. At the same time, it obscures both the limited role played by the alliance's political institutions throughout the 1968 crisis and the negative impact of the invasion on the Czechoslovak armed forces. While two major studies of Soviet decision-making in response to Dubček's "socialism with a human face" place the Warsaw Pact high command squarely in the interventionist coalition, they also document the Pact's political paralysis after its March 6, 1968, meeting in Sofia. In *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia*,[8] Jiri Valenta applies a modified version of Graham Allison's model of bureaucratic politics. Karen Dawisha, in *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring*,[9] utilizes the international crisis behavior framework associated with Michael Brecher. She raises the point that Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff M. I. Kazakov, who was replaced on August 5, 1968, may have been less enthusiastic than his colleagues about the decision to invade. Unfortunately, neither of these otherwise very fine books deals explicitly with the consequences of that invasion for the Warsaw Pact.

THE ABOVE observations bring me back to the central question of reliability. Notwithstanding Erickson's irritation with what he regards as "woolly speculation" and wishful thinking about the reliability of East European members of the WTO (Dawisha/Hanson, p. 166), two of the books to appear on the Warsaw Pact in the last five years focus primarily on this issue, while most of the others address it.

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[8]See Jiri Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision*, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.

[9]See Karen Dawisha, *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 1984.

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Volgyes conceptualizes reliability in terms of behavioral expectations and values on the part of (1) national-level decision makers, (2) the Soviet/Warsaw Pact political elite, and (3) East European military elites. He breaks the situational variable down into internal-offensive, internal-defensive, external-defensive and external-offensive. Then, using the states of the WTO's southern tier as case studies, Volgyes attempts to make this concept operational in terms of twelve components of reliability that can be clustered under the headings of national political environment (history, political culture, party-army relations); nature of the military establishment (sociology, corporate interests of the officer corps, modernization, mission, and integration of Soviet-Pact forces); and a catch-all category for time frame, perception of Soviet reactions, etc. This is an ambitious theoretical framework, but it is not "woolly." Volgyes's chapter headings tell the tale of Bulgaria: "Faithful Ally," Romania: "Dubious Partner," and Hungary: "Problematic Performer."

Daniel Nelson's assessment of the mobilization potential of the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact stem from an emphasis on institutional structures rather than values or attitudes, and a concern with restraints imposed by economic as well as political conditions in individual countries. Nelson's six indicators of reliability—(1) scenario of hostility, (2) duration of involvement, (3) systematic integration, (4) domestic socioeconomic conditions, (5) domestic political conditions, and (6) military preparedness—raise real doubts about the mobilization potential of even such stalwarts of "real socialism" as Bulgaria and East Germany. With respect to the East Germans, these doubts have taken on added seriousness in light of subsequent Soviet anxiety over the drift of intra-German relations and the resultant forced postponement in 1984 of Erich Honecker's visit to Bonn.

Mackintosh approaches the issue of reliability in terms of Soviet perceptions about the military utility of their East European allies. In his view, the nature and duration of the specific conflict and its interaction with historic national antagonisms need to be considered in assessing reliability. He is quite straightforward in saying that in the Warsaw Pact nothing succeeds like success. Therefore, Moscow can rightly assume that it could count on its alliance partners (Romania aside) unless the military situation soured, in which case Poland, Hungary, and perhaps Czechoslovakia might become unreliable from the Soviet perspective.

In contrast, Thomas Cason, in Michael J. Sodaro and Sharon L. Wolchik's *Foreign and Domestic Policy in Eastern Europe in the 1980's*, takes the stand that the issue of political/military reliability in Eastern Europe (again minus Romania) is not a matter of governments but of peoples. According to this criterion, there is no doubt that Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary would not be reliable.

Yet another approach can be seen in Simon and Gilberg's somewhat contradictory position that although "the general transformation of Eastern Europe from a Soviet asset to liability . . . has had spillover effect on Soviet–East European military relationships," the new operational concepts of the 1970's and 1980's "will bear fruit in the form of improved coalitional capability by the early 1990's" (pp. 297–98). This view appears to assume, without actually saying so, that military reliability is a function of military capability and integration that can be isolated from broader political trends, such as rising East European nationalism, which according to the authors, is "likely to reduce Soviet influence" (p. 302).

In my own judgment, the best summary and soundest analysis of reliability is contained in A. Ross Johnson's chapter in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry's study for the Council on Foreign Relations. Johnson treats both reliability and military utility, economic/political and strategic considerations, to conclude that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania must all be seen as problematical by strategic planners in Moscow; that only East Germany and Bulgaria are truly reliable. And, in the Bulgarian case, geography and Romanian defiance of Pact integration combine to impede the Soviet Union from translating political reliability into military utility (a view supported by Thomas Cason in his chapter for the Clawson/Kaplan volume, p. 145). Nonetheless, Johnson concludes that if these East European forces found themselves in the middle of a Soviet offensive into Western Europe, they would fight and fight well—"because Soviet forces would be behind and around them" (p. 277).

In sum, despite differences of approach and criteria, there appears to be underlying agreement that the East Europeans are not particularly reliable vis-à-vis their Soviet patrons, with considerable doubt among most scholars whether this would make much difference if a shooting war began in Europe.[10] While hardly profound, this conclusion supports Erickson's view that Western national security policymakers should be looking at the role of the Warsaw Pact in Soviet operational planning to which, he suggests, the Pact's institutions are patently irrelevant (Dawisha/Hanson, p. 166).

[10]See also Nicholas Vaslef, "Soviet Strategic Style," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1983, pp. 56–60.

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Another aspect of alliance dynamics to receive somewhat more attention in recent years is burden-sharing within the WTO. Rice's chapter in the Holloway/Sharp volume breaks considerable new ground, despite her frustration about unreliable East European budget data (p. 60). And there is Daniel Nelson's provocative reconceptualization of burden-sharing in terms of extractive and performance burdens carried by non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact. Nelson has moved beyond the straight-forward budgetary comparisons that suggest the Soviet Union's share of alliance military expenditures is 85 to 90 percent, to gauging the defense effort by resources that are *taken* and duties that are *performed*. Seen in this light the East European contribution looks substantially more significant. (See *Alliance Behavior in the Warsaw Pact*, pp. 74–105).

FOR SCHOLARS and policy-makers concerned with the policy coordination function of the Pact rather than with the reliability issue, this essay would tentatively suggest an analytical framework that grows out of but is not articulated in the literature on the Pact. In thinking about the ability of Moscow to translate its power advantage into the desired policy outcomes, or about the utility of the alliance to its small and medium-sized members for purposes of cross-system comparisons, one must remember that postwar Eastern Europe is not a geographical or historical entity. In current usage, Eastern Europe refers essentially to ideological and political boundaries separating those East Central European countries that underwent communist revolutions at the end of World War II from those that did not. This region comprises roughly 140 million people living in eight states. These states differ dramatically in terms of size, natural resources, level of economic development, history, culture, ethnic composition, language, religion, and political experience. East European communist systems took root in enormously varied political environments and developed in the context of very different opportunities and constraints. Thus the hallmark of Eastern Europe is diversity.

Russian involvement in the politics of this region substantially predates the 1917 Russian revolution. By virtue of the fact that the Bolsheviks were able to capture that revolution, ideological millenarianism and the obligation "to save" fraternal socialist countries replaced the tsarist Russian sense of messianic mission embodied in the conception of Moscow as the "Third Rome" and in Panslavism. In short, an articulated ideology replaced an inchoate messianism based on theological assumptions and perceptions of ethnic kindredness as a justification for meddling in Eastern Europe. Tsarist and Soviet policy-makers alike have treated this region as a natural sphere of influence to be consolidated.

Moreover, the underlying military/security concerns remain much the same. Stalin was not the first ruler in Moscow bent on security-related expansion or the establishment of buffers on Russian borders. While such fears are increasingly atavistic in view of the destructive capability of available nuclear technology, for the Soviets they have become entangled with a perceived political/ideological threat inherent in the symbiotic nature of Soviet–East European communist systems.[11] Simply put, to the extent that East European imitation of the Soviet model is considered necessary to validate Soviet domestic choices, truly "national roads to socialism" among Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies become a domestic policy problem for Soviet decision-makers, and have the potential to fuel factionalism within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union itself.

It is in this sense that Soviet–East European relations are appropriately described as "organic." This mixture of Soviet historical, ideological, and systemic concerns is continually confronted by the centrifugal forces inherent in East European diversity. To understand the political dynamics within the Warsaw Pact, it is useful to keep in mind that Soviet and East European leaders operate in four overlapping political arenas or environments.[12] First, the leaders are *national* political actors subject to a range of national pressures and concerns that differ greatly not only between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but within Eastern Europe. In this arena, interests may either coincide or conflict and must be evaluated in country-specific terms on a case-by-case basis.

Second, the leaders are *intra-bloc* actors, relating to one another in terms of perceived alliance obligations. Within the bloc, the Soviets have an ongoing concern to control foreign policy and, within somewhat blurred limits, East European domestic policies as well. However, the degree to which the Soviets feel they must control domestic policies in Eastern Europe varies greatly with

[11] Andrzej Korbonski, "Eastern Europe as an Internal Determinant of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Seweryn Bialer, Ed., *The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981, pp. 271–332.

[12] This analytical approach was elaborated in a paper, "Problems of Political Cohesion of the Warsaw Pact," presented by this author to a conference on the Warsaw Pact and the Question of Cohesion, held at Carleton University, March 14–15, 1986. It goes beyond John Van Oudenaren's analysis of national, interbloc, and East-West dimensions contained in *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Options for the 1980s and Beyond* (Santa Monica, CA, The RAND Corporation, March 1984) to include an expanded intra-communist component as well as the East-South (Third World) connections.

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circumstance and time and results in behavior ranging from military intervention to benign neglect. There is at least the possibility, as Andrzej Korbonski suggests in his chapter for the Clawson/Kaplan volume, that Moscow's self-image may have moved closer to that of a leader of a conventional alliance as opposed to a "vozhd of an ideological camp" (p. 25).

East European policy-makers, depending on their country's individual situation, seek to expand their room for political maneuver vis-à-vis Moscow, to increase their input into joint decisions, or to secure Soviet support against one another. On the intra-bloc level, there is not one political game but many games, with different alignments. Edwina Moreton's chapter in the Holloway/Sharp book is a first-rate analysis of myriad East European national objectives that influence the political context of the Warsaw Pact. The modernization/professionalization tensions that Erickson discusses are further elaborated in Condoleezza Rice's chapters on defense burden-sharing in the Pact (in the Holloway/Sharp and Nelson collections) and reinforce Moreton's points, but in an alliance-specific fashion. Paul Marer's chapters on the political economy of Soviet–East European relations (in the Holloway/Sharp and the Sarah Meiklejohn Terry volumes) spell out the economic restraints limiting both Soviet and East European options. His contribution to understanding the economic trade-offs facing Warsaw Pact decision-makers is invaluable. This point is further driven home by John Hardt's discussion of Soviet energy policy in Eastern Europe (in the Meiklejohn Terry book).

Third, the intra-bloc dimension is influenced by the membership of all the actors in a broader grouping that scholars call the communist subsystem[13] and the participants themselves variously refer to as the "socialist commonwealth" or "family of socialist nations." That is to say, Soviet and East European policy-makers are operating in an *intra-communist* political environment. As part of the world communist movement, they are officially committed to a transnational ideological/political campaign to change the international status quo. They share in-group norms, standards, and values. They play the game of intra-communist politics with reference to their own heroes, villains, and martyrs. In this world there is a highly ideological language of politics that tends to obscure (but not eliminate) the driving force of traditional nationalism. Esoteric debate and ritual behavior combine to confuse the underlying political dynamics. There are rules to this game that do not apply to relations among these states and the non-communist world.

This aspect of political interaction is essentially ignored by all of the books discussed here, an omission that constitutes a decided weakness in the literature. To the degree that Soviet–East European relations are "organic," the problem of ideological transfer to Eastern Europe from the Eurocommunist parties of Western Europe becomes a security issue in Moscow. To give a concrete example, Romania and Yugoslavia in alliance with the Spanish and Italian parties managed to substitute "voluntary cooperation" for the long-standing Soviet slogan of "proletarian internationalism" at the 1976 Berlin conference of European communist parties.[14]

Finally, the intra-communist and intra-bloc arenas are also influenced by Soviet and East European membership in an *international* system, where Soviet and East European leaders interact in an East-West context as well as in an East-South framework with Third World countries and a range of non-state actors such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization, multinational corporations, and various churches. Within this international political environment, constant tensions are produced by the fact that the Soviet Union is a global power and the East European states are primarily regional actors, their ideological commitments notwithstanding.

Among the interactions in the international system, East-West relations receive the most attention, in chapters with subjects ranging from discussions of the Warsaw Pact and NATO (Kaplan and Boczek in Clawson/Kaplan) to studies of relations with the United States and Western Europe, such as the contributions by Pierre Hassner and Raymond Garthoff to the Meiklejohn Terry book, or Jonathan Dean's chapter in the Holloway/Sharp volume. With the exception of Roger Kanet's thoughtful analysis of the expanding relationships of the East European states with the Third World in Sodaro/Wolchik, and brief references by Moreton and Rice, this aspect of Warsaw Pact politics is also a non-topic. This may be justified on the part of those scholars applying the more narrow definition of the Pact. But even so, the ability of Romania to join the Group of 77 and to become a de facto member of the Nonaligned Movement should raise some interesting questions.

As the Warsaw Treaty Organization entered its second decade in the mid-1960's, both superpowers had to adjust to the erosion of the postwar bipolar international system. Both Moscow and Washington had to function in an increasingly

[13]See George Modelski, *The Communist International System*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, Center for International Studies Monograph, 1960.

[14]A text of the conference's final document was published in *New Times* (Moscow), July 1976, pp. 17–32.

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polycentric international system. In this context, Soviet efforts to substitute joint institutions for Stalin's charismatic authority, and "socialist legality" for terror as an instrument of control, backfired and reinforced the growing diversity of East European roads to socialism.

The change in the international system was dictated by the escalating destructiveness of nuclear weapons technology and the Soviet ideological response to the demands of living in a nuclear age. Once the Soviet Union itself became a nuclear power, the sobering realization of what nuclear war could mean began to influence Soviet dogma. Unlike Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev accepted that nuclear war would destroy not only capitalism but communism as well. The Leninist tenet of the "inevitability" of war between the competing capitalist and socialist systems was replaced by "peaceful coexistence," that is, by a long-term stalemate in which confrontation must be limited to nonnuclear means. This reassessment in turn affected the Warsaw Pact in two significant ways.

From the viewpoint of the totality of Soviet–East European relations, Khrushchev's shift to peaceful coexistence substantially worsened relations with the Chinese, who said that the West was militarily "a paper tiger," and who were outraged because Khrushchev also reneged on the Soviet promise to help China develop its own nuclear capability. The Sino-Soviet rift contributed to changing the intra-communist environment within which East European policy-makers operated by creating two communist superpowers to relate to. Moreover, Moscow needed allies to help contain Beijing's sustained ideological/organizational challenge.

In the more narrow sense of the WTO as a military alliance, Romanian resistance to playing the role assigned to it in the "international socialist division of labor" soon spilled over into the Warsaw Pact. Albania, too, openly criticized Pact policy towards the German question, and Enver Hoxha turned Albania into an island of Chinese influence in the Balkans.[15] Indeed, for all practical purposes, Albania was excluded from Warsaw Pact meetings by 1962, while Romania quietly dropped out of military cooperation in the alliance. Subsequently, Nicolae Ceauşescu combined an increasingly independent Romanian foreign policy with a domestic firm hand—"national Stalinism," so to speak. He has walked a tightrope, and as George W. Price correctly suggests, nationalism in the Romanian military is a double-edged sword that has "undercut the ideological supremacy of the party by introducing a competing set of values" (Simon and Gilberg, p. 292).

FROM a more narrowly military perspective, changes in Soviet military doctrine in the early 1960's added up to a new mission for the Warsaw Pact. The alliance moved from being a political instrument in Moscow's foreign policy strategy to being a military coalition expected to play a serious role in the event of war in Europe. By 1961, an ambitious program of modernization of East European armies, standardization of weapons, joint exercises, and expanded consultation among defense ministers was under way. Clearly, to whatever extent East European ground forces could substitute for Soviet troops, they were expected to do so. Under the rubric of "coalition warfare" the Warsaw Pact was acquiring a solid military identity.[16] In principle, East European military forces had become an extension of Soviet military power directed against Western Europe.

The initial assumption in Moscow appears to have been that the issue of reliability was one of training, professionalism, and the hardware to do the job. It seems to have been assumed that, leaving aside increasing political diversity in East Europe, the Kremlin could maintain control over joint military doctrine. Ideally, in that view, the Warsaw Pact would serve as an instrument for achieving both military and political objectives or, at a minimum, for containing political differences.

What such assumptions overlooked was precisely that the appearance of consolidation, which made the Eastern Europeans potentially viable military partners, meant that the East European political leaders were themselves subjected to more domestic pressures. In short, the national arena of the East European policy-makers was beginning to become their number one priority because their own identities were being remade by virtue of the responsibilities that came with running a country and juggling apparatuses of power. Moreover, "fraternal exchanges of experience" among Warsaw Pact armies notwithstanding, East European armed forces had been substantially "renationalized" after 1956. Soviet officers had for the most part been recalled, and no one knew or knows just what degree of professional and political socialization had been achieved by the East European officers who remained in command of East European military establishments.

However, the Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev study of the Warsaw Pact's northern tier suggests that as a consequence of their increased professionalization, the East European militaries appear to have begun to demand more say in Warsaw Pact

[15] See W. E. Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift*, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1963.
[16] A. Ross Johnson, *The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe*, Santa Monica, CA, The RAND Corporation, P-6583, July 1981.

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military councils. Romanian pressure in this regard is well known.[17] We also know that the Czechoslovak military was not enthusiastic about the role assigned to it on the southwestern front, where losses of 60 to 70 percent were projected within the first few days of limited nuclear conflict (Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, p. 116). It is fair to say that the Prague Spring escalated into the long, hot summer of 1968 in part because Dubček and the civilian leadership of the Czechoslovak party were being preempted by an increasingly politicized officer corps.

Although Brezhnev used "allied socialist" troops to force Czechoslovakia back on a Soviet-defined road to socialism, the ghost of the Prague Spring even reappeared at the 25th CPSU Congress in 1976, and informed the platforms of the Eurocommunist parties. Its essence was rehabilitated at the 1976 European communist conference in Berlin. Not only did that gathering reject Soviet-style proletarian internationalism in favor of "voluntary cooperation," but the Soviet-preferred "general laws of socialist development" gave way to the right of each party to "creatively interpret" its own experience along the road to socialism. Clearly, "real socialism" as defined in Moscow suffered a setback.

In the 1980's, eroding Soviet hegemony in the international communist movement has continued to interact with intra-bloc dynamics and national pressures that are more insistent—not only in Eastern Europe but in the Soviet Union as well. There is no doubt in my mind that the unpleasant choices that confronted Brezhnev and company in Poland in 1980–1981 intensified the Soviet desire to reestablish control over Eastern Europe. An atavistic harking back to the "general laws of socialist development," and nostalgic references to the countries of "real socialism," were an attempt to revitalize the Soviet model. That effort in itself has become a primary source of tension for East European communist regimes struggling with their own ideological, political, and economic crises.

IN EASTERN EUROPE, the urgency of the search for national roads to socialism exists in large part because East European communists are plagued by ongoing crises of legitimacy. This in turn is the case because, with the exception of Yugoslavia and Albania, East European communist transformations were a direct result of Soviet occupation at the end of World War II. Soviet "liberation" and scientific socialism are no substitute for an indigenous revolutionary myth. This weak legitimacy is exacerbated by the fact that the rational-legal basis for legitimacy embodied in East European constitutions is visibly stronger in form than in content. Moreover, charisma is not generally a strong point among East European party leaders, who are at best often seen as the least worst choice by large parts of their populations.

Not surprisingly, East European leaders have attempted to improve their image by means of cautious nationalism, consumerism, and cooptation of the technical and cultural intelligentsias. Although Western scholars tend to feel that this attempt at legitimization has not worked, the process does appear to have convinced those Eastern Europeans dedicated to change that the only political game in town is tinkering with party reform under the guise of national roads to socialism.

But this tactic has its limits. Dubček's "socialism with a human face" was unacceptable not only in Moscow but especially in the capitals of more orthodox East European party/states. The "allied socialist" invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 represented an attempt to draw the line. Yet, Hungarian leader Janos Kádár's subsequent decision to proceed with more modest reforms, which did not provoke a march into Budapest by "fraternal" troops, sends yet another signal. Whatever the perceived limits, East European leaders are under increasing pressure to reinterpret "proletarian internationalism" as socialist patriotism.

With the establishment of Solidarity in Poland in 1980–81, the crisis of legitimacy became an ideological crisis, as Polish workers attempted to become their own vanguard. With workers demanding to speak for themselves and Solidarity insisting that the Polish United Workers Party put its "leading role" to a vote, Poland collapsed into martial law. Military rule prevented Poland from falling off the road to socialism altogether, but it hardly increased the legitimacy of the Polish communist party.[18]

Although martial law was officially lifted in July 1983, Poland remained in the grip of an ongoing ideological crisis. There was little initial progress in rebuilding the party, which appeared to be something of a sore point between General Wojciech Jaruzelski and his Soviet patrons (see Korbonski in Meiklejohn Terry, p. 90). Notwithstanding such moves toward normality as Jaruzelski's stepping down from his post as premier and the 10th Polish Party Congress in the summer of 1986, the Polish scenario is a nightmare for communist leaders in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The specter of rejection by a communist

[17]Alexander Alexiev, *Romania and the Warsaw Pact: The Defense Policy of a Reluctant Ally*, Santa Monica, CA, The RAND Corporation, P-6270, January 1979.

[18]Indeed, Polish Deputy Prime Minister Mieczysław Rakowski, in an interview with *The Times* (London), Feb. 23, 1982, openly admitted that the party "went bankrupt, intellectually and politically."

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party's most fundamental constituency, the working class, has increased the urgency of considering genuine concessions to worker needs and has necessitated at least the contemplation of change in the priorities of party-run trade unions.

Another core "lesson of Poland" may be found in the strength of the ideological challenge posed to official secularism by revitalized religion. In Poland, the Pope is a political actor. In the Soviet Union and other East European countries, religious groups are becoming more overtly political. Even when this is in ostensible support of official policies, it feels threatening to party leaders who have a deep distrust of religious activism and fear its popular appeal. Their responses to political currents outside of the party are instinctively repressive. Note the crackdown on churches in East Germany in an effort to retain official control over the East German peace movement.

At the same time, party ideologues throughout the Soviet bloc are grappling with the dilemma of a widening generation gap. Teenagers are "dropping out" of developed socialism. They are alienated, hostile to regimentation, and bored by Marxism-Leninism presented in the ideological jargon of their grandfathers. This is a core problem for the ideological component of political socialization. Young people—in East and West—live in a youth culture increasingly permeated by political apathy and are hard to reach.

The youth problem is compounded by the intra-bloc pressure inherent in a deeply held Soviet assumption that the appearance of unity, and especially of unity that reflects Soviet practice, provides necessary validation for Soviet domestic policy choices. The tension is created because the appearance of unity so essential to Moscow undermines the position of East European policy-makers, whose credibility depends on the perception that they are pursuing "their own practices." There is no ideological sleight of hand that can simultaneously serve both needs. This dilemma, in turn, feeds into the most serious problem of political transformation facing Eastern Europe as a whole—how to expand the capacity of East European communist parties to deal with ever growing demands for political access.

Soviet efforts to resolve East European leadership disputes along lines dictated by Moscow's own policy preferences is understandable. However, they make it virtually impossible for East European parties to cope with their ongoing crises of participation. This was graphically underlined when "allied socialist" forces aborted the party reform envisioned in the Czechoslovak party draft statutes in 1968, thereby freezing the process of political change under way during the Prague Spring into a distorted, artificial form that simultaneously destroyed the historically pro-Russian feelings of many Czechs and the last vestige of legitimacy for the rebuilt Czechoslovak party.

WHAT are the implications of Poland in this regard? The good news from the perspective of anxious Warsaw watchers in the Kremlin was that Solidarity as an alternative to the "leading role" of the party had been neutralized. The bad news was that the Polish United Workers' Party had for all practical purposes collapsed. Its "leading role" passed into the hands of the Polish military. General Jaruzelski is still the head of the Polish party. The issue is not whether he wears civilian clothes but whether his self-identity is "first of all a soldier."[19]

Those who view this situation as a victory of the party in uniform obscure the fundamental long-term implications.[20] Communist political systems had been assumed to be immune to military coups. But the Leninist principle on army subordination to the party did not hold in Poland. When the civilian leadership of the Polish party proved incapable of dealing with the situation, the military became the vanguard of a party that essentially ceased to function. This happened because the Polish party could not resolve the political crisis of participation in the context of an intensifying economic crisis. Such problems are by no means unique to Poland and therefore increase the awareness of communist civilian and military leaders alike of their respective roles in the national political arena.

There is no real consensus in the literature on the implications of the shift in party-army relations and the militarization of the Polish party that took place during and, indeed, after martial law. But there is general agreement that to whatever degree the Polish armed forces are involved in running the country, the military capability of the Warsaw Pact may be the loser. The Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev study of the Pact's northern tier makes the point that even before the challenge from Solidarity, a substantial politicization of the Polish military was a fact of life that had to be taken into account by Polish and Soviet leaders alike (pp. 49–53). Johnson's chapter in the Meiklejohn Terry book illustrates this with a quote from Khrushchev about

[19] *The Statesman* (New Delhi) Feb. 12, 1981.

[20] See Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems," *The American Political Science Review* (Washington, DC), December 1982, pp. 778–89. For a more realistic discussion of the Polish data, see A. Ross Johnson and Barbara Kliszewski, *The Polish Military After Martial Law: Report of a Rand Conference, October 14, 1982*, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Note, N-2001-AF, June 1983.

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Soviet uncertainty as to which Polish regiments could be counted on to obey then Polish Defense Minister and Soviet Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky during the tense days of the Polish October in 1956 (p. 282). The questions that Johnson raises concerning Soviet reappraisal of the doctrine of coalition warfare (p. 279) go beyond the issue of Poland to a fundamental assumption in Moscow that the leading role in all joint military operations must be played by the Soviet Armed Forces.

Undoubtedly, the meteoric rise of Solidarity exacerbated already existing worries about the reliability of the East European components in the Pact's Joint Armed Forces. Whatever Moscow may have believed about the commitment of professional Polish officers to their international obligations, Poland has a conscript army. This raises the possibility that tensions between the offensive (East-West) function of the Warsaw Pact and the alliance's "internal" (intra-bloc) function have resulted in a situation whereby internal Polish pressures now operate as a restriction on the Pact's "offensive" options.[21]

AT THE SAME TIME, recent debt-servicing crises make clear that neither East European borrowers nor Western lenders can count on a Soviet umbrella to protect them from the fallout of potential defaults. Moscow has no interest in assuming responsibility for bad East European debts. Even more serious, ever since the change in CEMA oil pricing mechanisms in the mid-1970's to a moving average based on world prices, it has been clear that the Soviets intend to cut what they perceive as their losses in the realm of energy subsidies to Eastern Europe. Eastern Europeans will have to look elsewhere to meet their rising energy needs. This Soviet policy is making it more and more essential for Eastern Europeans to seek other economic alternatives, suppliers, and markets, thus necessitating increased interactions with both noncommunist developed countries and the developing countries of the Third World.

It is against this background that Soviet attacks in 1984 on the increasingly close East-West German relations must be understood. Honecker postponed, rather than cancelled, his trip to West Germany scheduled for September 1984. Although the East German leader yielded to Soviet pressure, he did so in the context of East German insistence on the right of "communist parties everywhere to follow their own paths and arrive at their own solutions."

This clash may be seen as resulting from the Soviet attempt to have the East Germans put intra-bloc concerns above their national economic interests. In my view, this was only the tip of the iceberg. The Soviets had to contend with a difference of opinion on the part of the East Germans about how to respond to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. When Moscow had walked out of the arms talks in 1983, the East German leader called for "limiting the damage" through constructive dialogue and continuing peaceful economic and political relations. Honecker thereby preempted Soviet control over Warsaw Pact policy in an extremely sensitive area. His position was a logical extension of the Hungarian call for national foreign policy initiatives that stressed the important role of small and medium-sized states in facilitating détente. That the East German press reprinted the Hungarian articles rather than the Czechoslovak criticisms of the Hungarian position on the foreign policies of Warsaw Pact member states revealed a visible break in the ranks of the proponents of "real socialism."[22] These differences evidently spilled over into alliance politics: the April 1984 Warsaw Pact statement came substantially closer to the positions of East Germany and Hungary than to those of the USSR and Czechoslovakia.[23]

Today, the Soviet Union's superpower concerns can and do conflict with its intra-bloc priorities. At the same time, the establishment of communist rule in several Third World states, the sustained challenge from the Chinese, and the Eurocommunist emphasis on pluralism have eroded Soviet ideological authority and political hegemony in the international communist movement. The Soviet Union's own economic problems undoubtedly will demand much of CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's time and political energy as he tries to get the "rad-

[21]For more detail on this question, see Leszek K. Stachow's chapter on Poland in Richard A. Gabriel, Ed., *Fighting Armies*, pp. 227–45; and Robin Alison Remington, "The Leading Role of the Polish Military: Implications for the Warsaw Pact," in J. L. Black, Ed., *Sisyphus and Poland: Observations on Martial Law*, Winnipeg, Frye Publishing, 1985.

Jarosław Piekalkiewicz documents the continued militarization of Polish political life after Jaruzelski changed political hats in July 1983. See his "Poland 1981–1984: White, Red, and Black," *UFSI Report* (Indianapolis, IN), No. 30, November 1984.

[22]These tensions were not resolved by Honecker's concession to Moscow concerning his fall 1984 travel schedule. The East German daily, *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), on Aug. 9, 1985, reprinted yet another Hungarian article defending the GDR's active diplomacy despite Soviet criticism (in *Pravda*, June 21, 1985) of the thesis that "small" socialist states have a special role in reviving détente. From a Marxist perspective, it was probably "no accident" that the *Népszabadság* article appeared in the East German press so close to the anniversary of Honecker's postponed trip to Bonn. For an analysis, see Ronald D. Asmus, "East Berlin Defends Foreign Policy Toward Western Europe," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE-RL), *Background Report* (Munich), No. 85, Aug. 23, 1985.

[23]"WTO Foreign Ministers' Conference Communiqué," *Pravda*, Apr. 27, 1984, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), May 22, 1984, p. 12–13.

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ical reform" that he called for at the 27th CPSU Congress into gear. In such international and domestic circumstances, Soviet efforts to reassert control over East European "national roads" to socialism face serious obstacles. And there are signs that the men at the top in Moscow are anything but united about policy direction in this regard.[24]

Notwithstanding the renewal of the Warsaw Pact for another 20 years, the extent to which the alliance will function as an instrument of Soviet policy is not a settled question. Given the inherent economic/political instability in some of the East European member states of the Pact, Gorbachev may well have to choose between intra-bloc cohesion Soviet-style and viability of the East European regimes in question. That could be a costly trade-off. Whether it proves to be sufficiently costly to make Moscow abandon its atavistic imperial behavior and accept the restraints implicit in coalition politics of a more traditional alliance remains to be seen.

Spillover of the Soviet reform debate into alliance politics is as inevitable as it is unpredictable. Intra-bloc outcomes depend heavily on what becomes defined as "real socialism" in the Gorbachev era and on whether the General Secretary is able to overcome the opposition of those who "like some character in Gogol" stubbornly intend to outwait the demands for overhauling the Soviet economy. The political repercussions of his reform efforts in the Soviet Union are also still uncalculable, as are the international alternatives available to the East European members of the Warsaw Pact who attempt "national initiatives."

In the meantime, while conferences where scholars discuss what is happening in the East bloc alliance are a good thing, more books on the issue of reliability would represent an underutilization of the analytical ability of the scholars involved.[25] Seen as a whole, the literature on the Warsaw Pact suffers from repetition and intellectual fragmentation. This is not to say that the books reviewed here do not make a contribution. Quite the contrary. For all the uneven coverage, the state of the art in the 1980's includes some first-rate scholarship and provocative approaches. But we need to stop repeating ourselves, to begin to fill existing gaps, and to provide the kind of data that would allow for serious cross-system comparisons of coalition politics.

[24]This is an example of what is sometimes referred to as "dynamic ambiguity" in Soviet–East European relations. See Walter L. Barrows, "Speculation on a Multipolar 1984," in Louis J. Mensonides and James A. Kuhlman, Eds., op. cit., p. 210. See also Elizabeth Teague, "*Kommunist* Speaks out in Defense of East Europe's National Interests," RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 262/85, Aug. 12, 1985.

[25]A still more promising format is one whereby scholars gather to discuss not chapters, but book-length manuscripts, as with the Kennan Institute/Wilson Center and Carleton University conferences in May 1984 and March 1986, respectively, to discuss the mammoth study by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Christopher D. Jones et al., *The Warsaw Pact and the Question of Cohesion*. First published in three volumes under the auspices of the Canadian Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, this study is currently being revised under Rakowska-Harmstone's general editorship for Indiana University Press as *The Warsaw Pact National Military Profiles Series*, an anticipated five volumes, with publication scheduled for 1988–89.

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Pathologies of Central Planning

Bartłomiej Kamiński

ANDRÁS KOVËS. *The CMEA Countries in the World Economy: Turning Inwards or Turning Outwards*. Budapest, Akademiai Kiado, 1985.

JANOS KORNAI. *Contradictions and Dilemmas. Studies on the Socialist Economy and Society*. Cambridge, MA, and London, The MIT Press, 1986.

DAVID LANE. *The Soviet Economy and Society*. New York, New York University Press, 1985.

ALEC NOVE. *Socialism, Economics and Development*. London, Allen & Unwin, 1986.

P. T. WANLESS. *Taxation in Centrally Planned Economies*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985.

RECENTLY the issue of political and economic change in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has made headlines and has received much attention in both the East and the West. The interest has been triggered not only by Mikhail Gorbachev's campaign for sweeping changes in Soviet society, but also by such developments in non-Soviet member countries of the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA)[1] as growing marginalization of their economies, the drop in their standing within the world economy, and a widening gap with the West and even newly-industrializing countries with regard to technology and standard of living. Taken together, these developments have raised serious doubts as to the viability of central planning or—to borrow a term widely employed in Poland—"the traditional planning mechanism."

Among the many questions specialists have been asking themselves are: How critical is the economic situation of the Soviet Union and other East European countries? What symptoms of economic crisis can be observed? Will it be sufficient to correct economic policies, or is there a need for a more systemic economic reform? This essay will address these questions by examining whether CEMA economies are indeed facing a crisis situation, and if so, how serious the situation is, and how might it be rectified. Though not necessarily focused on these questions, the literature reviewed here does shed some light on them.

IS THERE a crisis? Although specialists agree that CEMA states are plagued by serious economic and social problems, they are divided in their assessment of the scope and depth of the economic malaise as well as in their perception of the remedies that are needed or available. One point of contention is whether the Soviet and East European record of economic growth justifies the use of the term "crisis." Thus, J. Drewnowski, D. M. Nuti, A. C. Gorlin, D. L. Bond and H.S. Levine,[2] and A. Kovës, whose book is reviewed here, see the potential for a crisis if present trends are not checked. Others, such as André Liebich[3] and authors of volumes reviewed here, David Lane, Alec Nove, and Janos Kornai, seem to believe that poor economic performance is not in it-

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[1]This analysis is confined to European full members of CEMA: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. The term Eastern Europe, as used here, excludes the Soviet Union.

[2]See J. Drewnowski, Ed., *Crisis in the East European Economy*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982; D. M. Nuti, *Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe*, European Institute Working Paper, No. 26, Florence, July 1984; A. C. Gorlin, "The Soviet Economy," in *Current History* (Philadelphia), October 1986; and D. L. Bond and H. S. Levine, "An Overview," in A. Bergson and H. S. Levine, Eds. *The Soviet Economy: Toward the Year 2000*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1983.

[3]See A. Liebich, "Eastern Europe Today: Marching Together Out of Step," in *Behind the Headlines* (Toronto), Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1986, Vol. 43, No. 3.

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self indicative of a crisis. Lane, for example, comparing the performance of the Soviet Union with that of the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), finds that the developmental gap between them has been reduced significantly. Nove, in his essay "The Soviet Economy: Problems and Prospects," in *Socialism, Economics and Development,* argues against prophesies of inevitable economic collapse, even though his balance sheet of Soviet economic performance has hardly any bright spots.

Although both Lane and Nove are aware of the traditional drawbacks of Soviet-style economies, they also emphasize the numerous advantages of central planning.[4] Nove contends that immunity from pressure groups and lobbyists enables central planners to choose investment priorities rationally. In Lane's view, this feature of Soviet-style economies has contributed to sustained, long-term rates of economic growth accompanied by stability and full employment. As both note, neither recent rates of growth of gross national product (GNP) nor levels of the standard of living, when viewed in comparative perspective, justify characterizing the Soviet economy as being in "crisis."

In one of his essays "The Health of Nations," in his book under review here, Kornai seeks to place the issue in a broad comparative context, arguing that, whatever the shortcomings of central planning, the alternative "capitalist economy" has its own long list of pathologies. The conclusion that every economic order has its pathologies is not very revealing, however. What really matters is not that all economic systems have their weaknesses, but the extent to which these economies have the organizational capability to cope with difficulties.

Some societies and their governments choose to ignore pathologies, while others regard them as symptoms of a crisis to be dealt with. That crisis could be defined as a perception of the gap between the actual and potential rate of change, of a suboptimal use of resources. It is not surprising that in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where the legitimacy of the Stalinist model of development was based on its proclaimed superiority to what Marx called "the capitalist socioeconomic formation," the elites have tended to minimize the scope and extent of the problems that the system has not yet been able to solve. Nevertheless, it is striking to note the degree to which the issue of economic reform has figured in the politics of succession in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Despite the fact that the economic growth rate of the Soviet Union and most East European countries continues to be respectable by international standards, there is strong evidence that it has lost its momentum (see Table 1). Deteriorating performance is apparent even from the usually "inflated" official data. In 1976–80, the average annual rate of growth of the CEMA economies was about 4 percent, as compared to 7 percent a decade earlier. Except in the case of East Germany, it was even lower in 1981–85, averaging approximately 3 percent.[5]

Moreover, since the fall in growth rates has been accompanied by increased savings rates, we are observing a marked decline in economic efficiency. Indeed, since the late 1950's, CEMA countries have experienced a relative decline in the productivity of both labor and capital. Thus, in attempting to maintain economic growth, centrally planned economies (CPE's) have had to use increasing amounts of labor and capital. For instance, the Soviet Union now has to expend twice as much capital as it did in the early 1970's to achieve the same growth in national income.[6] Except for the 1971–75 period, when the rate of growth of labor productivity rose to 7.3 percent as contrasted to 4.9 percent in the years 1961–70, Eastern Europe has experienced a continuous, long-term decline in labor productivity. In the two five-year-plan periods since the 1971–75 period, these rates were just 3.4 and 2.1 percent respectively.[7] The Soviet economy has experienced a steady decline in the annual growth rate of labor productivity that was not even interrupted in 1971–75.

Declining labor and capital productivity, combined with slowing expansion of employment, has had a retarding effect on economic growth. Moreover, even the very substantial—by international standards—investment effort in all CPE's proved insufficient to compensate for the losses in output growth caused by the falling rates of employment growth.

Clearly, the days when the substance, if not the timing, of Nikita Khrushchev's plans to overtake the

[4]The term central planning as used here refers to the dominant role of the administrative/bureaucratic mechanism of control in organizing economic activity. It says nothing about the degree of actual centralization of decision-making effectiveness.

[5]See *Economic Survey of Europe in 1985-1986,* New York, United Nations, 1986. p. 114. It is noteworthy that the decline was not solely due to the performance of the agricultural sector. Industrial output has also been falling. For instance, in the Soviet Union, the annual average rate of industrial growth fell from 8.7 percent in 1966–70 to 7.4 percent in 1971–75, to 4.4 percent in 1976–80, to 3.0 percent in 1981–85. (Official Soviet data quoted in M. Kostrzewski, "The USSR: From Experience in Rebuilding," in *Życie Gospodarcze* [Warsaw], No. 15, Apr. 12, 1987.)

[6]See E.A. Hewett, "Gorbachev's Economic Strategy: A Preliminary Assessment," in *Soviet Economy* (Washington, DC), No. 4, 1985, p. 288, as quoted in Gorlin, loc. cit.

[7]See *Economic Survey of Europe in 1985–1986,* p. 8.

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Table 1: Growth in Net Material Product of East European Economies, 1966–86

(Average annual growth, in percent)

	1966–70	1971–75	1976–80	1981–85	1986
Bulgaria	8.7	7.9	6.1	3.7	5.5
Czechoslovakia	6.9	5.6	3.7	1.8	3.2
GDR	5.2	5.4	4.1	4.5	4.3
Hungary	6.8	6.3	3.2	1.4	0.5
Poland	6.0	9.7	1.6	-0.8	5.0
Romania	7.7	11.3	7.2	4.4	7.0
USSR	7.6	5.7	4.3	3.6	4.1

SOURCES: Kovés, p. 162; *UN Economic Survey of Europe in 1985–1986*, New York, United Nations, 1986, p. 116, and M. Misiak, "'The Seven' [CEMA Countries] After 1986," *Życie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), No. 14, 1987.

United States economically could be taken seriously are long gone.[8] When Leonid Brezhnev declared in 1976 that "never before in its entire history has [the USSR] enjoyed such authority and influence in the world" and spoke of the "great things [being] accomplished" at home,[9] he could do so only because slower economic growth was compensated by international political gains and rapidly improving terms of trade, which permitted a rapid expansion of domestic consumption.

By the late 1970's, such self-satisfaction was giving way to a growing sense of failure, and with good reason.[10] Since the mid-1970's, the gap between economic performance and expectations has been widening not only in the Soviet Union, but in all of Eastern Europe. While most countries in the region have avoided the catastrophe of Poland, where global output plummeted by about 25 percent between 1978 and 1982,[11] not one CEMA economy has fared particularly well.

Declining growth has been particularly disappointing in view of the generally favorable external environment for economic development in the bloc during the 1970's. The 1974 oil-price shock, along with a general improvement in the demand for primary-commodity exports brought the Soviet Union a spectacular windfall in profits in convertible currencies. The introduction of annual, rather than quinquennial, revisions of the intra-CEMA price of oil, based on world prices averaged over a five-year period, doubled the price of East European energy imports, and so reversed the earlier trend of deterioration in the terms of the Soviet Union's trade with its bloc partners.[12]

At the same time, the CEMA countries were themselves partially and temporarily cushioned from the price shock because of the moving five-year average price applied to intra-bloc transactions. Although this gave them an opportunity to adjust more or less smoothly to energy scarcities, there is ample evidence that the East European countries did not substantially decrease the energy intensity of their economies, allowing it to remain significantly higher than in market economies at a similar level of development.[13] Instead of responding to more expensive energy with changes in investment programs, East European planners continued their dash-for-growth policies. They failed to take advantage of a unique opportunity to spread the cost of adjusting to energy scarcities over a longer period of time than was available to non-CEMA oil-importing countries.

This was not the only development opportunity that CEMA countries let slip away in the 1970's; they also failed to exploit to best advantage opportunities offered by an explosion of liquidity in international financial markets—triggered by the inflow of surplus funds from members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and a recession in the West—as well as by détente in East-West relations. Better political relations between the superpowers during the early 1970's, coupled with Western eagerness to export to CEMA countries, created a very favorable climate for East-West commercial and financial relations. In brief, Western banks had ample supplies

[8]The famous Polish economist Oskar Lange predicted, in the late 1950's, that developed capitalism would in the not too distant future become "encircled" by more developed communist economies (See his *Pisma społeczne i ekonomiczne* [Social and Political Writings], Warszawa, Państwowe Wydanie Naukowe, 1961, p. 61). Of course Lange was involved in building communism. It is interesting to note in this context that Peter Wiles, who can hardly be accused of sympathy for the Soviet-style development model, praised its capability to generate high rates of economic growth. See his "Growth versus Choice," in *Economic Journal* (Cambridge), June, 1956.

[9]Quoted in Timothy J. Colton, *The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1984, p. 9.

[10]For an excellent discussion of the Brezhnev regime's loss of purposiveness during its last days, see Colton, op. cit.

[11]See B. Kamiński "The Dying Command Economy: Solidarity and the Polish Economic Crisis," in *Journal of Contemporary Studies* (San Francisco), No. 1, 1985.

[12]For a discussion of the impact of oil on intra-CEMA relations and for estimates of Soviet opportunity costs, see M. Lavigne, "The Soviet Union inside CMEA," in *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1983.

[13]Given the difference in GNP estimates in convertible currencies for Eastern Europe, it is difficult to compare energy per unit of GNP in Eastern Europe and OECD countries. All estimates place OECD energy consumption per unit at a level of 50–67 percent of that in Eastern Europe. See data in *World Development Report 1986* (Oxford).

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of capital, while Western governments were willing to back loans to CEMA countries as a means of stimulating external demand for Western goods. The lack of attractive investment opportunities in Western economies hit by the recession that followed the oil-price shock, coupled with the good credit standing of most CEMA countries, facilitated bloc borrowing on world financial markets.

With credit cheap and easily available, central planners could draw on external resources, permitting their economies—if so desired—to consume more than they produced. As a result, to varying degrees, CEMA countries embarked on the path of import-led or, as it turned out later for some, indebted growth. Imports increased at a much faster rate than exports, resulting in significant trade deficits, financed by Western credits. The average annual growth rate of European CEMA countries' imports from the West jumped from about 10 percent in the 1960's to 32 percent in 1971–75.[14]

This regional picture, however, conceals important differences in the foreign trade dynamics and patterns of individual CEMA countries and is also distorted by the worldwide inflation in the 1970's. A closer examination of trade trends in constant-price (volume) rather than in current-price (value) terms and an analysis of East-West trade over time suggests that symptoms of crisis in East-West economic interaction appeared earlier than generally assumed.

First, it must be stressed that most East European countries embarked on a path of import-led growth not in the 1970's, but in the 1960's. CEMA countries, with the notable exceptions of Poland and the Soviet Union, recorded higher annual average rates of growth in the volume of imports from non-communist countries in the 1960's than in the 1970's or, for that matter, the 1980's.

Second, though the bloc reoriented its trade outward in the 1960's, during the 1970's and the 1980's the volume of intra-CEMA trade expanded faster than that of trade with the West. (There were exceptions: in the 1970's, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union turned outward in terms of volume of both exports and imports.) The deceleration of real trade growth between East and West continued in the 1980's. Because of difficulties in financing balance-of-trade deficits and managing debt, Eastern Europe had to reduce deficits and generate surpluses in its convertible-currency trade. As a result, the volume of non-socialist imports fell absolutely for Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania.

Third, the expansion of East-West trade was due mainly to Western credits. Increased imports did not produce a similar expansion in exports. While the relative debt burden of Eastern Europe was rather insignificant, the debt/export ratio for some countries was higher in the early 1970's than in 1982, the peak year of the East European "debt crisis" (see Table 2). Some East European countries accumulated considerable debt as a result of running deficits in their trade balances with the West.

Although the net debt/convertible currency exports ratio does not take into account a number of aspects of the external financial position of a country—e.g., its balance on services, remittances, and other transfers, maturity structure of liabilities, share of interest payments in convertible currency revenues—it does give a general measure of the relative debt burden. By this measure, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania were the most indebted CEMA economies in the early 1970's; they were also the countries recording the highest rates of non-socialist real import growth in the 1960's. In 1971–75, the net debt of all CEMA economies, except the Hungarian and Romanian, expanded faster than their convertible currency exports in 1971–75. Between 1975 and 1980, only Bulgaria and the Soviet Union succeeded in increasing their exports more than the net debt. Since the share of machinery in total imports from non-socialist countries fell, the growing bulk of imports was used to sustain current production levels and the standard of living rather than modernize the economy.

In the early 1970's, by far the greatest increase in imports from industrialized Western economies occurred in the cases of Poland and the Soviet Union: the average annual rates of growth of such imports were 46.1 percent and 36.7 percent respectively.[15] These were the only CEMA countries that effected a significant shift in their foreign economic policy, a shift later described as an import-led growth strategy and erroneously ascribed to all countries of the region. As mentioned earlier, the volume of CEMA economies' trade with the West did not significantly increase, and in fact increased at a slower rate in the 1970's than in the 1960's. In contrast to the Soviet Union which, thanks to a windfall in profits from gold and oil sales, did not have to mortgage its future by accumulating convertible-currency debt, the East European countries, lacking easily exportable primary commodities, relied on Western financing.

Because none of the East European countries that significantly in-

[14]For data on foreign trade see J. Vanous, "General Trends in East-West Trade and Finance: 1970–84," a paper presented at the Conference on East-West Trade and Financial Relations, European University Institute, Florence, June 4–6, 1985.

[15]Ibid.

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Table 2: Changes in Relative Debt Burden of Eastern Europe

(Ratio of convertible currency net debt to convertible currency exports)

						Indexes	
	1971	1975	1980	1982	1985	1975 (1971 = 100)	1980 (1975 = 100)
Bulgaria	1.72	2.41	0.91	0.53	0.38	140	37
Czechoslovakia	0.13	-.34	0.81	0.76	0.67	261	238
GDR	1.12	1.22	1.97	1.41	0.92	109	161
Hungary	1.27	0.99	1.44	1.35	1.78	77	145
Poland	0.54	1.79	3.27	4.56	4.63	330	182
Romania	1.44	0.86	1.39	1.51	0.86	60	161
All Eastern Europe	0.82	1.21	1.81	1.76	2.06	148	150
USSR	0.21	0.76	0.33	0.31	0.56	360	43

SOURCE: calculated from data in R. G. Oechsler and L. Woods, "Statistical Abstract of East-West Trade and Finance," Staff Report, International Trade Administration, Washington, DC, US Department of Commerce, 1986.

creased their imports from the West had an outstanding record of export expansion, they all eventually ran into balance-of-payment difficulties. It is noteworthy that, excluding the Soviet Union,[16] a list of CEMA members arranged in order of average annual rate of import growth in the 1970's reads almost like one of the international banking credit-ratings lists, but in reverse. Poland, the most indebted East European country, headed the list with an average annual import growth rate of 23.8 percent, followed by Hungary (18.4 percent), Romania (18.0), Bulgaria (17.5), the German Democratic Republic (16.2), and Czechoslovakia (15.1).[17] The September 1983 issue of *International Investor* published the following average credit ratings (on the scale of 0 to 100) for the countries of the region: Poland, 8.5; Romania, 17.5; Bulgaria, 40.7; the German Democratic Republic, 41.9; Czechoslovakia, 42.7; and Hungary, 44.0.

The only exception to the general rule of inverse correspondence between the credit ratings of CEMA countries in the early 1980's and their import growth in the early 1970's has been Hungary. Even though it is ranked second to Poland in terms of relative debt burden, it was the only East European country with an option to continue borrowing in the 1980's. The explanation for this clearly lies more in the international image of the Kádár government and the demonstrated skill of the Hungarians in cultivating relations with the international financial community than in an ability to generate surpluses in current accounts.

Those CEMA countries that avoided a debt trap did so thanks to more restrained borrowing policies rather than to increased competitiveness in international markets. In other words, neither imprudent nor prudent borrowers managed to significantly improve their export performance and thereby eradicate sources of persistent disequilibria in their interaction with the West.[18] Hence, disequilibria in East-West financial and commercial relations are due not to the borrowing strategies of individual East European countries, but rather to their productive structures, low export capacity, and inability to operate in non-CEMA markets.

The disjunction between the exigencies of world markets and those of intra-CEMA interaction was glaringly revealed in the methods used by the East European countries to cope with the balance-of-payments crisis when the Western credit squeeze occurred in the early 1980's. First, the East European process of adjustment to external disequilibria entailed a significant shift in the commodity composition of exports to non-CEMA partners. Although in the period 1980–84, Eastern Europe's share in the total imports of Western economies grew, this occurred on the strength of low-processed primary commodities. Western import demand for capital equipment and other more sophisticated manufactured products from CEMA countries fell. According to an estimate by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the decline in Eastern Europe's share in Western imports of manufactures from 2.5 percent in

[16]The USSR recorded the highest annual growth rate in imports from the West during the 1970's, namely 24.6 percent. See Table 38 in *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, Geneva, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, October 1986, Vol. 38, No. 4, p. 67.

[17]Calculated from data in Vanous, loc. cit.

[18]It is noteworthy that variation in East European (excluding the USSR) export performance was lower than in expansion of imports: the standard deviation of average annual growth rates of exports (2.4) by East European countries was lower than that of their imports (2.9) in 1971–80. (Calculated from the data in ibid.)

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1980 to 1.9 percent in 1985 represented an annual loss of US$4–5 billion in export revenues.[19] This accounted for between 12.4 percent and 15.5 percent of Eastern Europe's total hard-currency income from exports. The decline in relative competetiveness of manufactures was not confined to highly demanding markets in developed Western countries,[20] but also occurred in trade with developing countries. [21]

Although one may argue that there is nothing wrong with having a comparative advantage in low-processed products, the problem is that the prices of such commodities tend to fluctuate, and markets for them have been shrinking. Furthermore, this emerging international specialization is not in line with current or past investment goals in these countries and contrasts rather sharply with their specialization in intra-CEMA trade, where manufactured products dominate.[22]

Second, improvement in the convertible-currency trade balance was obtained primarily through drastic cuts in imports rather than through an expansion of exports. Since cuts in imports included raw materials and other intermediate inputs, they depressed economic growth. True, the impact of reduced imports was somewhat offset by more efficient use of materials, depletion of inventories, and some limited re-orientation of trade toward other CEMA countries.[23] Even so, since most of the products imported from the West are simply not available within CEMA, import cuts must have a negative effect on exports.

Third, in an effort to bring domestic absorption (consumption plus investment) into line with debt servicing requirements, Eastern Europe has also cut its import demand for investment goods. Even though the share of machinery imports in total imports from the West increased between 1980 and 1985, it remained lower than in the mid-1960's, that is, prior to the alleged decade of import-led growth. Since domestically produced machinery is by and large technologically inferior to that available in the West, this development was bound to have negative consequences for the technological level of investment and efficiency in general (Kovës, p. 86). One can expect that it will also have an increasingly negative impact on future export capacity.

Fourth, it is very doubtful whether the pattern of adjustment manifested in 1980–85 can be sustained over a longer period of time. Kovës observes (p. 65) that, "as opposed to exports, which can expand continuously . . . , imports cannot go on being restricted when aiming at the avoidance and reduction of economic tensions." The corollary of this statement is that continued constriction on imports exacerbate domestic economic tensions while impeding economic growth. Indeed, this was the case in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Investment activity was significantly depressed, and as a consequence, capital equipment became increasingly obsolete.[24] The developmental and technological gap, which did not narrow even during the import-led growth period, has widened in the 1980's.[25] Hence, the continuation of a policy of reduced imports would be detrimental to the standard of living and entail a significant cost in deferred development.

At the same time, any attempt to significantly boost rates of economic growth may run up against external limitations. Increased domestic demand for raw materials and energy, a likely consequence of boosting economic growth rates, would reduce the availability of those commodities for export. The convertible-currency export earnings of CEMA countries have been critically dependent on primary goods and fuels; these exports were in fact the driving force of external adjustment in Eastern Europe. In addition, given a high level of deferred investment needs and the physical shortage of

[19]See *Economic Survey of Europe 1985-86*, p. 248. For an excellent analysis of declining competitiveness of East European manufactures on the world market in the 1970's, see K. Poznański, "Competition between Eastern Europe and the Developing Countries in the Western Markets for Manufactured Goods," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee (hereafter—JEC), *East European Economies: Slow Growth in the 1980's*, Selected Papers, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1986, Vol. 2.

[20]For a detailed analysis of changes in the commodity composition of Eastern trade with market economies during the years 1980–1984, see R. Dietz, "The Impact of Recent World Economic Changes on East-West Trade," in *WIIW Forschungsberichte* (Vienna), No. 119, June 1986.

[21]See B. Kamiński, "External Dimension of Balance of Payments Adjustment in Eastern Europe," forthcoming in *Osteuropa-Wirtschaft* (Munich).

[22]Although machinery and equipment investment has accounted for about 45 percent of the total investment of CEMA, the share of machinery and equipment in East European convertible-currency exports has been in the range of 10–12 percent over the last 15 years.

[23]The volume of goods imported from non-socialist countries by Eastern Europe (exclusive of the Soviet Union) in 1984 was 89 percent of its 1980 level, while that of goods imported from socialist countries was 104 percent. The volume of goods exported to socialist countries increased during the same period by 19 percent while that of non-socialist exports by 30 percent. The total trade turnover rose by 12 and 8 percent respectively. Thus the "inward" reorientation was not substantial. (Based on data in *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, Vol. 37.) L. Csaba argues even more strongly that the "inward" variant of CEMA integration failed. See L. Csaba, "CMEA and East West Trade," published in *Comparative Economic Studies* (Tempe, AZ), 1986, Vol. 28, No. 3, p. 54.

[24]That investment bore the brunt of internal adjustment has been convicingly shown in "Changes in the External and Domestic Use of Output Growth in 1970–1984," in *Economic Survey of Europe 1985-1986*, pp. 204–208.

[25]According to an econometric study, the gap indeed increased in the 1970's. See S. Gomulka and A. Nove, *East-West Technology Transfer: Contribution to Eastern Growth, An Econometric Evaluation*, Paris, OECD, 1984.

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intermediate products and spare parts within CEMA, an increased level of aggregate economic activity would reduce the availability of those products for export while simultaneously augmenting import demand.

Eastern Europe has so far kept out of this vicious cycle mainly by limiting the outflow of resources to Western financial institutions. The years 1985 and 1986 have witnessed an upsurge in imports from the West accompanied by a falling rate of export growth, which is indicative of difficulties that exist in reconciling an acceleration in economic growth (see Table 1) with the patterns of trade with the West revealed during the balance of payments adjustment in the early 1980's. Imports can be financed either by current export earnings, a portion of which has to be spent on debt servicing, or by credits. An increase in Eastern Europe's and the Soviet Union's debt suggests that part of this increase in imports in 1985–86 was financed by new credits. Although a return to the borrowing spree of the 1970's is improbable because of a changed attitude toward sovereign lending on the part of financial institutions, creditors impressed with East European debt management have so far been willing to allow for a decrease in resource transfers from CEMA countries.

In a long-term perspective, however, East European planners must figure out how to increase their exports and convince potential creditors that credits will indeed boost export capabilities. Short of this, the result will be further economic decline. Recently the problems with increasing export capacity have been exacerbated by Soviet insistence on qualitative improvements in Eastern Europe's exports to the USSR *and reduction of the region's deficits* with it.[26] Since the combined effect of meeting these demands would be to reduce the share of East European exports available for trade with the West, this may pose an extra problem for East-West economic relations. Therefore, though Eastern Europe's trade balance with the Soviet Union is likely to improve in 1987–90 as a result of lower oil prices in the 1980's, East Europe's convertible-currency export capacity may not increase.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, thanks to its position as a net exporter of energy and other non-renewable natural resources, has not had to embark upon the path of indebted development. Still, it, too, has not managed to avoid a slowdown in growth triggered by a decline in productivity, a fall in labor force growth, and a significant increase in costs of extracting non-renewable natural resources.

In contrast to the smaller CEMA members, which could with varying degrees of justification blame adverse external conditions for their economic predicament, the Soviet Union had experienced a vast improvement in terms of trade with both East and West. It can be assumed that without that commercial advantage, the Soviet slow-down would have been even greater or that Soviet central planners would have had to rely on Western credits to maintain rates of growth similar to those actually achieved in the 1970's. In the latter case, one would have to add foreign indebtness and low export capacity to Alec Nove's list of the economic problems facing Brezhnev's successors (p. 182)—falling growth rates; declining efficiency and rising waste; dependence on imports of agricultural products; growing shortages; bureaucratic overload of central planning apparatus; and erosion of foreign economic relation. Taking into account contraction in Soviet oil convertible-currency exports, combined with reduced West European purchases of natural gas, an increase in the Soviet Union's international indebtedness is ever more likely.[27]

Nonetheless, as Nove convincingly argues, neither the Soviet Union nor Eastern Europe is in a state of acute economic crisis where "nothing works and everything disintegrates" (p. 131). There is neither unemployment nor hunger. Although life expectancy has been declining, the biological survival of the populations is not yet at stake. Personal consumption, after a setback in the early 1980's in some CEMA countries, has been on the increase, and economic growth rates were at a respectable level of almost 5 percent in 1986. Eastern Europe is the only region in the world that has been successful in reducing its commercial debt. Even Poland, which faced the most serious crisis, has experienced partial recovery.[28] By and large, CEMA economies have so far displayed considerable resilience, although—as capital and labor productivity data indicate—they continue to move along a resource-inefficient path of development.

But viewed from the perspective of economic modernization and the interaction of CEMA economies with the outside world, certain symptoms do point to crisis. That the process of economic modernization as it is understood in the West has been halted and perhaps reversed in some areas, is illustrated by rather startling developments in demography and employment. Whereas eco-

[26] J. P Hardt, "Highlights" in JEC, op. cit., p. vii.

[27] According to predictions, the Soviet hard-currency oil earning will fall by US$4–5 billion in 1986. In addition, new supplies of Norwegian natural gas to Western Europe will displace Soviet sales, which are expected to fall by US$7–8 billion a year. See Gorlin, loc. cit.

[28] For a discussion of recent economic developments, see J. Prust, "Poland Emerging From Economic Crisis," in *IMF Survey* (Washington, DC), Feb. 23, 1987.

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nomic modernization has always been accompanied by declining mortality and birth rates, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have become the first industrialized countries to experience a significant shortening of male life expectancy. This is the first case of a prolonged reversal in the so-called demographic transition.[29] Another development challenging the notion of economic modernization is the surprising growth in agricultural employment in some East European countries: in the GDR and Poland since 1975, and in Hungary since 1978. This increased rate of employment within the agricultural sector is symptomatic of a failure to increase adequately levels of agricultural productions and runs counter to development generally associated with economic modernization.

CEMA countries not only failed to reduce the technological lag, but they were outperformed by a number of countries that in the mid-1960's were at a similar or lower level of economic development.[30] Soviet and East European inability to adapt to Western technologies and build a viable export sector, as well as their faltering economic growth, accompanied by declining efficiency, raise doubts as to the suitability of central planning systems for coping with the challenges of a modern economy.

As argued earlier, the potential for crisis is much deeper than indicated by the statistics on export performance or growth performance. The extrapolation of past trends and their impact on the economy has the makings of a crisis scenario. The inability of the East bloc to expand imports from the West may set in motion processes that will directly limit further growth in production and exports. As a result of continuing cuts in Soviet supplies of raw materials and energy,[31] these countries will have to turn to other suppliers, thus limiting their ability to purchase capital equipment from the West. The rapidly growing costs of extracting raw materials and energy, combined with low prices on world markets, have reduced Soviet export earnings and contributed to significant deterioration in its terms of trade. Without the modernization of obsolete equipment and technologies, the energy- and material-intensity of CEMA production will not decline, and is in fact likely to place an increasing burden on an already strained hard-currency trade balance. Because of debt to the Soviet Union incurred during the period of high oil prices, any improvement in terms-of-trade resulting in lower prices of oil may well bring little immediate relief to the smaller East European countries. And since a significant portion of intra-CEMA trade is in commodities whose production requires Western imports, a limited capacity to generate hard-currency export earnings—as Kovës argues—may curtail trade within the bloc as well. Reduced access to Western markets may thus trigger a crisis at both domestic and regional levels.

ARE THE ROOTS of economic malaise external or domestic? Max Weber distinguished between formal economic rationality and substantive economic rationality.[32] Formal economic rationality refers to the most efficient use of resources within a specific decision-making and institutional environment, whereas substantive rationality involves an assessment of the institutional framework itself in terms of ultimate goals. This dual concept of rationality is useful in assessing the roots of the deteriorating economic performance of the CPE's. To what extent have the economic slow-down and declining international competitiveness in industrial products been due to departures from formal economic rationality, that is, to policy blunders and poorly conceived strategies? To what extent can faulty policies be blamed on the rigidities and constraints built into the institutional framework of central planning, i.e., to what degree have the decision-makers been "enslaved" by the rules of the central planning system? If the policies pursued have met the requirements of formal rationality, then either the framework is at fault (i.e., there is the case of substantive irrationalilty) or external conditions are to blame.

While rising real interest rates depleted external sources of financing, and rising protectionism and recession in the West in 1981-83 adversely affected the balance-of-payments position of East European countries (the Soviet Union excluded), these factors alone cannot explain their economic slow-down and

[29]For a stimulating discussion of its implications for political developments in the Soviet Union, see M. Feshbach, "A Different Crisis" *The Wilson Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Winter 1981. Data on mortality trends are analyzed in J.C. Dutton, "Changes in Soviet Mortality Pattern, 1959–77," in *Population and Development Review* (New York), No. 2, 1979, and, with a focus on Eastern Europe, in M. Okolski, "Some Features of Recent Mortality Trends in Eastern and Western Europe," paper presented at the IVSSP General Conference, Florence, Italy, June 10–21, 1985.

[30]David Lane's insistence on comparing the Soviet level of development in terms of GNP per capita, consumption, etc., with similar indicators for Western Europe and the United States misses the point. It would be much more relevant to assess Soviet economic vitality by examining the Soviet Union's position in the world economy in terms of its GNP per capita over a longer term and comparing its position to that of such countries as Spain, Brazil, Taiwan. This would indicate to what degree other countries are overtaking—and even surpassing—the Soviet Union in terms of economic development.

[31]Some experts believe that the Soviet Union has cut deliveries not only of oil but also of raw materials. These cuts are expected to continue. See Gorlin, opt. cit, p. 326.

[32]See Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1978.

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declining international competitiveness. Neither can the decline in the terms of their trade with the Soviet Union and the West.

For Kovës, the problem lies with the entire developmental concept, which has remained unchanged in its most significant aspects since the early 1950's. The East European policy of what can be termed "two-level self-sufficiency" has not been adjusted to changing development needs. At the first level, domestic economic strategies continue to accord priority to heavy industry—that is, defense-related sectors—and one may assume, unless there is proof to the contrary, to replacing imports. At the second level, the policy focuses on creating an autonomous world socialist market. This approach has led to investment programs that not only ignore limitations in the domestic resource base but also in domestic potential for developing a dynamic comparative advantage in the non-CEMA world economy.

To make things worse, the policies pursued in the 1970's suffered from a "saleability illusion"[33] that was the outcome of an investment policy-making mechanism that invited distortions in the information flow within the command planning hierarchy and eroded financial discipline. This illusion could also be attributable to the conviction of central planners that absorption and diffusion of technology would not pose a problem for economic actors operating within the framework of central planning. Other misperceptions were related to the possibility of insulating domestic producers and consumers from the world economy and reorienting trade and investment to other CEMA countries.

Since, as demonstrated earlier, the single most important factor influencing variations in the convertible-currency export performance of CEMA economies was the available surplus of raw materials, energy, and agricultural products, development strategy turned out to have an insignificant impact on export performance.[34] To put it differently, independently of accumulated debt, all the CEMA countries proved incapable of creating a viable manufacturing export sector. Countries that avoided falling into a debt trap either did so by obtaining some form of external assistance—for example, extra Soviet oil deliveries to Bulgaria in 1978–80—or by pursuing a very cautious borrowing strategy, as did Czechoslovakia throughout most of the 1970's. In other words, there is no evidence suggesting a relationship between borrowing strategies and export performance in non-CEMA markets of CEMA countries. Thus, leaving aside the benefits generated by Western credits (which allow borrowers to maintain higher consumption levels than would be possible with domestic resources alone), a debt-free development strategy—that is, a strategy of a balanced foreign trade—falls closest to the requirements of formal economic rationality of command planning.

On the other hand, as Kovës and Nove so forcefully argue, reliance on external resources and access to Western technology was and continues to be necessary for CEMA countries in order to modernize and sustain economic growth in the long run. But since this notion stands in conflict with formal rationality of policies pursued in the 1970's and 1980's, the question is whether the two-way opening, including both exports and imports, could have been achieved within the institutional constraints of central planning.

Central planning, state ownership of capital assets, centralized control over accumulation and distribution, a state monopoly over foreign economic relations, and one-party political control through *nomenklatura* are all crucial features of Soviet-style socialist societies. Although close examination reveals variation in governing structures, all are similar insofar as the "economic base" is dominated by the "political superstructure." Evolving out of the system built by Stalin in the 1930's, they have all retained its administrative character. As Nove puts it: "The extreme tensions and confusions of the early 1930's are past history, but the *essence* of the system of directive or command planning is still with us" (p. 81, emphasis added). This gives rise to a unique relationship between economic and political processes that constrains economic policy and external transactions regardless of the intentions of policy-makers.[35]

This is not to suggest, however, that economic strategy is uniquely determined by the central planning structure. Clearly, the channel linking the domestic structure with the economic plan does not pass through a vacuum: the choice of pol-

[33]The term was coined by Holzman to describe a tendency among central planners to base their investment decision on highly optimistic estimates, emphasizing quantity, rather than quality, of future exports. See F. D. Holzman, "Some Theories of the Hard Currency Shortages of Centrally Planned Economies," in JEC, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change: A Compendium of Papers*, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1979.

[34]It is rather startling that the most industrially developed CEMA economies, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, with a relatively high share of manufactures in total exports to the West in the mid-1960's, expanded their exports of fuels and primary commodities at much faster rates than exports of manufactures. Kovës observes that "it can hardly be judged favourable that in the GDR the 1975 share of agricultural products reached almost that of Polish exports" (p. 127).

[35]For instance, a clear-cut link between institutional arrangements of central planning and development strategies has been established, see Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "The Communist Pattern of Industrialization," in *Soviet Studies*, Vol 2, 1986.

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icies reflects types of political leadership, leaders' political power base, and external and internal pressures.[36] Nonetheless, as was argued earlier, neither foreign economic policy nor investment preferences have differed significantly from country to country. Foreign economic policy has followed a traditional pattern of regional autarky: the only important variation has been in the amount of foreign borrowing by individual states and its temporal distribution. Given the highly differing political and economic circumstances of each of those countries, this demonstrates the limits imposed by the central planning "superstructure."[37]

That central planning is incompatible with economic efficiency and is thus non-viable was suggested already in the 1930's by Ludvig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek. Abraham Bergson later observed the issue was not really whether socialism was viable, but which system, capitalism or socialism, is more efficient in practice.[38]

Kornai revives this theme, although with a different perspective, in an essay contrasting the exigencies of economic efficiency with the principles of socialist ethics. He argues that a socialist economy cannot meet the ultimate test of economic efficiency, because realization of the latter would run counter to the principles of "socialist" solidarity, the principle of "equal work for equal pay," and job security. The introduction of reward and penalty structures based on competition and profit maximization, in order to be compatible with socialist ethics, would have to include provisions to ensure that the same amount of effort would be equally rewarded and that a firm could not go bankrupt.[39] This also requires the decentralization of investment decisions, which in turn would violate the principle of the priority of general long-term interest over partial short-term interest. The alleged incompatibility between efficiency and a socialist value system makes the strong involvement of state bureaucracy in economic decision-making indispensable. In other words, "socialist ethics" is in sharp conflict with substantive economic rationality.

Kornai's reasoning sets the entire problem of system efficiency on its head. First, arguing conformity between social interests and socialist ethics and the incompatibility between them and efficiency implies that losses in economic efficiency are compensated by gains in the fulfillment of social objectives. For instance, Kornai's statement that "where fully decentralized investment would result in unfavorable proportions from the overall social viewpoint, the central authorities can counterbalance those by centrally decided investment" (p. 133). Can they really?

Paradoxically, Kornai himself gives a negative answer in his other writings.[40] He demonstrates that because of information processing constraints related to central planning (a factor also discussed in Nove's book) the ability of central planners to identify the social preference function is questionable. Remembering that the fulfilling of social objectives requires economic resources, it certainly has not been demonstrated that social interest is better served by making economic actors directly responsible for providing "socialist" public goods rather than obtaining them through other arrangements.[41]

Second, Kornai's analysis implies that a rejection of the principles of socialist ethics would automatically restore both formal and substantive economic rationality. The problem, however, lies not with socialist ethics but with central planning. Full employment is not a policy objective but a result of central planning; of built-in capacity to generate persistent shortages of services, goods, and factors of production, including labor. Unemployment, even if declared by central planners, would not necessarily materialize.[42] Under the conditions prevailing in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Stalin's model of development was not designed to help the weak or to make sure that each member of society felt secure, but in order to provide the state with a powerful instrument for control and economic and political mobilization. Scrapping central planning would not put an end necessarily to socialist ethics, but to the existing distribution of power based on the fusion of state and economy. Thus, conceptualiza-

[36]For an excellent discussion of the interplay between institutional and political factors in Soviet-style societies, see E. Comisso, "Introduction: State Structures, Political Processes, and Collective Action in CMEA States," in the special issue of *International Organization* (Cambridge), Spring 1986, No. 2, edited by Ellen Comisso and Laura D'Andrea Tyson.

[37]For excellent studies of individual CEMA countries' responses to international disturbances, see ibid.

[38]See A. Bergson, *Essays in Normative Economics*, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press, 1986, p. 236.

[39]Several CEMA countries have introduced legislation concerning bankruptcy. However, given the absence of capital markets, that is, of objective criteria for evaluating enterprise performance, final investment decisions, as a rule, rest with the state administration rather than with the market.

[40]See, e.g., J. Kornai, *Anti-Equilibrium*, Amsterdam and New York, North Holland Publishing Company, 1973.

[41]Note that even within the limits of central planning the safety net can be supplied by special agencies financed by the state or local budgets.

[42]Ironically, Kornai is fully aware of it. In another essay on the reproduction of shortages in socialist economies, published in the volume under review here, he notes: "Full employment is not brought about by specific economic policy measures aimed at increasing employment, and not even by planning or envisaging labor-absorbing input-output combinations" (p. 29). Hence, socialist ethics is just a rationalization of resistance to change.

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tion in terms of a clash between a socialist value system and efficiency is but an excuse not to analyse the political underpinnings of central planning.

Janos Kornai's theory of socialist economies, presented in most comprehensive form in *Economics of Shortages*[43] and developed in his essays, provides a good vantage point from which to explain the reasons for deteriorating export and economic growth performance in functional rather than intentional terms. According to this theory, the problems typical of socialist economies are rooted in social conditions and economic mechanisms or the institutional framework of "bureaucratized" planning. The unique feature of socialist societies is the reproduction of shortages, which are conceived of as a product of processes and behavioral patterns generated by central planning. As a consequence, CEMA economies are in the state of more or less permanent shortages.

This, in turn, has several implications. Because of persistent excessive demand or suppressed inflation, producers operating within the framework of central planning have little incentive to develop new products and to improve the cost-effectiveness or quality of their products. The coercion of the marketplace associated with what Kornai calls a hard budget constraint is replaced by a "negotiable coercion" of the central planning apparatus, or soft budget constraint. Imports do not increase competitive pressures upon domestic producers but merely mitigate shortages of various products. Shielded from the international economy by domestic currency non-convertibility, the producers display "disinterest" in export and, because of their higher quality and greater reliability of delivery schedules, a high propensity toward imports, in particular, from non-CEMA countries. Consequently, foreign trade decisions bear little relationship to the considerations of dynamic comparative advantage: they are shaped by the material balances used in constructing plans.[44] Since material balances serve to identify bottlenecks and shortages, foreign trade is *but a component of the macroeconomic management of shortages*.

Socialist economies seeking to improve their export performance and economic efficiency face other limitations directly related to central planning as well. Because of the absence of well-functioning markets and because of the non-convertibility of domestic currency, central planners are deprived of the information to assess the comparative advantage of domestically produced outputs, and thus to make sophisticated decisions concerning international specialization.[45] They are also incapable of identifying export opportunities. Consequently, within the framework of central planning, exports tend to be regarded as a "necessary evil" in order to secure supplies of products that are not produced domestically, as an externally imposed economic situation that makes the products destined for export unavailable for domestic consumption.

Thus the choice in foreign trade consists in trading off one shortage for another without knowing the economic cost involved. The logic of decision-making and the information constraints associated with central planning make this "residual" and import-substituting approach to foreign trade and specialization the only one available to central planners. A pro-export strategy cannot be declared by fiat.

Kovës's study provides a number of illustrations supporting the view that central planning makes the implementation of an export-oriented growth strategy or rapid adjustment to world market conditions impossible. "Large-is-beautiful" logic, so visible in investment policies, also affects foreign trade decisions. Central planners have displayed an affinity for "large" foreign trade transactions involving exports of homogeneous simple products or raw materials because they create neither domestic coordination problems nor difficulties related to adjusting to changing demand. On the other hand, success in highly diversified and rapidly changing markets for manufactured goods is not achieved by an ability to exploit economies of scale, but by an ability to explore new marketing opportunities. Although the advantages of small industrial units have been recognized in official CEMA policy declarations, in the long list of the reasons advanced for deconcentration one finds "import-substitution" but not "export promotion."[46]

The necessary, but not sufficient conditions for increasing flexibility is the establishment of direct links between domestic producers and the international economy and the decentralization of investment decisions. The former would provide competition whereas the latter

[43]See J. Kornai, *Economics of Shortage*, Amsterdam and New York, North Holland Publishing Company, 1980. The book has been acclaimed as developing a new approach for studying Soviet-style economies.

[44]For a discussion, see A. H. Smith, *The Planned Economies of Eastern Europe*, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1983.

[45]For an excellent discussion of the inadequacy of the information system serving central planning and its impact on the quality of decision-making in the international specialization domain, see P. Marer and J.M. Montias, "CMEA Integration: Theory and Practice," in JEC, *East European Economic Assessment*, Part 2: Regional Assessments, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1981.

[46]See M. Kostrzewski, "Through Division—Improvement," in *Życie Gospodarcze*, No. 14, 1987

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would allow successful firms to expand their productive capacities. In addition, enterprise investments "are better suited to increase exports to the West" (Kovës, p. 79). The problem, however, is that centrally-controlled capital projects to build new productive capacities rather than modernize existing ones absorb the bulk of investment in CEMA economies.

Domestic system-specific drawbacks are exacerbated by the mechanisms regulating economic interaction within CEMA, which is de facto a second—after a country's own boundaries—defensive trench insulating domestic economies from the world markets. The mechanism of regional integration is based on principles that are entirely alien to those prevailing in the international non-CEMA economy, whereas they are fully compatible with those of central planning. The domestic interaction between various tiers of economic hierarchy is replaced by bilateral relations at a government level;[47] and the non-convertible domestic currency, by the equally non-convertible transfer ruble. Inconvertibility enhances the central planners' delusions of control, but at the price of lessened economic efficiency.

Some Soviet economists blame the price-setting formula used in intra-CEMA trade for the inability of CEMA economies to adjust to relative scarcities in international markets.[48] The problem is not with the price formula, however: changing it alone would have no impact on the ability of centrally planned economies to compete. The crux of the matter is that the combination of domestic pressures rooted in the central planning framework and those related to the mechanisms of regional integration in CEMA triggers a path of development that, as Kovës succintly put it (p. 111), "contradicts the establishment of macroeconomic and product structures competitive in the world market."

Thus, one may conclude that the economic problems facing the Soviet Union and other East European countries stem from the incompatibility of their domestic structures, based on administrative centralized state controls, with the character of the contemporary world economy. Economic slow-down has been due to internal factors. While it remains to be proven that strong central institutions were useful for some of these economies in achieving coordination and mobilization during the first stage of industrialization, when unutilized resources were still amply available, they have now—as demonstrated by their persistent inability to absorb and diffuse new technologies and to compete in international markets for technologically sophisticated products—certainly become liabilities. In other words, the central planning system, which has retained all the pillars of the system built by Stalin in the 1930's, is significantly lacking in substantive economic rationality.

CAN CENTRAL PLANNING be improved? It is customary to make a distinction between administrative approaches and market-oriented or, to use P.T. Wanless's term, selective-decentralization approaches to economic reform. David Lane distinguishes between two types of solutions based on market-oriented changes: the first calling for "the development of market relations in the context of a socialist market economy," and the second, for "a revolutionary change in the nature of power relationships" (p. 67).

Leaving aside the question of how such a change is to be brought about, the crux of the matter is that neither an administrative nor a non-radical market approach, equated by Alec Nove with the Hungarian economic reform of 1968, would significantly alter central planning and the existing structure of ownership, control, and exchange. The market is treated here merely as an instrument to improve the quality of planning and coordination and, therefore, as something to be squeezed into an administratively controlled environment.

In order to assess the scope for change we must address two interrelated questions. First, to what degree can the characteristic ills of centrally planned economies be rectified by change limited to the administrative instruments of central planning? Second, assuming that the Hungarian reform represents an extreme case of what is feasible within the "central planning" domestic structure, to what extent has the Hungarian reform so far succeeded in eliminating system-specific drawbacks of centrally planned economies?

Improvements of administrative planning and management procedures are probably possible, although the actual extent depends on a country's level of economic development, the authorities' power base, and the pre-existing structures of economic governance. While in the past the elimination of certain planning indicators inducing waste in industrial enterprises—for example, global output as a mea-

[47] As Marrese observes: " CMEA is primarily a forum for bilateral bargaining between the Soviet Union and each of the CMEA countries over mutual economic foreign policy, and defense needs." See P. Marrese, "CMEA: Effective but Cumbersome Political Economy," in *International Organization*, No. 2, 1986.

[48] Professor Yuriy Shiryayev, Director of the Moscow-based International Institute of Economic Problems of the World Socialist System, has observed that the current formula "reduces possibilities for active involvement in the international division of labor, which petrifies non-effective economic structures." Quoted in A. Chmielewski, "CEMA—New Impulses: Personal Correspondence from Moscow"in *Życie Gospodarcze*, No. 46, 1986.

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sure of enterprise performance—has positively affected micro-economic efficiency, the range for potential corrective action has become increasingly limited.

The pool of available ideas for the improvement of central planning administrative procedures has remained essentially unchanged since the wave of economic reforms in the 1960's. Alec Nove's discussion of the Soviet decree on "economic reform" in 1979 provides ample illustration both of the limits of an administrative approach and of the scarcity of innovative ideas. The list of proposals contains no surprises for a student of economic reform. It includes alterations in the performance criteria of industrial and construction enterprises, closer integration of annual and long-term plans, greater emphasis on meeting contractual delivery obligations, and extension of the obligatory scope of plans to the introduction of new technology. Nove's critique, which points to "the impossible scale of centralized micro-economic planning" (p. 143) in terms of the information required to coordinate economic activities from above, may serve as a reminder of the insurmountable barrier to the administrative approach. Once the obviously irrational procedures that produce some of the worst distortions and inefficiencies have been removed, there is very little room for any improvement.

The alternative, introducing a market-oriented reform à la Hungary's New Economic Mechanism (which has undergone numerous changes since its inception in 1968) has yet to produce a miracle: Hungarian economic performance, by CEMA standards, has been neither spectacular nor deplorable.[49] The Hungarian economy has not demonstrated any distinctive capacity to generate or absorb high technology, although probably it has provided consumers with a greater choice of products than any other CEMA country.

Despite all its changes in the tools and scope of central planning, "the Hungarian system may be considered a shortage economy to a considerable degree" (see Kornai, p. 111). The political and social mechanisms of shortage generation have yet to be removed. Producers are not subject to the discipline of hard-budget constraint. As Kornai shows, the price reform introduced in the early 1980's, whose intention was to link enterprise performance with price signals, had no effect on their financial situation. Firms were able to renegotiate or evade price-setting rules. Hence, their survival and financial position is the product of bargaining with the state, not of market success.

The current rules of the game do not provide any stimuli to make economic actors sensitive or responsive to changes in demand. As in other centrally planned economies, all economic actors manifest an uncontrollable drive for investment expansion and find domestic sales much more attractive than exports. Moreover, according to Kornai, the very high—by international standards—concentration of industry, which Kovës identifies as one of the causes of faltering export performance, has not lessened.

These observations suggest that while the Hungarian economic mechanism differs in a number of respects from that of other CEMA economies, the patterns of behavior have not been drastically altered. Since the state and the party apparatus continue to retain a significant degree of discretionary control over major economic actors through "the jungle of state subsidies and preferential treatments" (as Hungarian economist Marion Tardos has put it),[50] this should come as no surprise.

The Hungarian experience is by no means unique: for instance, the recently published blueprint of the second stage of economic reform in Poland[51] has been rightly described by Cezary Jozefiak, member of the Government Committee for Economic Reform, as a "concept of indirect centralization of the economy. . . which consists of replacing administrative commands by financial parameters shaped not by the market, but by central planning authorities."[52]

If the focus of planning in Hungary after almost 20 years of reform is still on the management of shortages, this raises serious doubts whether the economic mechanism in Soviet-style socialism can be improved by substituting financial controls for administrative commands. In such a case, financial instruments are not "responsive" to market forces but, even in Hungary, are shaped by the central planning hierarchy. As one astute observer of East European economic reforms, Paul Marer, noted: "It is utopian to believe that the operation of a market can be simulated by planners instead of being allowed to develop."[53]

[49]Hungarian net material product fell in 1985 by 1.4 percent and only slightly increased, by 0.5 percent, in 1986. Hungary ran a deficit in its hard-currency current account financed by Western credits. See *Economic Survey of Europe in 1986-1987*.

[50]See M. Tardos, "A Development Program for Economic Control and Organization," in *Eastern European Economics* (Armonk, NY), 1984, No. 3-4.

[51]See "Theses Concerning the Second Stage of Economic Reform," in *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), Apr. 17, 1987.

[52]Quoted in T. Jeziorański, "Acceleration, How and When?" in *Życie Gospdarcze*, No. 14, 1987.

[53]See P. Marer, "Hungary's Foreign Economic Relations in the Mid-1980's: A Retrospective and Predictive Assessment," in P. Joseph, Ed., *Foreign Economic Relations of East European Economics*, Brussels, NATO, 1987.

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The obfuscated market is thereby deprived of a mechanism that would provide for automatic correction of ill-designed decisions. Both Hungarian and recent Polish experience seem to suggest that attempts to fuse components of the market with hierarchical central planning invariably lead to a situation in which there is neither market nor administrative planning. In short, central planning does not replace the market nor does the market replace central planning. What one gets, instead, is an inefficient, hybrid set of controls.

This conclusion raises several important questions concerning contemporary approaches to political economy that focus on the interaction between state and the political economy. As Charles Lindblom in his much heralded *Politics and Markets* writes: "The greatest distinction between one government and another is the degree to which market replaces government or government replaces market."[54] This would seem to suggest the existence of a continuum defined by two extremes: at one end, pure command planning, typified by the original Stalin system, and at the other, the laissez-faire competitive system. In an earlier work, co-authored with Robert Dahl,[55] Lindblom argues that once policy-makers have freed themselves from ideology, any reform will be implemented as long as it provides a solution. The implication is that movement along the continuum can be viewed as the product of piecemeal actions taken in response to emerging problems.

It can be demonstrated that the Dahl-Lindblom framework fails to take into account certain salient characteristics of centrally planned economies, and that instead of a single continuum there are two different continuums on which existing socio-economic systems are located. Each of them is defined by different theoretical concepts, although this does not necessarily imply that they do not share some common social phenomena and pathologies.

First, it should be noted that Kornai's economics of shortage, pointing to limits of supply, is symmetrical to Keynes's general theory, which identifies insufficient demand as a major limit on the growth of capitalist economies. This dichotomy of supply- and demand-constrained economies suggests the existence of two different economic clusters, subject to differing principles and rules. One cluster is characterized by political and economic structures reproducing excessive supply; the other, by those producing shortages. Some students of CPE's are aware of the implications of this dichotomy for research. For instance, the menu of policy recommendations in P. T. Wanless's excellent book on state budget and taxation is, contrary to what its title would suggest, not relevant for central planners in the existing socialist economies. It presupposes a different political and economic order. The author's prescriptions will have to wait for application until a "no-shortage" socialist economy emerges. Wanless should be credited with recognizing the problem when she observes that an analysis of taxes in a resource-constrained economy would require "an approach . . . different to the approach generally used in this book" (p. 133).

Second, Keynes's policy recommendations called for the state to step in to manage demand. They did not call for more government and less market: on the contrary, state intervention was intended to save the institution of the market from self-destruction. Since the institutions of state and markets existed, the result was an expansion in economic functions of the state.

No similar policy prescriptions can be found in Kornai's writings. The economics of shortages amounts, in fact, to the "economics of inefficiency": it provides a powerful theoretical explanation for the well-known drawbacks of centrally planned economies, but fails to show how these drawbacks can be overcome.[56] Significantly, the most obvious conclusion one can draw from Kornai's analyses of Soviet-style economies and his assessment of the problems facing the Hungarian economy, generally considered to be the most market-oriented, is that the obstacles to improving efficiency are rooted in the institutional framework of central planning.

Central planning has eradicated the institution of the market. The invisible hand—to paraphrase Nove (p. 141)—has been replaced by the visible hand of the party/state apparatus. Trotsky criticized Stalinist central planning for "freeing itself from monetary (tsennostnyi) control, just as bureaucratic arbitrariness frees itself from political control."[57] What Trotsky failed to note is that bureaucratic arbitrariness has become an instrument of political control and, more significantly, that the economy has become a part of the state. This symbiotic relationship between economy and state has replaced objective economic with subjective political criteria.

Not a single economic reform in-

[54]Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets*, New York, Basic Books, 1977, p. ix.

[55]See R. A. Dahl and C. E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare: Planning and Politico-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes*, New York, Harper Row, 1953.

[56]Taking into account that the only translation of *Economics of Shortages* to be published (and under a rather misleading title of *The Shortages in Economy*) was in Poland, where inherent efficiencies of central planning seem to have been taken for granted, it is clear that the censors in other East European countries are aware of the implications of his analysis.

[57]L. Trotsky, *Chto takoye SSSR i kuda on idyot* (What is the USSR and Where Is It Heading?), mimeo, 1936, quoted in A. Nove, p. 60.

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troduced in any CEMA-member economy has succeeded in *breaking the symbiosis between state and economy*. Central planners or the party/state bureaucracy have retained their power, even if the methods and instruments have become more sophisticated, although not necessarily more efficient. The failure to insert the market between the state and economy means that the Hungarian reform is subject to the same centralizing and shortage-generating logic. The Hungarian experience probably represents an extreme case of what is feasible without "reviving" the institution of the market. Hence, in contrast to Western societies where the coexistence of state and economy leaves much room for diversity and experimentation along the lines depicted by Dahl and Lindblom, Soviet-style societies face limited opportunities in their quest for improved efficiency and heightened economic and export performance.

The recent wave of economic reforms in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has so far revealed no political willingness to effect measures that would substitute a market environment for the bureaucratic/administrative one, that is, that would move their systems into Lindblom's "government-market" set. Neither have there been any signs that East European reformers have a real grasp of the steps that need to be taken.

However, some measures designed to create financial markets may actually exacerbate tensions at the enterprise level between "physical" central planning and financial planning thus making the administrative approach obsolete. The result will depend on the strength of various conflicting forces within East European societies. Some CEMA countries have either introduced or are contemplating introducing changes that would pave the way for their transition to "government-market" economies. Bulgaria and Hungary, to be followed soon by Poland, have introduced legislation separating commerical banking from central banking. This reinvention of the competitive commercial banking system almost 150 years after the 1844 Peel's Act did the same in England, has been accompanied by the introduction of other "capitalist" financial institutions.[58] They are still *in statu nascendi* and—as Nuti has convincingly shown—subject to the tyranny of ideology.[59]

Yet without institutional changes favorable to the introduction of capital and financial markets, the deficiencies of the traditional approach of seeking to reconcile physical central planning with financial steering of enterprises cannot be overcome—as Polish and Hungarian experience suggests. The introduction of capital markets would produce several important changes.[60] First, economic actors would be in a position to objectively evaluate their past performance and profitability prospects. Second, the monopoly of the use of capital equipment, only slightly lessened by the laws in some CEMA countries that allow for bankruptcy, would be abolished, as poorly performing enterprises could be taken over by more successful ones. Third, such a development would offer an opportunity for improving allocative efficiency: under the existing system investment decision are subject to purely political criteria and, more significantly, decision-makers are deprived of information indispensable for making a rational decision. All in all, the introduction of capital markets would improve efficiency and open the way to integration with the world economy, even although it might also expose the economy to the instability and unemployment frequently associated with demand-constrained economies. However, it may be the only way for centrally planned economies out of the historic cul de sac that the Stalinist system has placed them in.

The existence of financial markets would not require changes in the system of ownership. It would require, however, a "monetization" of the economy and a decentralization of production and trade that would amount to the scrapping of central planning. Competition does not necessarily require capitalist ownership, but it does require an adequate structure of rewards and penalties. The Lindblomian mixture of "government and market" is also not to be presumed automatically, as there are many ways of linking business and politics. As A. Lipowski observed, effective "central planning is possible only when the addressees of plans relate to each other through genuine markets in which money plays an active role."[61] But this would not be a central planning in physical terms based on material balances, but rather macroeconomic planning using financial instruments. A "Third Way" of socialist development does exist, but only within the logical framework of demand-constrained economies. To paraphrase an old Soviet slogan, it remains to be seen whether this will become "one fortress the Bolsheviks cannot take."

[58]In this context, the absence of a discussion of the role of financial markets in "socialism" is particularly striking. Their possible impact is not explored by Kornai, or Nove, even in the latter's other book *The Economics of Feasible Socialism* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1983).

[59]For an analysis of the scope of financial markets in Eastern Europe and their ideological underpinnings, see D.M. Nuti, "Financial Innovation Under Market Socialism", mimeo, European University Institute, Florence 1987.

[60]See D.M. Nuti, loc.cit; and A. Lipowski, "Plan and Market," in *Polityka* (Warsaw), No. 17, 1987.

[61]Lipowski, loc. cit.

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CUBAN UPDATE

TO THE EDITORS: Two events that took place in Havana in December 1986—the deferred session of the Third Congress of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), reported in the December 14 issue of the *Granma Weekly Review*, and the subsequent session of the National Assembly of People's Power, reported in ibid., Jan. 11, 1987—throw additional light on the issues raised in the insightful *Problems of Communism* articles by W. Raymond Duncan ("Castro and Gorbachev," March-April 1986) and Jorge Pérez-López ("Cuba's Economy in the 1980's," September-October 1986).

With respect to the economy, at the deferred session, there was no let-up in Fidel Castro's outrage at corruption and capitalist backsliding, as well as in his exhortation for a revival of socialist "revolutionary" virtue. "A consciousness, a communist spirit, a revolutionary will and vocation . . . will always be a thousand times more powerful than money," Castro declared.

However, Castro's response to the critical problems of the Cuban economy did not appear to be leading to another full-scale experiment in infantile leftism, as in the mid-1960's. He did not propose to abandon the basic structure of the Soviet-style planning and management system introduced in the mid-1970's. "History has shown," he said, "that we cannot fall into the error, as we once did, of equal remuneration in the productive sphere." Cuba had made errors, he admitted, "along the lines of being extremist . . . of being idealistic."

Moscow could thus be reassured, and not overly concerned, when he continued with a warning that "economic mechanisms and economic accounting" alone cannot build socialism and can only be "tools in the construction of socialism." Hence, it appears that the devastating "revolutionary offensive" of 20 years ago will not be repeated. What Castro is proposing for contemporary Cuba might be called a "pseudo-revolutionary offensive"—the same slogans but only "rectification," not rejection, of the "mechanisms."

The impact of the faltering economy on the Cuban consumer was illustrated by decisions adopted by the National Assembly. The supply of a number of goods—including fresh milk, sugar, rice, and beer—was reduced. Food allocations to day-care centers and workers' dining rooms were cut, and snack breaks in government agencies were eliminated. To some extent at least, these restrictions are related to Castro's abrupt elimination of free farmers' markets, which had been operating since 1980 and which he now denounced as centers of capitalist vice. Other austerity measures included reduced kerosene and cloth rations; less television broadcasting time, and increases in electricity rates and bus fares. The rate of growth of gross social product (a variation of gross national product) was projected to be between 1.5 and 2 percent, extraordinarily low.

Austerity is nothing new for the Cuban population, but over the years it has become less readily accepted. One can reasonably speculate that Castro's rejection of a market-oriented socialism will eventually have to be modified. Otherwise, his frantic exhortation for a Marxist-Leninist revival will have to be accompanied by increasing repression.

As for Cuban-Soviet relations, the great public warmth toward the Soviet Union displayed by Castro at the early February 1986 session of the PCC Congress (and reciprocated by Mikhail Gorbachev at the 27th CPSU Congress at the end of the month) vanished at the deferred session 10 months later. Although Castro spoke of the "historical" feat of the "first socialist state" and "its internationalism," which had made the Cuban Revolution possible, conspicuously absent from Castro's statements and final speech was any mention, by name, of the

CORRECTIONS

On page 91, column 1 of Robert S. Ross's review essay "Indochina's Continuing Tragedy" (*Problems of Communism*, November-December 1986), the value of military equipment China agreed in 1976 to provide to Cambodia should be 226,000,000 yuan. Also, the name of the editor of *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingji Dashiji* cited in footnote 16 on the same page should be Fang Weizhong.

* * * * *

In the caption of the photo on page 34 of the September-October 1986 issue, the translation of the sign should read: "The strength of the party stems from its close ties with the masses."

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Soviet Union. It was the first time in 10 years that Castro failed to pay specific tribute on an important occasion to the virtues of the USSR.

Instead, he spoke of "the help of the goods and raw materials we get from the *socialist countries*" and promised that Cuba "will continue to advance . . . thanks to our relations with the *socialist camp*" (emphasis added). At the same time, commenting on a million-ton shortfall in sugar production, Castro implied that the "socialist camp" was applying unaccustomed pressure to Cuba. The island would have to meet its obligations to the socialist countries, he said, "and . . . can no longer do what we did at times before—simply reduce our deliveries to them so as to not affect our deliveries to the capitalist market—now we won't have much sugar available for the capitalist market in 1987." (Sugar is normally Cuba's main source by far of convertible foreign currency.) Earlier he mentioned that in 1987, Cuba would have only "half of the traditional sum for hard-currency expenditures." The inference was clear. The "socialist camp," that is, the Soviet Union—by far the most important purchaser of Cuban sugar—was in no small measure responsible for this hardship.

In a manner reminiscent of ideological tensions with the Kremlin in the mid-1960's, Castro again asserted ideological autonomy: ". . . the ideas that inspired the Revolution . . . were our ideas and interpretations of society according to Marxist-Leninist principles. Nobody told us how to interpret things; we interpreted them for ourselves." And in this connection he reiterated that "it was totally unrealistic to consider abundance as the basis for socialism and communism." Still, it was only a mild, indirect protest compared with the fulminations directed outright at Soviet ideological aberrations 20 years ago.

"Internationalism" was another of Castro's themes, one that could not have pleased the current Soviet leadership. "We have had tens of thousands of people abroad on civilian and military missions," he boasted. "Internationalism was a way of repaying our debt to humanity." Castro had probably not failed to notice that Gorbachev, in his keynote address to the 27th CPSU Congress, omitted the traditional Kremlin support for "wars of national liberation" and for "liberation struggles." It was the first such omission at a party congress in 30 years (see Edward González and David Ronfeldt, *Castro, Cuba, and the World,* Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, June 1986, pp. 97–98). For Castro, it must have been profoundly disturbing. His inflated Third World leadership ambitions require continued Soviet backing. Gorbachev has other priorities. Castro had been pampered by Brezhnev ever since supporting the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Now he faces a more demanding and innovative leadership in the Kremlin, but one moving in a distressingly wrong direction for Castro.

Gorbachev's drive for "glasnost'," or openness; his encouragement of genuine public debate on major policy issues; his significant relaxation of censorship in the arts and letters; his release of long-time political dissidents from prison or internal exile; his call for more management autonomy from central planners; and his proposal for secret balloting in Communist Party elections—all of this has been kept practically secret from the Cuban people. And with good reason. Gorbachev's "glasnost'" goes head on against Castro's unremitting personal domination of every facet of Cuban life, of his colossal ego, and his self-appointed role as the redeemer of oppressed humanity from the scourge of capitalism and imperialism.

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